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ABSTRACT
Chapter 1 (Distance and Morality): This chapter is a response to
Frances Kamm's uFaminine Ethics: the Problem of Distance in
Morality and Singer's Ethical Theory". I argue that Kamrn fails to
produce a pair of cases in which a moral difference is present
that is not attributable to factors other than distance. I claim
that all of Kamm's pairs of cases that purportedly show that
distance per se matters in morality, and in which Kamrn's moral
intuitions seem plausible, can be subdivided into two categories:
(1) the cases are not, contrary to first appearances, properly
equalized for all non-distance factors that might reasonably be
expected to playa moral role; and (2) the cases are properly
equalized, but only in virtue of stipulations that are very hard
to believe or even fully comprehend; thus our intuitions refuse to
reflect those stipulations even if we seem to accept them. I also
.point out that Kamrn's attempts at explaining why distance could
possibly matter in morality fall far short, as she herself admits.
I conclude that there is no reason for us to believe that distance
matters in morality, and offer an explanation of why it might
nevertheless appear to us that it does - there are numerous
factors that apparently are of moral significance, and that are
normally correlated with distance. In the process, I offer a few
methodological remarks and suggestions, the importance of which, I
believe, transcends this particular discussion.
Chapter 2: (The Problem of Numbers): In t~is chapter I discuss
whether or not numbers matter in morality in the way that most
people think they do, i.e. in the way which is best exemplified by
the claim that all other things being equal, if two non-
overlapping groups of people cannot both be saved, we should save
the numerically larger group. My goal is to defend John Taurek's
criticism of the standard view of the role of numbers in morality,
and to establish Taurek's position, despite its shortcomings, as a
viable alternative to the standard view. After pointing out the
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under appreciated fact that in ~Should the Numbers Count?" Taurek
has two independent arguments for his conclusion, I proceed to
defend both arguments from some of the more prominent objections
that have been raised against them. I also discuss the role that
fairness plays in the debate. Ultimately, in light of
considerations derived from several of the objections that I
address, it becomes clear that Taurek's first argument has to be
rejected. In addition, several modifications have to be made in
Taurek's overall position in order to make it consistent and
plausible. However, the second argument, which focuses on the
claim that interpersonal aggregates of losses or suffering carry
little, if any, moral significance, and which, I argue, is a much
more powerful and illuminating argument to begin with, still
remains to challenge the standard view. But Taurek's position is
not without serious difficulties either - in the last section I
point out and try to address several problems which should be a
concern to anyone who is sympathetic to Taurek's views, including
the problem of very large numbers. I do not claim to have the
answers, and at best just offer a direction in which one may look
for a solution.
Chapter 3 (The Return of the Trolley): This chapter is about the
Trolley Problem. Very roughly and simplistically stated, the
problem is to explain why it is apparently morally permissible to
divert a runaway trolley to a track where it will kill one
innocent person rather than five, but not morally permissible to
kill an innocent healthy person in order to use his organs in
saving the lives of five others. I examine in detail several
prominent purported solutions to the problem, and find them all
severely deficient. In light of the systematic failure of efforts
to solve the Trolley Problem, I suggest that perhaps no solution
has been found because there is no solution to find - the actions
in question in the two cases fallon the same side of the moral
permissibility line. I proceed to give a positive argument for
the claim that diverting the trolley is not morally permissible,
and try to give an explanation of how the intuitions of the
majority could have been so deeply mistaken. Since my proposed
"solution" relies heavily on the alleged moral role of the
making/allowing distinction, I conclude with a discussion of that
distinction as well as a defense of its moral significance.
Thesis Supervisor: Judith Jarvis Thomson
Title: Professor of Philosophy
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DISTANCE AND MORALITY.
Section I.
An introduction to the problem.
Let's consider the following moral dilemma. Suppose that
right outside my house a driver loses control of his car and it
smashes into a lamppost. I can see that the driver is alive but
very badly injured. It seems that my course of action is clear -
I have to call an ambulance and then run out and see if I can be
of any assistance. But suppose I also know (say, from a report
I've just heard on TV) that if I do not make a phone call pledging
a small sum of money to an international relief organization in
the next 30 seconds, that organization will not be able to provide
the next food shipment to a starving village in Somalia and at
least one child will die of starvation. Suppose, furthermore,
that by the time I would be done calling an ambulance it will be
too late to save the child. What should I do? My moral
intuitions, as well as those of more or less everyone else, seem
to give a clear answer - I ought to call an ambulance. Examples
such as this have convinced many people, and among them many
philosophers, that the moral pressure1 to help is higher with
regard to events nearby than with regard to events that are
distant from liS. At the very least, it seems that ~n some cases
IMost authors in the literature use the term 'obligation'. But since
that term is possibly a loaded one and may mislead us into thinking
that we know what is behind it, I prefer to use the more vague 'moral
pressure' .
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the distance between the agent and a stranger is relevant to our
intuitions regarding how much moral pressure the agent is under to
help the stranger. That, however, creates a serious difficulty in
moral philosophy - how can we justify these intuitions? This
problem - the problem of finding a theoretical justification for
our moral intuitions to the effect that distance makes a moral
difference - has become known as the Problem of Distance in
Morality (PDM).
But, as Frances Kamm correctly points out at the beginning of
"Faminine Ethics: the Problem of Distance in Morality and Singer's
Ethical TheoryH, which constitutes a groundbreaking attempt to
analyze PDM, before we can deal with PDM we have to first
understand what it is, i.e. the problem needs to be stated
correctly. It should be immediately clear that my original
example is ridiculously insufficient to generate PDM. There are
many differences between the plight of the crashed motorist and
the relation in which I stand to that plight on the one hand, and
the plight of the starving child and the relation in which I stand
to his or her plight on the other. To name just a few: the
motorist's life is in danger because of an accident, the child's -
probably because of a "basic social injustice"; the motorist is
quite likely to be a member of my community, perhaps even a friend
of a friend, the child is definitely neither; the motorist is not
a child2 ; assisting the motorist requires no financial
expenditures on my part, assisting the child does; if I call an
2The age of a victim may matter to some people's intuitions, so I am
including this factor as well.
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ambulance, I can be relatively certain that the medical personnel
will do everything in their power to save the motorist, whereas I
cannot be as sure of what the relief organization is capable of
doing, let alone of what it would actually do; if I do not help
either the motorist or the child, the motorist will probably die
much sooner than the child; and, for all I know, maybe there would
still be time for the child to be saved somehow even if I assist
the motorist first; in some countries, I may be required by law to
assist the motorist3, but nowhere would I be required by law to
send money to a starving child in Africa, provided that the child
has no legal connection to me; and, last but certainly not least,
I am presumably in the best position out of anyone in the world to
help the motorist, especially if we assume that there are no other
houses nearby and the road is empty, whereas many other people
have heard the reports on TV and are in as good a position to help
the child as I am - that might make a moral difference even if I
am 100% certain that no one else will, in fact, help the child.
The reason why all of these factors make my example
insufficient to generate PDM is simple: the fact that our
intuitions tell us that we should help the motorist may be, and
quite probably is, caused by some or all of the differences, other
than distance from me, between the motorist's and the child's
situations, and the way I relate to them. And while it might,
should we find the need to do it, be very difficult, if not
impossible, to find a theoretical justification for the purported
3France is, I believe, an example of such a country.
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intuition that distance matters in morality, we should not have
much of a problem explaining why some of these other factors
matter in morality. To quote Kamm, "if we are trying to find out
whether a factor x matters per se in our intuitions, we must
construct a set of comparable cases, one with factor x and one
without it, and hold all other factors in the two cases constant.
I call this "equalizing the cases" "4. Karnm quite rightly points
out that none of the pairs of examples that can be found in the
literature so far, are properly equalized. She devotes a
significant portion of the remainder of her paper to trying to
produce adequately equalized pairs of examples in order to elicit
our intuitions regarding whether or not distance by itself matters
in morality. Her conclusion is that all other things being equal,
i.e. even after all other differences are filtered out, our
intuitions still leave us with the sense that we are under
stronger moral pressure to help someone who is near us than to aid
someone who is distant.
My example at the beginning of this paper was deliberately
chosen to be as poor as it is in demonstrating PDM (it is even
more inadequate than the few pre-Kamm examples found in the
literature) in order to emphasize exactly how hard it is going to
be to make all other things equal. I am going to argue that while
Karnm's requirement that the pairs of cases being considered need
to be equalized is a necessary one, she only manages to succeed
4F . M. Karnm "Faminine Ethics: the Problem of Distance in Morality and
Singer'S Ethical Theory", Singer and His Critics, ed. by Dale
Jamieson, Blackwell's 1999; p.179.
All future quotations from Kamm are from this article.
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partway. I will try to show that in all of her examples, whenever
there is a difference, as far as our moral intuitions are
concerned, between two cases, only one of which 1S a case of
nearness, the difference can be fully explained by factors other
than distance - namely, some psychological, epistemological, and,
possibly, even sociological factors that Karnm did not, or was not
able to, equalize for. Thus I will argue that at least for now we
do not have to solve the problem of distance in morality because
at this point it has not been established that we are faced with
such a problem to begin with. FinallY, I will attempt to show
just how unlikely it is that distance could possibly matter in
morality, but at the same time try to explain why we initially
tend to think that it does.
I should point out that I do not claim to be able to show
conclusively that distance doesn't matter in morality. In
particular, I agree with Karnm that if we can find at least one
case or, even better, a group of similar cases in which our moral
intuitions clearly and conclusively tell us that it is distance
and not some other factors that make the moral difference, then we
are faced with a PDM, albeit perhaps one with a very limited
scopeS. So, just generating a number of cases in which distance
SThe scope would be limited because we would only be faced with a PDM
when a particular factor or group of factors is present. Not everyone
even agrees that this is possible - it has often been argued that if a
factor is morally relevant, it is always morally relevant, even though
other morally relevant considerations may sometimes outweigh it. But
this claim is controversial - see, for instance, Shelly Kagan's "The
Additive Fallacy" in ETHICS Problems and Principles (ed. by Fischer
and Ravizza) for an argument against it. Fortunately, the bothersome
possibility that distance is morally relevant, but only sometimes,
need not concern us until and unless we are presented with at least
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does not matter, or in which we mistakenly thought that distance
mattered until we discovered the real source of our intuitions,
cannot, no matter how large the number of cases is, conclusively
establish that distance plays no role in morality and thus that
there is no PDM. However, if I am successful in showing that in
none of the cases that have been considered so far, do we have any
reason to believe that distance is doing any moral work, and if I
can give grounds for thinking that any purported example of
distance's role in morality with which we might be faced in the
future will, upon due examination, reveal the same inescapable
flaws, then, at the very least, the burden of proof shifts back to
Kamm, and others who think that distance per se matters in
morality, to show why we should believe that it does.
Section II.
Does salience matter?
After an introductory discussion, Kamm sets out to dispute
the suggestion that perhaps it is salience of need of a uv ictimn6
that generates the additional moral pressure to help in cases
where the victim is nearby, where salience of need urefers not
one situation where distance does, indeed, make a moral difference.
6Foll owing Kamrn's terminology, I am going to refer to people requiring
aid as victims, regardless of how appropriate such usage would be in
everyday discourse.
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only to the obviousness and inescapability of noticing need, but
also to the continuing imposition of this knowledge on US"7.
First, Kamm correctly points out that a victim's need can be
salient even if the victim is very far away. She suggests that
the need may become salient to us through an unusual faculty such
as long-distance vision8 • On the other side of the coin, the need
of someone suffering close by may very well not be salient.
Therefore, there certainly can't be a perfect correspondence
between proximity and salience and so it can't be the case that in
all situations where we have a difference in distance we also have
a corresponding difference in salience.
However, Kamrn still needs to show that in cases where the two
differences do coincide, it is distance and not salience that is
doing the moral work; otherwise, it could simply turn out that
distance never matters in morality, but in some cases the
coincidental difference in salience does make a moral difference.
One reason why we should be immediately suspicious of this
suggestion is that if there is a group of people suffering the
exact same plight in exactly the same way, but one of them finds a
way to make his need more salient to us or just simply to stand
out in the crowd (Kamm gives an example of one of a group of
7Karnm , p.181.
8However, for the point that Kamm is trying to make here, it doesn't
even seem to be necessary to introduce supernatural abilities - a
distant victim's plight may become salient to us in any number of
ways, e.g. a report on television or in a newspaper or a verbal
account vividly imparted by a reliable and trustworthy third party.
But more on supernatural abilities later.
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starving people dressing up in a clown suit and ~much more
dramatically exhibiting his need n9 )1 it seems inappropriate to
conclude just on the basis of that that we are under greater moral
pressure to help this particular person than to help any of the
others 1 even though the psychological pressure might be greater in
his favor. But Kamm 1 s ma1n argument against the suggestion that
salience of need can generate moral pressure is the following: it
is true that salience adds significant psychological pressure to
render aid; however 1 if there is no strong moral pressure on me to
help that is independent of the salience 1 there doesn 1 t seem to be
anything wrong with eliminating the salience - for exarnple 1 by
turning off the TV or disengaging my long-distance vision or even
taking a sleeping pill - even if it means that I will not end up
helping the victim. Let 1 s call this Intuition 1. Kamm also
presupposes a general principle 1 which I will call the
Non-Elimination Principle 1: All other things being equal 1 it
1S not morally permissible to deliberately change your situation
so as to eliminate a factor which is generating moral pressure
on you to aid someone simplylO in order to reduce or altogether
avoid that moral pressure.
Non-Elimination Principle 1 in conjunction with Intuition 1 yield
leAs Kamm points out 1 it is obviously morally permissible to change
such a factor if that is required in order to help the victim. For
instance 1 if the moral pressure on you to aid the victim of an
accident is partially generated by your being the only person who is
aware of the accident and so in a position to help, it is clearly
morally permissible for you to call an ambulance, even though once you
do you will no longer be the only person to know about the accident.
On the other hand, taking a fast-working sleeping pill to make sure
that you are no longer in a position to help does not seem to be a
morally permissible option.
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the conclusion that in cases where nothing other than salience
generates any moral pressure to aid, salience can't be generating
any moral pressure to aid either.
But that still leaves open the slim possibility that in cases
where something other than salience is already generating some
moral pressure on us to help, salience of need may bring
additional moral pressure to bear on us. After all, as Kamm
states, if there is, antecedently to any salience-related
considerations, strong moral pressure on me to help someone whose
need also happens to be salient, if eliminating the salience will
make it less likely that I will help even though I am still under
strong moral pressure to do so, it seems that it would be morally
wrong of me to eliminate the salience. Let's call this Intuition
2. But there is a better explanation available for Intuition 2
than the claim that salience can sometimes generate additional
moral pressure. That explanation is provided by another
relatively uncontroversial general principle which Kamm appears to
endorse - a principle which I will call the
Non-Elimination Principle 2: If there is genuine moral
pressure on you to help someone, it is not morally permissible
to alter any factor (even one that is purely psychological and
is not generating any of the moral pressure), the alteration of
which will make it less likely that you will helpll.
Thus, especially with the clown-suit example in mind, there
llAn exception would be a case where there 1S an even stronger moral
pressure on you to do something else that is incompatible with the
original act of aiding being considered. In that case, eliminating
the salience, and, perhaps, other psychological factors as well, might
be the only way for you to enable yourself to do what you are under
greater moral pressure to do.
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doesn't seem to be any reason to believe that salience can ever
generate moral pressure, and every reason to believe otherwise.
Karnm makes two further comments at this point, which she
believes support her contention that distance does matter in
morality. (i) She says that the fact that if we are near someone
who requires aid and whom we feel great moral pressure to assist,
it is intuitively morally wrong to move further away if it is done
simply in order to reduce the moral pressure to help, is an
additional reason for thinking that it is the nearness itself that
sometimes generates the increased moral pressure. (ii) She also
says that "another sign that I believe I have obligations to those
who are near me because they are near is that if a free device is
available that will help me detect need that is near to me, I
think I have an obligation to get it, whereas I believe I have
less obligation to get a free long-distance device in order to
know what need exists at a distance,,12.
However, if stated as general principles, I do not share
either of those intuitions, even though in certain particular
cases my intuitions might conform to those general principles. As
far as (i) is concerned, my intuitions will only coincide with
particular instances of it when whichever feature(s) of the case
is(are) generating the moral pressure on me to aid, will be
coincidentally removed by my moving further away from the victim.
That makes it question-begging to rely on the general principle as
a reason for believing that distance matters in morality. About
12Kamm , p _183 .
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(ii), at least as stated, I just don't seem to have any moral
intuitions either way except, perhaps, that I am not under much
moral pressure to obtain either device. I would probably have
intuitions regarding some particular instances of (ii), but only
if the situation were described in much more detail, with a number
of morally relevant circumstances filled in.
In, fact, I suspect it might be the case that Kamm is working
backwards here. The two generalizations might not be antecedently
and independently held moral intuitions, confirming her claims
about the role of distance in morality. Rather, these intuitions
might be the results of applying some principles similar to the
Non-Elimination Principles in conjunction with Kamm's belief that
distance matters in morality. At any rate, even if these are
Kamm's genuine moral intuitions, it is unclear what they are based
on and so they can't by themselves provide a substantial reason
for someone who doesn't share those intuitions to believe that
distance matters in morality. So, even though I believe that
Kamm's argument is conclusive in showing that salience cannot make
a moral difference, I have to disagree that she has given us a
good reason to believe that distance can. On the other hand, and
this is extremely important to the entire discussion of the
problem of distance in morality, a change in salience can
definitely give us the illusion of a change in the level of moral
pressure on us to act by changing the level of psychological
pressure that is affecting liS. Therefore, In order to be able to
judge whether or not distance ever matters in morality based on
examples, we have to make sure that, among other things, the
21
examples are equalized for salience. Otherwise, our intuitions
may simply mislead us into believing that it is distance that is
making a difference in the level of moral pressure, when in fact
there is no difference there to begin with. After all, we are
human and are all too often subject to all kinds of psychological
pressures to which we might not, in our calm and reflective
moments, choose to be subjected when faced with decisions of grave
importance, such as decisions regarding the kinds of moral
questions that are the subject of this paper.
Section III.
Supernatural abilities.
Another issue which I think affects a significant portion of
the analysis of whether or not there is a PDM is Kamm's discussion
of unusual abilities (which, in most cases, are, as I will explain
shortly, more properly classified as supernatural). Kamm claims
to have an intuition that she is morally permitted to "turn off"
her long distance vision in order to "eliminate my salient
knowledge of the far need"!3. On the other hand, if knowledge of a
near need comes via an unusual machine or sense, e.g. a machine or
sense that can detect heart beats through a wooden door, Karnrn
believes that she is not morally permitted to "ignore his plight
13 Kamm , p. 183.
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once I have found out about it or to move so I am far".14 I take
it that Kamm offers this as an additional argument for the
purported fact that distance matters in morality, because it is
not whether or not the method of finding out about the need in
question is "usual" or "unusual", but whether or not the victim is
near, that makes the moral difference. The argument is aimed
against those of us who would say that the reason we have the
intuition that it may be morally permissible for me to turn off my
long distance vision and go on with my life as usual, but not to
turn around (or close my eyes or walk further away) so as not to
see the victim with my regular vision in a putatively equalized
case, is that in the first case, but not the second, my knowledge
of the victim's plight comes Vla an unusual sense. Such a person
would, prima facie conclude that there is nothing in this web of
intuitions to support Kamm's thesis.
But now let's consider Kamm's response15 . First of all, her
choice of the adjective "unusual" both to describe a machine that
can detect heartbeats through a wooden door and to describe the
sense of long-distance vision is highly misleading. The machine
in question is unusual only in the sense that very few, if any,
people currently own one. However, there is nothing supernatural
(on a par with a time machine or a matter-energy transporter) or
14Kanun , p. 183 .
15S0 as to not be distracted from the real issue in this section, let
us ignore the fact that these cases are not equalized for many
extremely relevant factors. For instance, if someone is right outside
my door, I seem to be in the best position to help and I am likely to
be the only person to know of the victim's situation - not so, most
likely, in the long-distance vision case.
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magical (on a par with an instantaneous wish-granting machine)
about it. In fact, with a little knowledge of engineering,
programming and human biology, we would probably be able to
construct such a machine quite easily. On the other hand, long-
distance vision seems supernatural and, perhaps, even magical. An
additional reason for thinking that is given by the question of
what justifies us in classifying so-called long-distance vision as
a case of vision. If long-distance vision is to allow us to
observe events that are taking place hundreds or even thousands of
miles away, and that seems to be intended by Kamrn, it clearly
can't be just like regular vision but with an unusually large
range, as regular vision allows us neither to see through
obstacles nor to see beyond the horizon. Thus long-distance
vision would probably need to fall under the category of extra-
sensory perception or clairvoyance, but definitely not under the
category of vision16 . Also, whereas it is clear how we would use
the heartbeat detection device - it would have an on/off switch,
it would perhaps alert us if there were a heartbeat or heartbeats
within a certain distance from our door, etc. - we can't make
heads or tails of what would be involved in using long-distance
vision, how reliable and safe it would be, and so on.
This is important for at least two reasons that I can think
of. Neither of these reasons can make a difference to the actual
level of moral pressure we are under, but they can, and, I
believe, almost without fail do, affect our moral intuitions.
161 am indebted to Judith Thomson for directing my attention to this
point.
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Thus they can, so to speak, make our moral intuitions lie to us,
just as salience can. The first consideration is that of how
other people would react once they found out that I did not help
the victim. In most cases, it seems obvious that, all other
things being equal, if I both found out about the situation and
could have helped using common, garden-variety, very well
understood means, people would tend to judge me much more harshly
than if supernatural, magical, or even just highly unusual means
were involved. While this difference appears to be purely
psychological (although maybe in some cases sociological as well),
as all factors, such as the reliability of the means and the
probability of success in using them, have supposedly been
equalized for, and so cannot affect the moral pressure on me to
act, it can certainly unduly affect my moral intuitions.
And that brings us to the second, more important issue. I~
supposed to be aware of the fact that all the factors other than
the "unusualness" of the means of information and/or the means of
aiding have been equalized for. In particular, I am supposed to
be aware of the fact that in both cases the probability of
success, should I decide to help, is the s~e. However, it may
not be enough, especially if the cases become very complicated
and/or divorced from our current physical reality, to simply
stipulate that a number of factors have been equalized for. A
further step may be needed - we might have to convince our
intuition-generating faculties that the factors have really been
equalized for. Otherwise, the stipulations end up being useless,
as our intuitions do not really track the actual moral situation
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delimited by the stipulations.
For instance, if I am contemplating whether or not to act on
information received via highly unusual, perhaps even supernatural
or magical, means, or whether or not to employ equally unusual
means for the rescue, it may not be enough to just stipulate that
the means of receiving the information are just as reliable as the
usual ones and that the means of rescue are just as safe and
likely to succeed as some usual ones l7 . As a general rule, life
has taught us to be very mistrustful of the highly unusual,
especially if potentially life-threatening situations are
involved. That cannot be overcome by mere stipulation once the
situation gets complex or science-fictional enough. This is a
very significant problem, I believe, for a large part of Kamm's
analysis l and so I will come back to it and to how it appears to
be distorting some of her conclusions later.
But, in any case, the two considerations that I have just
offered provide a plausible a plausible account of the source of
Kamm's intuitions, which are the topic of this section, without
relying on the supposition that distance plays a moral role. In
fact, it is very likely that Kamm's intuitions would be greatly
affected by a shift from the use of an unusual device, such as the
I7It may be interesting to note that in the case of some unusual, and
perhaps even supernatural, machines, our intuitions may have
relatively little trouble coping. For instance, we have read and
watched so much science-fiction about matter-energy transporters and
time machines, that in hypothetical moral examples involving their
use, we might actually be taken in by an illusion that we understand
them. None of that, I think, can apply to cases of long-distance
vision as well as to a few other examples that Kamm uses and that I
will discuss later on in this paper.
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heartbeat-sensing machine, to the use of a supernatural sense,
such as clairvoyance.
Section IV.
On Kamm's new definition of distance.
Whether or not we believe that distance matters in morality,
it is important to figure out what we mean by "distance" in the
formulation of the problem. Karnm has several suggestions on the
topic. First, she claims that when figuring out the distance
between the agent and the victim, it is wrong to simply measure
the distance between "where the agent stands and where the needy
stranger stands". One reason for that is the REACH case -
Reach: "Suppose I stand in one part of India, but I have very
long arms that reach all the way to the other end of India,
allowing me to reach a child drowning in a pond at a distance".18
Karnm says that her intuitions seem to be treating this case as a
case of nearness and thus suggests that the proper measurement of
distance, as it is relevant to morality, is from the "extended
parts of the agent's body to the extended parts of the victim's
body"19. She adds that the moral pressure on you to render
assistance is only slightly decreased if the part of you that can
extend near the victim is not efficacious in aiding the victim;
IBKamm , p .186.
19Kanun , pp.186-187.
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and so in such a case the moral pressure is still significantly
greater than in a case where you don't have any parts that can
extend to the victim or any of the victim's extended parts. This
is a claim that I will come back to at the end of this section.
Kamm's first assertion may seem prima facie plausible.
Certainly Reach is morally different from
Standard: I stand in one part of India and in another part of
India there is a child drowning in a pond. In this case I don't
have extendible arms that can reach her.
But Reach and Standard are not equalized for an entire host of
factors other than the extendibility of my arms. The most
important of these factors is that if extending my arms to the
drowning child in Reach is as simple, safe and reliable as using
my arms is normally, then it seems that it is very easy, as well
as costless and safe, for me to save the child, and I can be
virtually certain that the rescue attempt would be successful. No
one would argue that such factors are irrelevant to the moral
pressure on me to save the child, but this is not the issue -
distance is what we are concerned with. Thus, to evaluate what
Kamm is saying, Standard has to be greatly modified. At the very
least, I should have the means for saving the child which are
(i) just as safe, costless, and sure to produce the desired result
as in Reach and (ii)such that I actually believe, when evaluating
the case, that the means are just as safe, costless, and sure to
produce the desired result as in Reach.
Equalizing the cases, even just to meet these two criteria, is
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already a very difficult task. As a result, modifications to
Standard might get so cumbersome that our moral intuitions will
still treat Reach differently because they will, contrary to the
newly-added stipulations, still believe the means in Reach to be
more simple, and so more reliable, safe, etc. 20 But if the cases
are properly equalized in such a way that our intuitions would
only be reacting to the morally relevant features of the pairs of
cases, rather than to the irrelevant psychological factors related
to how complicated and science-fictional the story being told In
one or both of the cases is, why on Earth would we think that the
moral pressure on me to help is greater in Reach than in modified
Standard? I can see no such reason and there don't seem to be any
offered by Kamm.
In fact, I believe that if you take at face value Kamm's
assertion that her moral intuitions react to Reach in the same
way, and for the same reasons, as to a case where the victim is
near the agent, that just shows that perhaps her intuitions were
never tracking moral differences created by varying distance, but
were tracking other factors all along. There are many factors,
changes in which normally accompany changes in how close you are
to the victim. Some of them are irrelevant to the actual moral
pressure on you to aid the victim, e.g. salience and the "what
will my neighbors say" kind of reasoning. Some, e.g. how easy it
lS to help, how likely it is that you will succeed should you try
to help, and what the chances are of somebody else's being in an
2°1 will say more about this and some related phenomena in section V.
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equally good position to help, are, it appears, morally relevant.
It seems from the preceding discussion that Kamm's intuitions in
Reach are influenced by factors in the latter grouping, rather
than by considerations of distance. That strongly suggests that
in the other cases where she believes that it is distance per se
that is influencing her intuitions, it is actually either some of
the factors in the latter group doing the moral work, or some of
the psychological factors in the former group distracting her
faculty of moral intuition from the morally relevant aspects of
the situation and thus rendering the resulting intuitions
untrustworthy.
An additional reason for thinking that Kamm is reacting to
factors other than distance in Reach can be found in the paragraph
that she devotes to cases of ~non-continuous reach". She states
in passing that it is possible that ~someone may reach to a and
all the way back of a to his centered location, but his arm may
fail to extend and stop within area a to b, so he has no reach
there. It extends and stops again within b to c. Intuitively,
there can be a point somewhere between a and b from which he is
distant, even while he is near a physically further point between
band C"21. Notice the locution ~physically further". That is the
notion with which it seems we started out at the beginning of this
endeavor - we were trying to figure out whether physical distance
mattered in determining the level of the moral pressure on us to
aid someone. And it may be worthwhile to note that before we got
21Kamm , p .187.
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to these messy complications, there was never a need to add
~physical" to "distance".
Granted, we might need to specify how exactly the distance is
to be determined for our purposes. But if we end up with a notion
of distance that is such that possibly A is far from B, C is
further from A than B, but C is not far from A, I think we are not
talking about distance any more. It seems that we are then trying
to define a more or less completely new term, say "distance'", in
such a way that the corresponding notion will automatically
contain within itself certain factors which generally affect the
level of moral pressure on us to aid needy strangers: in the Reach
case, that would be the ease and certainty with which the
assistance could be rendered. Introducing this new notion does
nothing to answer the question of whether or not we have PDM, and
it begs the question of whether or not we have PD'M - the problem
of distance' in morality, where distance' is a factor which varies
not only with distance, but also with other factors such as, for
instance, the ease with which we could render assistance.
So, it seems wrong for our purposes to define distance in the
way that Kamrn suggests. But, to stick with this topic for one
moment longer, I also want to point out just how problematic it
would be for Kamm to substitute distance' for distance. After
bringing up Reach, which she most definitely considers to be a
case of nearness, she goes on to say that she believes that in a
case where an extended part of her can reach the victim, but that
part 1S not efficacious in helping the victim, we are still
dealing with a case of nearness and thus with a case where there
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is an increased moral pressure to aid (even if the resources that
would be needed in order to assist the victim are far). It seems
to make sense that there may be great moral pressure on me to aid
the victim in Karnrn's modification of Reach, call it
Reach': This is just like Reach except my extendible arms
cannot actually do anything to help the victim, but there is a
machine in Canada that I can activate via remote control that
will somehow make the rescue happen.
However, similarly to what I've argued above about Reach, distance
(or distance') doesn't appear to have anything to do with the
level of moral pressure in question - there is simply no reason to
believe that the moral pressure on me in Reach' is greater than ln
a modification of Standard in which I have that same machine in
Canada available to me, provided, of course, that the cases are
properly and believably equalized.
But that's not the end of the difficulties. Let's make Reach'
slightly less respectable. Consider the Freak case -
Freak: I have a medical condition which, from time to time,
causes my gall bladder to temporarily extend by 1000 milesj
with time, I learned to control the effect and can actually make
one of those freak occurrences happen at will and in the
direction of my choosing.
Suppose that there is a drowning child on the other side of India,
1000 miles away from mej and suppose, quite reasonably, I think,
that gall bladders are non-efficacious in rescuing drowning
children (if they are efficacious, the example can be adjusted to
compensate). It seems ludicrous to believe that the level of
moral pressure on me to save the child, assuming that I have some
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means of doing so such as the magical machine in Canada, is in any
way affected by my ability to extend my gall bladder. In fact,
even if I had had one of those freak gall bladder occurrences
while the child was already drowning, and my gall bladder was
temporarily within 5 feet of her, I fail to see how I could have,
simply in virtue of that fact, picked up any additional moral
pressure to save her. It seems a lot more difficult than Kamm
thinks, and than it might initially appear, to get her modified
definition of distance to make sense, especially in conjunction
with the supposition that distance matters in morality.
Section V.
On different kinds of nearness and Kamm's ranking of
them.
But now let's move on to a different part of Kamm's analysis
of what determines the relevant kinds of nearness. It has to be
conceded to Kamm that there are certain cases in which, at least
initially, it seems intuitively plausible that nearness adds to
the moral pressure to aid. So far we have only discussed the
nearness of the agent to the victim. But, as Kamm correctly
points out, our intuitive prima facie reactions to these cases are
extremely similar, if not outright identical, to our reactions to
several other types of cases. These cases involve considering not
only the relative locations of the agent and the victim, but also,
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where applicable J the relative locations of the threat to the
victim, e.g. a runaway train J a hired killer, or a vial containing
a deadly virus, of the victim's means, 1.e. means that belong to
the victim and might be efficacious in aiding the victim22 , and the
agent's means, i.e. means that belong to the agent and might be
efficacious in either combating the threat while it is still far,
or in aiding the victim directly, or in retrieving or activating
some of the victim's efficacious means. This causes Kamm to
revise PDM. ~My tentative conclusion is that the PDM should be
understood as whether we can justify our intuition that we have a
greater responsibility to take care of what is going on in the
area near us or near our efficacious means, whether this involves
needy victims, threats, or means belonging to the victim".23
Of course, it is my contention that up to this point Kamrn has
not given us sufficient reason to believe that PDM exists, either
in the original or the revised form. And, furthermore, the need
for Kamm to revise the formulation of PDM does, I think, throw an
additional shadow of doubt on her contention that PDM exists.
That's because the need to include kinds of distance other than
the distance from the agent to the victim seems to further
indicate that perhaps what's doing the moral work in all purported
instances of distance's mattering in morality is factors such as
how easy it is to assist and how likely the help is to actually
22 The means may be efficacious either by removing the threat while it
is still far or by aiding the victim once the threat is already
directly acting on the victim.
23Karnrn , p .195.
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rescue the victim. And considerations like these provide a very
plausible explanation (the most plausible one, in my opinion) of
what it is that unifies all of the different kinds of alleged
nearness into a single grouping that might potentially be relevant
to moral theory. Also, with the modified definition of distance
(the one dealing with extended parts) as well as the new relevant
kinds of distance, it becomes utterly unclear how a pair of cases
can ever be equalized for everything but distance, especially for
factors such as the costliness of the attempt to help and the
certainty of its success.
But, be that as it may, this revision of PDM is interesting
both for its own sake and because I believe that looking at Kamm's
subsequent discussion in slightly more detail might help us figure
out why there is probably no PDM even though it might initially
seem otherwise. On p.195 of her article, Kamm tries to rank the
various distance factors by their contribution to the moral
pressure on the agent to render assistance. she admits that the
difference may be slight, but, in at least some of the cases, she
is certain that there is one. In particular, she is certain that"
all things not related to distance being equal (where by
'distance' I mean any of the kinds of distance mentioned above),
the importance of the distance between the agent and the victim
outweighs the importance of the distance from the agent to the
threat to the victim; as well as that the importance of the
distance from the agent to a threat outweighs the importance of
the distance from the agent to a victim's efficacious means. Kamm
also maintains that the importance of the distance from the agent
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to a victim's efficacious means ranks at about the same level as
the importance of the distance from the agent's efficacious means
to the victim. The latter claim seems to be too complicated, and
the intuitions regarding it to be too murky, for it to be of much
interest to us. But I think it may be worth our while to consider
more carefully the claim that, all things not related to distance
being equal, the importance of the distance between the agent and
the victim outweighs the importance of the distance from the agent
to the threat to the victim.
This is what Kamm has to say about it: "In one near pond,
there is a threat to a faraway victim and, in another near pond,
there is a different (unseen)24 victim. To which pond should the
agent go if one life is at stake in either choice? Perhaps to the
pond with the victim"25. But what is that intuition based on? To
try to answer that question, let me change the example a little
bit. The reason for doing this is that it's hard to come up with
a realistic and not too complicated story about a threat in a
nearby pond to a victim far away. And I as I've remarked before,
the more science-fictional and complicated the example, the harder
it is to make any sense of our intuitions about it. So, let's
consider
Threat VB. Victim: Suppose that there is an unseen and
unheard child drowning in a pond near me. Also, at the same
distance from me as the drowning child, there are railroad
tracks and a switch. If I throw the switch, one mile further
24This is inserted by Kamm ln order to equalize the two sides of the
example for salience.
25Karnrn , p .195.
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down the track the train will be diverted to a different track.
Suppose that as the train passes by, I simultaneously find out
about the drowning child and about another child of the same
age, gender, religion, nationality, etc., that is lying
incapacitated on the track. That incapacitated child is located
one mile beyond the fork and on the same track that the train,
which I find out at the same time to be a runaway train, will
be on if I don't throw the switch.
We also need a large number of additional equalizing
conditions. The children are both strangers to me and I am under
no contractual obligations of any kind to them or their families.
Neither of them is responsible for his or her plight (or,
alternatively, the two are equally responsible). Let's also
assume, to make our lives a little easier, that in this case the
death by drowning and the death by runaway train are equally quick
and equally painful. Also, let's assume that no one else can get
either to the train or to either of the children in time to save
them and that I cannot prevent both children from dying; but let's
suppose that whether I choose to save the drowning child or to
throw the switch that would divert the train, I have a 100% chance
of succeeding in saving the child I've chosen to save. And
whichever child I do not help is 100% certain to die.
Furthermore, let us suppose that I am fully aware of all of these
circumstances.
So, what are we to make of this example? Let's suppose, for
the moment, that we are tempted to agree with Kamm that our
intuitions point to its being the case that there is greater moral
pressure on me to save the drowning child? What could be making
us think that? I can suggest a number of factors, but none of
them can actually affect the moral pressure on me to save the
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drowning child, even though they can affect the psychological
pressure on me to do so. All of these reasons have to do with the
problem that I have brought up earlier, in section III - that many
of the factors that have been equalized for, were equalized by
stipulation only. The circumstances of the case suggest that
these stipulations might be false and, in fact, are highly likely
to be false, because based on our experience they are usually
false when such circumstances obtain. For instance, a factor of
major importance is that of how probable it is that my help will
actually succeed in saving the victim in question. It is
stipulated that the probability is 100% in either case. But
perhaps I feel that if I run to the pond and physically pull the
child out with my own two hands, that is by far more reliable,
especially if I know how to swim, then pulling the switch and
hoping for the best26 • of course, some people may feel the
opposite way, but that, I should think, reduces the probability of
their being inclined to agree with Kamm's conclusion. We might
26This phenomenon is much more obvious, perhaps even blatantly so, when
we start talking about putting some money in a mailbox somewhere and
being guaranteed by stipulation that the moment we do so, some
organization like Oxfam will find out about it and save a particular
starving child (Kamrn flirts with similar examples on occasion). Our
knowledge of past experiences and of some unpleasant facts about life,
makes us feel highly uncertain that we can trust any aid organization
to be either that honest or that efficient (where by efficiency I not
only mean the ability to find out about my "deposit" the moment I make
the money available and the ability to procure, deliver and distribute
the necessary amounts of food and medicine in time, but also, for
instance, the ability to protect the shipments from raiders such as
the Somali warlords or local bureaucrats). Therefore, if we have a
more commonsensically plausible and trustworthy opportunity to save
some child's life, a mere stipulation that the chances of success are
equal is not likely to be enough to truly equalize the cases for our
faculties of moral intuition.
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want to equalize the two options in our example even further by
making the activation of a machine that is certain to rescue the
drowning child the only way that the child can be saved. But here
we would have to be careful. This might actually tip the balance
of our moral intuitions in favor of saving the child on the
railroad tracks, as based on our experience railroad switches are
very likely to be much more reliable than science-fictional
devices such as the child-scooping machines that figure in several
of Kamm's examples, some of which we will discuss in just a few
pages.
Another important issue is the certainty of the death of the
child on the railroad tracks if I don't throw the switch. It is
stipulated that the probability of death in that eventuality is
100%. But do we really believe it when we are evaluating what our
intuitions tell us about the case? It is very difficult in
general, I think, for human beings to comprehend absolute
certainties, especially in complicated situations, and especially
when the outcome in question is as mind-bogglingly horrible as a
helpless child's being torn to pieces by a runaway train. All
stipulations aside, there is always irrational hope that someone
else might stumble upon the child in the time that it takes for
the train to get there, or, when all else fails, we can always
hope for an "act of God" to stop the train. I think in most cases
which are equalized for the basic physical factors and in which we
are greatly tempted to go for the near victim rather than a near
threat, it is these kinds of hope that are the cause. It is,
however, I believe, possible to equalize the two options in the
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example for that factor as well. We simply build into our example
the clause that if I assist neither child they will die at the
same time - that should even equalize for such an irrational
factor as the hope for an act of God27 •
I am sure that there are other psychological issues, related
to the stipulations that are needed in order to equalize the
options, that create similar difficulties and that I have not
considered. But I think the ones I have brought up are already
more than sufficient in order to make my point. Once the factual
equalization of the options is carried out and a number of
psychological problems are discovered and equalized for, we end up
with an extremely complicated example that probably borders on, or
even crosses over into, the realm of science fiction. At that
point, if it still seems that our intuitions tell us to go for the
victim and not for the threat, it seems that the only explanation
is that the result as a whole is too complicated for our faculties
of moral intuition to grasp, because there just doesn't appear to
be any reason why the moral pressure could actually be different.
I think there are only two options - either the example is still
"graspable" in the relevant sense, in which case we can't avoid
the conclusion that the moral pressure pulling me in one direction
is equal to the one pulling me in the opposite direction, or we
have a plausible error theory for why our moral intuitions are, in
27 In "Whatever the Consequences" (1966), Jonathan Bennett aptly
describes the tendency to think of outcomes that are stipulated to be
certain as increasingly uncertain in direct proportion to the amount
of time that remains until the outcomes take place as "perhaps
encouraged by an eccentric view of God as powerful but slowH •
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a manner of speaking, lying to us.
There appears to be no justification for Kamm's conclusion
that in a properly equalized case there is greater moral pressure
to save a nearby victim than to eliminate a nearby threat to a
faraway victim, even though there might, conceivably, be
psychological grounds for saying that it will seem to many of us
that the moral pressure to save a nearby victim is greater. The
main reason for this is that, as I've argued a bit earlier, even
if all the factors other than distance are equalized for, the
illusion of those or even, perhaps, other differences can still
remain to skew our intuitions and lead them astray. So, the
examples really don't tell us what Kamm argues they do.
The same problem plagues Kamm's examples which are supposed to
illustrate the very existence of PDM. If proper moral intuitions
were the outputs of a computer algorithm, the facts of the example
being the inputs, then, of course, no equalization beyond the
factual one could possibly be required in order to determine
whether or not distance matters in a particular case. But since
the examples have to be subjected to the human test, a '\conceptual
equalization" is also required: the example has to make our
faculties of moral intuition believe that the facts are truly
equalized. And that is an extremely hard, if not impossible,
thing to do considering the level of complexity that is required
to factually equalize the cases, in conjunction with the fact that
a change in distance is usually accompanied by other changes that
definitely do affect the moral pressure on us to aid - which ~s
the reason why it initially seems so plausible to us that distance
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matters in morality in the first place. We can see this
illustrated yet again by taking a look at one of the examples Kamm
offers at the beginning of her article 1n order to demonstrate
that intuitively distance does matter. Let's consider Kamm's
Near/Far case -
Near/Far: "I learn that in a distant part of a foreign
country that I am visiting, a child is drowning and someone is
near him. Either one of us could as successfully help by
depositing $500 in a device that will trigger a machine that
will scoop the child out. Who has a stronger obligation to
help" ?28
I am choosing this example because I think it is a very good test
case for determining what our intuitions are, that also lets us
look at the problem from a slightly different angle because only
one victim is involved.
I may be willing to concede to Karnm that prima facie it may
seem to some that the moral pressure on the person who is closer
to the child (let's call him Mike) to save her is greater than the
moral pressure on me to do so. But this example is not properly
equalized, so let me modify it a little. Suppose, first of all,
that not only I, but Mike as well, cannot personally participate
in the rescue or even observe it. Also, let us suppose that there
is only one child-scooping machine and it is located at an equal
distance from me and Mike. We can both get to it in an equal
amount of time and activate it so that it can rescue the child
before it is too late. The reason why I think there should be
only one child-scooping machine is similar to the one I offered 1n
28Karom , p .179.
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footnote 26. If there is one machine near me (and thus quite
distant from the drowning child) and one near Mike (and thus very
near the child), it has to be purely a matter of stipulation that
the insertion of the money into one of the machines lS equally
likely to lead to that machine's rescuing the child in time J
regardless of which machine it is. I think it is enough of a
strain on our faculties of moral intuition to be dealing with
child-scooping devices in the first place. To also endow such
machines with the ability to almost instantaneous transport
themselves across vast distances J in a way which we are to believe
is as certain to be speedy and successful from very far away as
from just a few feet away, is, perhaps, too much to ask.
So now, if we also add to our modifications of Near/Far that
both I and Mike found out about the plight of the child in the
same way - in particular, that neither of us can either see or
hear her - and thus we eliminate the possibility of salience
making it just seem that there is greater moral pressure on Mike
to activate the machine, why on Earth should anyone even be
tempted to think that either one of us is under greater moral
pressure than the other to aid the child29 ? I believe that the
Near/Far case is rather unique in that even though it seems
initially that distance matters in this case, it is apparently
possible to come up with an equalized modification of it without
making the example so complex that upon due reflection we still
29 0 f course, some further conditions have to be introduced, such as
that the child is a stranger to both me and Mike, that neither of us
has a duty (e.g., by contract) to help the child, etc.
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can't trust our moral intuitions30 • Thus it looks as if in this
case we can actually observe happening what I am arguing is going
on in everyone of Karnm's examples.
Section VI.
A few more of Kamm's arguments for PDM addressed.
Having, I believe, produced a satisfactory discussion of
Karnm's examples which are supposed to provide a direct argument
for the existence of PDM, I would like to address in this section
a second category of examples. They form the basis for what I
will call ~indirect" arguments for the existence of PDM. In these
examples, Karnm argues, we find it difficult, if not impossible, to
explain our moral intuitions unless we assume that distance does,
indeed, matter in morality. I will try to show that it is not
necessary to make that assumption in order to explain what's going
on in these cases.
All three of the examples that I am going to discuss in this
section are borrowed by Karnm from Peter Unger.
consider
First, let's
30In this case there are two potential agents and only one victim; but
obviously a case in which I can by an immediate phone call save either
a nearby child or a far away child (both of which are in an identical
predicament), but not both of them, can be analyzed in a completely
analogous fashion to reach an analogous conclusion.
44
Oxfam: "Someone who has already given a lot to Oxfam feels
morally free to refuse to respond to another request for life-
saving aid. The same person, however, does not feel that simply
because he has already given a lot to Oxfam, he may refuse
services to a person he meets on the road who needs life-saving
help,,31.
Kamm goes on to add that "since Unger denies the significance of
distance, he concludes that one cannot refuse the additional Oxfam
request for aid to distant lands any more than one can refuse the
person on the road,,32. But that conclusion appears to be blatantly
counterintuitive, prompting Kamm to give her own explanation of
what's going on in this case. Her evaluation of the example rests
on the assumption that as compared to the moral pressure to aid
someone who you find on the side of the road, there is in the
first place a much lesser, if any, moral pressure on one to give
money to Oxfam, or any other organization that claims to aid
starving people at a great distance. Whatever moral pressure
there may have been to begin with, has been lifted from the agent
in the example by virtue of his having given a lot to Oxfam in the
past. The moral pressure on the agent to aid someone near, e.g.
someone he notices on the side of the road as he is driving by, is
much stronger and of a different nature. Thus, the agent's prior
history with Oxfam cannot have any bearing on the moral pressure
on him to aid the near individual.
Karnm's account seems perfectly reasonable provided that
distance does, indeed, matter in morality. However, that account
is completely unnecessary in this case in order to explain what is
31Karnm , p .185.
32Karnm , p .185.
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going on and show that Unger's conclusion is utterly unjustified.
The reason is the same oversight for which Kamm criticizes Unger,
Singer and others at the beginning of her article - the two
alternative situations in the example are atrociously unequalized.
They vary with regard to a large number of factors, with many of
those, even considered individually, being sufficient to show that
Unger's conclusion is either unwarranted or just plain wrong.
Among those factors are the availability of other sources of aid,
the certainty of the help/s reaching the victim, whether or not
the victim belongs to the same community as the agent, and whether
or not the victim's need is the result of some much wider social
or political problems, as well as probably many others. There 1.S
also the issue of salience of need, which, even though it does not
affect the moral pressure to aid, may have made it seem to us that
the moral pressure to help a person you see on the side of the
road is greater than the moral pressure to give to Oxfam even if
that were not, in fact, the case. But that is irrelevant to
showing that Unger is wrong in saying that the moral pressure on
the agent in the two situations is actually equal. At any rate,
it is, I think, obvious by now that it is not necessary to assume
anything about the role of distance in morality in order to avoid
Unger's counterintuitive conclusion.
The second example deals with so-called futility thinking,
which in many cases seems to keep people from aiding those in
need. Futility thinking is "the tendency to not help anyone if
one cannot help a significant portion of those who need
help ... Unger says that the case in which I can definitely save the
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only person near me who is drowning is not a case in which I can
take care of Uthe whole problem", any more than I do when I save a
few of those doomed by starvation in distant Africa"33. Kamm
suggests that the reason futility thinking doesn't seem to affect
us in the case of a single person drowning nearby, is because we
are under much stronger moral pressure to help a person who 1S
near than to help the people who might be drowning very far away
from us at the same time, and so uwhen I take care of the only
person near me who needs aid, I think I have completely dealt with
a problem"34.
Unger, on the other hand, believes that the solution lies in
an appeal to salience, i.e. that in some cases, like the case of
one drowning man nearby, salience helps overcome futility
thinking. However, I even fail to see this as a relevant problem.
Futility thinking, just as salience, is a purely psychological
phenomenon. Unger, at least according to Karnm's account of his
views, believes that salience can actually affect the moral
pressure on us to aid and not just the psychological pressure to
do so. Therefore, he might similarly believe that futility
thinking can affect the moral pressure to aid as well, which is
probably what causes him to raise this puzzle in the first place.
Karnm, however, has successfully argued that salience by itself
cannot have any effect on the moral pressure to aid. And, in
light of that argument, it is unclear how futility thinking can be
any different in that respect.
33Kamm , p .185.
34Karnm , p .186.
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So, for Karnm this puzzle has to be
a non-problem, as it is for anyone who agrees with her argument
regarding salience.
As far as Unger is concerned, however, I believe he is
partially right. I think that while futility thinking does not
actually affect the moral pressure on us to aid, it can make it
seem that the moral pressure is smaller than it actually is. But
in cases where the victim's need is very salient, salience can
play the opposite role by counterbalancing futility thinking to
restore the level of moral pressure felt to about the level at
which the moral pressure actually is. In any case, there is no
need for the alleged moral relevance of distance to play any role
in the discussion of this Unger puzzle.
The third example involves a pair of cases in which an agent
comes to the rescue of a victim or victims using a third party's
means:
Yacht: ~An agent takes a boat that belongs to another to help
someone near him. The rescue will result in a million dollars
of damage to the boat for which he cannot cornpensate. u35
and
Account: ~A delivery boy to the office of a rich person can
do a computer transfer of funds from his account to Unicef'su 36 .
To make things a little clearer and somewhat more equalized, let's
add that in Yacht, as well as in Account, lives of strangers (both
to the agents and to the people whose resources are used) are at
35Kamm, p .191.
36Kanun , p .192.
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stake, and, in fact, that the number of lives in the balance lS
equal. Also, let us suppose that the amount of the transfer in
Account is one million dollars. Unger concludes that the two
cases are morally equivalent, i.e. that the actions of the agent
in Yacht are morally no better or worse than the actions of the
agent in Account. However, as Kamm points out, that just doesn't
seem to be the case. Our intuitions appear to be clearly telling
us that the actions of .the agent in Yacht are morally permissible,
while those of the agent in Account are not, or, at the very
least, if both actions are somewhat wrong, that the one in Yacht
lS much less so.
Kamm's explanation quite predictably relies on her views about
distance. She points out that in Yacht, even though the owner of
the yacht is not near the victims, the owner's means that are
efficacious in aiding the victims, i.e. the yacht, are near the
victims. In Account, on the other hand, neither the owner of the
money nor any efficacious means (including the rnoney)37 belonging
to him are near the victims; and, for that matter, the agent in
Account is not near the victims either. Therefore, Kamm concludes
that "in Yacht, when I take the yacht to help someone, I am
carrying out someone else's duty for him, based on either his
nearness or the nearness of his property. In Account, I cannot
37For simplicity's sake, let's forego the sticky discussion of whether
or not someone's money is near if an ATM from which the money could be
withdrawn is near, which could make it the case that a very large
proportion of the money in the world is near all kinds of victims,
threats and efficacious means; creating, on Kamm's view of the role of
distance in morality, an unbearable burden of additional moral
pressure to aid numerous physically distant strangers.
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say I am enforcing an owner's obligation to a victim if nearness
is a ground for obligation. "38 Thus, she believes, the actions of
the agent in Yacht, even if not completely Kosher, are on a much
more solid moral footing than those of the agent in Account.
Let's assume for the duration of this discussion that it makes
perfect sense to talk about ~carrying out someone else's duty for
him" . That makes Kamm's suggestion a candidate for a good
explanation of our intuitions regarding Yacht and Account. So the
question is: can we explain what's going on in these two cases
without relying on the assumption that distance matters in
morality? If we can, we deprive Kamm of yet another indirect
argument for the existence of PDM.
First, I want to suggest a reason why it might seem to us that
Yacht and Account are not morally equivalent even if, in fact,
they are. Whenever an agent "volunteers" someone else's resources
to help a third party, we are usually more inclined to be
understanding or forgiving if the agent, so to speak, brings
something to the rescue as well. In Yacht, the agent not only
borrows the boat, but presumably conducts the actual rescue which,
for all we know, might be very difficult or even dangerous. The
agent in Account, on the other hand, contributes nothing besides
someone else's money39 - the actual assistance is rendered by
Unicef. I don't see how this could affect the actual moral
permissibility of the two actions in question, but it is
38Karnm , p. 192 .
39Unless we are willing to take into consideration the dubious
contribution of risking being arrested for his actions.
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definitely a psychological factor that can, and I believe does,
skew our moral intuitions somewhat in favor of the agent in Yacht
and against the agent in Account.
But let's assume that not only does it seem that the actions
of the agent in Yacht are less wrong than the actions of the agent
in Account, but that they actually are. In that case the
explanation comes from Karnm herself. She points out that Account
and Yacht are not equalized for a wide variety of relevant
factors. Mostly these include all the usual suspects that have
come up many times before, e.g. the availability of other sources
of aid, the probability of success, etc., etc., and so I will not
discuss them in detail here. I do want to add that in this case
even salience might indirectly play a moral and not just a
psychological role. That's because we are missing a story on what
exactly is relevant in determining the moral permissibility of
"carrying out someone else's duty for him u • For all we know, not
only might the level of the moral pressure on the owner of the
resource to make that resource available be a relevant factor, but
perhaps whether or not a reasonable person in the owner's place
would want to make the resource available is morally relevant as
well - after all, the resource does belong to him. And for
determining the latter, salience may, indeed, be of some
importance.
Kamm believes that even if the cases are properly equalized
for everything but distance, the actions of the agent in Account
will only become as morally permissible as those of the agent in
Yacht, if, in addition, the victims in Account are close to either
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the agent or the money or, preferably, both. But if we didn't
believe Kamm's argument for a similar conclusion in Near/Far and
other cases discussed in this paper so far, why should we accept
it here? I believe, for the same reasons as in the earlier cases,
that there are no grounds whatsoever to suspect that if Yacht and
Account are properly equalized for everything but distance, any
moral difference between the two cases will remain. Thus if one
doesn't find Karnrn's direct arguments for the role of distance in
morality convincing, one cannot find her indirect arguments, i.e.
the arguments from the alleged indispensability of the role of
distance in morality for explaining certain moral facts, even the
least bit compelling.
Section VII.
Some final thoughts on the subject.
Previous sections seem to conclusively show that Kamm has
failed to provide us with any examples which directly or
indirectly establish that distance matters in morality. This, of
course, as I stated in section I, does not prove that distance
does not matter in morality; for if even one uncontroversial
example can be found where distance does matter, the thesis that
distance per 5e never matters in morality would be wrong, which
would perhaps imply that distance only matters when one or several
other factors are present. It is clearly not an option to simply
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go through all the possible examples one by one and show that
distance matters in none of them. However, the burden of proof is
squarely back on Kamm and anyone else who supports her view. And,
in light of the discussion above, it is virtually unfathomable
that there could be an example purporting to establish that
distance matters in morality, which is not instantly defeasible,
let alone one that is uncontroversial and conclusive.
There is also an additional reason for believing that distance
does not matter in morality. It is inevitable that there be some
truths which require no explanation and, in fact, are incapable of
having one. After all, explanations do have to end somewhere, and
every discipline needs a starting point. Arguably, one such
axiomatic fact is that pain and suffering, as well as death, of
sentient beings are morally significant. But it defies belief
that it could be a brute inexplicable fact about morality that
distance per se, of any of the kinds discussed in sections IV and
V of this paper, affects the level of moral pressure on a person
to help a stranger in need. Thus it seems that if there is a PDM,
there better be a plausible solution to it - some sort of an
explanation, derived from more basic, perhaps even brute, moral
facts, of how and why distance in itself can possibly make a moral
difference.
Even if there were more or less conclusive examples that
appeared to show that distance matters in morality, one might have
found the prospect of acknowledging this as a brute fact so
unpalatable as to consider rejecting the underlying moral
intuitions should the search for an explanation turn out to be
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fruitless. But in the absence of conclusive examples, it seems to
go without saying that anyone who believes that distance plays a
role in morality better have one hell of a strong theoretical
argument to back up that claim. That makes it doubly important,
not only for the sake of solving the PDM, if it exists, but also
to establish the very possibility of its existence, to investigate
the question of whether or not a role for distance in morality can
be justified.
Since Karnm believes that we are faced with PDM, she makes an
effort at the end of her paper to give an explanation for why
distance might matter in morality. But she herself finds that her
best attempts leave a lot to be desired. First, she says that
perhaps, in order to keep our moral duties manageable, there
exists "the need to set limits to our duty to aid strangers; being
responsible in accord with proximity is a way to set these
limits"40. But she immediately admits that this way of limiting
responsibility is too arbitrary to be justifiable, as other ways
of imposing such limits are certainly available - for one thing,
it is also the case that "if Asian Indians were [only] responsible
for helping those in East Hampton, New York, they would have less
strenuous obligations"41. Also, even setting aside the
arbitrariness objection for the moment, this explanation of the
role of distance in morality would imply that "proximity matters
as a heuristic device that correlates with morally significant
40Kamm , p .198.
41Karrun , p _198 .
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factors, though it itself is not morally significant ff42 • Thus
there would not be a direct role for distance in morality after
all.
Kamrn's second attempt at an explanation is only slightly more
plausible. The suggestion is that "it is commonly thought that
one has a moral prerogative to give greater weight to one's own
interests rather than giving equal weight to oneself and to
others ... but possibly, if one takes advantage of the option of
giving greater weight to oneself and what one cares about, there
is an associated duty, the flip side of the prerogative, generated
from the perspective on life which leads to the prerogative, to
take care of what is associated with oneself: for example, the
area near one"43. But, as Kamm herself points out, giving greater
weight to one's own interests is at most "a permissible option,
not a duty"44. So, accepting this explanation of the role of
distance in morality would lead us to the wildly implausible
conclusion that whether or not distance matters in morality is
agent-relative, i.e. it depends on whether or not the agent
chooses to give greater weight to his own interests. So, in
effect, each agent would get to choose whether or not distance
would matter in morality for him, which seems like an extremely
unattractive feature for an ethical theory to have.
As a result, I think it is clear that we do not at this
point have even a hint at a satisfactory explanation of the
42Karnrn , p. 198 .
43Kamm , p. 200 .
44Kamm , p.200.
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purported role of distance in morality. Thus, we currently have
no reason of any kind to believe that distance actually matters in
morality or that we are, in fact, faced with PDM. On the
contrary, we have compelling reasons to think that neither is the
case.
So, why would someone be initially tempted to believe that
distance matters in morality in the first place? It seems
obvious, based on the cases which we have looked at in the course
of this paper, that distance ~s very strongly correlated with a
large number of factors that do make a moral difference, e.g. the
cost of aiding, the probability of success in aiding, and also,
quite often, the availability of alternative sources of aid. It
is very important to note, however, that the correlation is
imperfect - for anyone of these factors, usually correlated with
distance, it is possible to greatly vary distance without varying
that factor. Thus it is not the case that distance can somehow be
morally analyzed into a combination of some of these factors,
which would, after all, have meant that distance matters in
morality. Distance is also somewhat correlated with certain
psychological factors, e.g. salience, which, even though they do
not make a moral difference, do tend to influence our moral
intuitions, not to mention our actions. So, perhaps Kamrn hit the
nail squarely, on the head while discrediting one of her own
suggestions - to quote the statement once again, "proximity
matters as a heuristic device that correlates with morally
significant factors, though it itself is not morally
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significant,,45.
In fact, as we have seen during our attempts to equalize the
cases we've examined for everything but distance, such equalizing
is an extremely difficult task and the outcome usually ends up
being complicated and at least slightly science-fictional. In
real life, where all factors other than distance are extremely
rarely, probably even never, equalized, it is indeed a very useful
rule of thumb that the moral pressure on an agent to help a
stranger usually increases with an increase in proximity. But it
is nothing more than a rule of thumb, made useful only by the fact
that a change in distance is usually, but not always and certainly
not necessarily, accompanied by changes in morally relevant
factors. It looks like we now have a very plausible explanation
both of why distance does not matter in morality and of why it is
quite reasonable that we would, prima facie, assume the contrary46.
45Kamm , p .198.
46 In the example on the first page of this paper, for instance, in
which it seems clear that I ought to call an ambulance to aid the
injured motorist rather than phone an international relief
organization, I think it is by now clear, in light of my discussion in
the preceding few sections, that should we be able to equalize the
options for everything but distance without treading too far in the
realm of science fiction, we should expect the moral pressure on me to
help the motorist to be equal to the moral pressure on me to save the
starving child. I do not, at this point, wish to hazard a guess or an
argument on the very interesting, though treacherous, topic of which
of the factors listed in section I, that are not equalized for in the
original case, make a more significant moral difference, especially in
light of objections brought by Unger, Singer, and some others against
the moral relevance of some of these factors. This topic I will leave
for a different discussion. In the meantime, the fact that we have
every reason to expect equal moral pressure in an equalized case,
should, in conjunction with there being no theoretical explanation in
the offing for how distance could possibly matter in morality, be more
than sufficient to conclude that there is no PDM.
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Finally, there is one last issue that I would like to address.
There seems to be a purely theoretical reason why Kamm wants it to
turn out that distance matters in morality. In several places
over the course of her article she expresses concern about a
particular type of cases - an example of which is a case where you
have a fixed amount of resources which you can use either to save
a large number of people who are very far away, e.g. 100 starving
strangers in Africa, or to save one stranger nearby, e.g. a
homeless person ~livingn on your street. Kamm is concerned that
if distance doesn't matter in morality, it will turn out to be the
case that you are under much greater moral pressure, or, even
worse, perhaps morally required, to aid the 100 people far away.
Kamm quite rightly finds that conclusion troubling, both
theoretically and practically, as well as somewhat
counterintuitive. The conclusion is especially disconcerting
because unlike most, if not all, of the other examples that have
been discussed, this 1S a dilemma that does occur quite often in
real life.
I have two suggestions in response to this difficulty. First,
if the alternatives are properly equalized for all factors other
than distance and the number of needy strangers, the conclusion
might begin to seem somewhat less counterintuitive and
disturbing. 47 Second, even if the problem still remains 1n an
470 f course, we also need, as usual, to keep in mind that the
alternatives should be equalized not only factually, but conceptually
as well, i.e. in such a way as to make the putative equalization
palatable to our moral-intuition-generating faculties. Otherwise, the
moral conclusion under discussion might very well be correct, but
still seem counterintuitive and disturbing.
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equalized example, there may be a solution that has nothing to do
with distance. It is possible that what we should do in order to
rid ourselves of the unpleasant consequences of the purported
moral fact that we should help the much greater number of distant
strangers, is not to assume that distance does, in fact, matter in
morality, but to argue that the number of the strangers involved
does not. But that is the topic of the next chapter.
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-Chapter 2-
The Problem of Numbers
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THE PROBLEM OF NUMBERS.
Section I.
Introduction to the problem.
Ask any reasonable person whether or not it is morally
permissible to kill a randomly chosen innocent healthy man in
order to use his organs for transplants that will save five
others, and you will hear that it most certainly is not. This is
the classical Transplant case. The example is usually brought up
to elicit strong intuitions which indicate that it is not morally
permissible to kill in order to bring about what would otherwise
be considered a preferable outcome. But there is a very important
question concealed here that usually goes completely unnoticed -
is the state of affairs in which five people's lives are spared
really a better one than, and morally preferable to, the state of
affairs in which one person survives a deadly threat, but the five
do not?
In Transplant, the number of people who are ln urgent need of
organs is stipulated to be five partly in order to evoke our
intuitions more clearly. After all, if it is morally wrong to
kill one innocent person to prevent five others from dying, surely
it is wrong to do so just to prevent one person from dying. But,
on the other hand, it is usually assumed without argument that the
converse is not necessarily true, i.e. that it does not have to be
the case that something that is morally impermissible if done to
save just one life is morally impermissible if it is done to save
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many more lives. This assumption seems to be strongly supported
by the fact that virtually everyone who believes that we are
morally permitted to divert a deadly threat from five innocent
people to one equally innocent person, would not feel the same way
if instead he were considering the possibility of diverting a
deadly threat from just one innocent person to an equally innocent
person. And no one in their right mind would suggest that, all
other things being equal, it is morally permissible to divert a
deadly threat from one person to five people.
But should we accept these intuitions? There is great room
for discomfort if we do. It seems that in allowing the number of
people involved to count as a moral factor, and a factor of great
force at that, we are apparently ignoring the people in question
as individuals, especially the people that form the smaller group.
Also, as Taurek suggests in "Should the Numbers Count?", by
allowing the numbers to matter in morality we are treating human
beings as objects: each one has a certain value to us, and In
deciding which group of people should be saved we follow the same
procedure we would follow if we had to decide which group of
objects to keep - we add up the individual values of each object
in a group and keep the group for which the resulting sum is
greaterl . In addition, the standard Vlew that numbers should
count turns out, upon closer examination, to be much harder to
justify than it might appear at first glance. These issues cause
some people, John Taurek and myself included, enough discomfort to
lIn cases where people are involved, we can just multiply the number of
people in a group by a unit.
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seriously entertain the suggestion that perhaps numbers should not
playa role ~n moral considerations or, at the very least, that
they should not play the role they are usually taken to play.
In this paper I will investigate the question of whether or
not numbers matter in morality. I will begin by summarizing
Taurek's arguments for the conclusion that they do not. I will
then proceed to address several major objections that have been
raised against Taurek's arguments and position. I will also
discuss the role that the notion of fairness plays in Taurek's
account. Finally, I will raise a few difficult problems for
Taurek's conclusion, to which I do not believe that I have an
entirely satisfactory response. I am sympathetic to Taurek's
view, but, due to the complexity of the problem and the numerous
difficulties that his account clearly faces, it will not be the
goal of this paper to demonstrate the correctness of Taurek's
conclusions. The most I can hope for is to establish his position
as a viable alternative to the standard view of the role of
numbers in morality - an alternative that addresses some of the
concerns created by the standard view. This will not be an easy
task, but it is a task that I believe to be worthwhile.
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Section II.
Taurek's Arguments.
Subsection 1: A Few Preliminary Thoughts.
In this section I will layout Taurek's arguments for the
conclusion that the relative sizes of two non-overlapping groups
of people do not, all other things being equal, playa role in
determining which of the two groups ought to be saved from a fatal
threat. It is extremely important to realize that in "Should the
Numbers Count?# Taurek has two independent lines of argument for
his main conclusion. Many philosophers seem to miss this point
and thus appear to falsely believe that undermining just one of
Taurek's lines of argument is sufficient to uphold the standard
view of the role of numbers in morality. In subsection 2, I will
state what I subsequently call Taurek's First Argument. In
subsection 3 I will present Taurek's Second Argument. But first -
several important preliminary points.
Taurek focuses on a group of cases where an agent can prevent
some harms from befalling one, but not both, of two non-
overlapping groups of people. In particular, Taurek considers
several cases where the agent has to decide between sparing one
person a certain harm and sparing five different people a similar
harm. We are to assume in all of these hypothetical situations
that there are no special considerations involved that should
influence the moral predicament that the agent is in. For
instance, it is not the case that the agent is somehow responsible
for the fact that some or all of the people involved are under the
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threat of suffering the harm in question. It is also not the case
that the agent has any contractual or quasi-contractual
obligations towards some of the people involved to protect them,
either from harm in general or from the immediate threat they are
faced with in particular.
The category of situations involving quasi-contractual, i.e.
implied rather than explicitly contracted, obligations should
definitely cover cases which feature such phenomena as the doctor-
patient relationship and the parent-child relationship, as well as
perhaps a few other familial relationships, probably including the
one between spouses. Some people might also be inclined to
include friendship in this list, but let/s assume for the purposes
of the discussion that is to follow that friendship does not
generate any quasi-contractual obligations.
Taurek also wants his examples not to be influenced by
considerations which might make one or more of the people involved
more or less "valuable" than the others, e.g. the fact that one
(or more) of the people involved is (are) on the verge of
discovering the cure for some horrible disease, or the fact that
some of them are "driveling old people" or "idiot infants, loved
by no one". The list of these special considerations is open-
ended, but that shouldn't be a problem for us, as from the partial
list above it is already clear what we are after. In order to
examine the role of numbers in morality we want to only look at
cases which will be untainted by other considerations that might
turn out to be morally relevant and thus tip the moral balance in
favor of one of the groups for reasons unrelated to the relative
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sizes of the groups.
Subsection 2: Taurek's First Argument.
We are now ready to take a look at some specific examples. First
let's consider
First Person: The agent (let's call him David) has a supply
of some life-saving drug. Unless he takes all of it, he will
die. However, if he takes the drug, five other people, all
strangers to him, each of which would require just one fifth of
the drug in order to survive, will die.
Surely, Taurek says, it is morally permissible for David to keep
all of the drug for himself. After all, the drug belongs to him
and he is, by assumption, under no contractual or quasi-
contractual obligation to relinquish the drug to the other five
people. Those five have no right to the drug and so, should they
not receive it, cannot complain that their rights have been
violatedZ. Also, Taurek asks, how could it not be morally
permissible for David to keep the drug for himself? Some might be
tempted to say that by giving up the drug to the five strangers,
and consequently dying, David would prevent a much worse outcome
from occurring. But, Taurek responds, that claim is unjustified.
ZAs I will discuss later on, while this claim itself is unproblematic,
it might not have the consequences that Taurek is looking for.
Certainly, if David is under no contractual or quasi-contractual
obligation to relinquish something that belongs to him, he has the
right to keep it for himself and, most likely, he would violate no
one's rights in the process. However, that may be compatible with its
being the case that it would be morally wrong for David to hold on to
his possession. On this view, Taurek lacks a conclusive argument for
his judgment regarding the First Person case. However, he can simply
resort to basing it on a moral intuition, which, after all, is shared
by the majority of humankind; this will be discussed in a lot more
detail in section IV.
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While it is certainly better for each of the five strangers that
they should get the drug and survive, it is better for David if he
keeps the drug for himself and survives. In what sense could it
be just plain worse, "not necessarily for anyone in particular, or
relative to anyone's particular ends, but just a worse thing in
itself"3 that the five strangers rather than David die?4
Taurek also claims that if outcome A is better than outcome B,
but you express a preference for B over A, that appears to have
bad implications for your moral character, as "it is a moral
shortcoming not to prefer what is admittedly in itself a better
thing to what is in itself a worse thing"5. But it just doesn't
seem right to Taurek to say that David is morally deficient for
not preferring his own death to the deaths of the five strangers.
Now let's consider the Friend case.
Friend: I have a dose of the drug: it belongs to me and I am
under no contractual or quasi-contractual obligation to give it
to anyone. I can either give the entire dose to David, someone
who I "know and like", which will save his life, or give a fifth
of the dose to each of five strangers, thus saving all five of
them. I cannot save both David and the five strangers.
Taurek argues that it is morally permissible for me to save
3John Taurek "Should the Numbers Count?", ETHICS Problems and
Principles, ed. by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich College Publishers 1992, p.220;
All future quotations from Taurek are from this article.
4This is an extremely important and underrated question, which also
lies at the heart of Taurek's Second Argument.
STaurek, p.221.
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David. 6 First, he points out that, as in the previous case,
nobody's rights can be violated by my giving the drug to David.
Second, Taurek argues, if it is not morally impermissible for
David to keep the drug for himself in First Person, it cannot be
the case that it is not permissible for me to give David the drug
in Friend. Here Taurek relies on a general principle, which I
will dub the
Non-Relativity Principle: ~if it would be morally permissible
for B to choose to spare himself a certain loss, HI instead of
sparing another person, C, a loss, H', in a situation where he
cannot spare C and himself as well, then it must be permissible
for someone else, not under any relevant obligations to the
contrary, to take B's perspective, that is, to choose to secure
the outcome most favorable to B instead of the outcome most
favorable to C, if he cannot secure what would be best for
each" .7
In Taurek's opinion, if there are grounds for its being the case
that I am morally required to give the drug to the five rather
than to David in Friend, those grounds would also be sufficient to
generate a moral requirement that David give away the drug in
First Person. Thus, since Taurek is assuming that it is morally
permissible for David to keep the drug for himself in First
Person, it appears to follow that it is morally permissible for me
to give David the drug in Friend. As Taurek puts it, ~unless it
is for some reason morally impermissible for one person to take
the same interest in another's welfare as he himself takes in it,
6Taurek also has the option of relying on our moral intuitions to
deliver the verdict that it is morally permissible for me to give the
drug to David in Friend, but it is an option that Taurek chooses not
to exercise.
7Taurek, p. 219.
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it must be permissible for me, in the absence of special
obligations to the contrary, to choose the outcome that is in B's
best interest. And, of course, this is what I would do if B's
welfare were more important to me than C's."s
I will discuss the validity of the Non-Relativity Principle,
as well as just how crucial it is in arguing for Taurek's main
conclusion, at a later time. For now I just want to finish laying
out Taurek's first argument. It is important to note that the two
judgments he reaches in the two examples I have already mentioned
seem to agree with most people's moral intuitions, even among
those who adhere to the standard view of the role of numbers in
morality. What Taurek claims about the next example, however,
clearly does not conform to the moral intuitions of the majority.
I will call this example
six strangers: I have to choose between saving one total
stranger by giving him all of the drug and saving five total
strangers by giving each of them a fifth of the drug. I am, as
in the two previous cases, under no contractual or quasi-
contractual obligation to any of the people involved.
Once again, Taurek argues that it is morally permissible for me to
give the drug to the one rather than to the five.
First, as in the earlier cases, no one's rights will be
violated whatever I decide. Second, the Non-Relativity Principle,
together with our verdict regarding First Person, already imply
that it must be morally permissible for me to give the drug to the
one stranger rather than the five. And, last but not least,
8Taurek, p.219.
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Taurek asks the following question: if in general there are
grounds for a moral requirement that five people rather than one
should be saved if there is no way to save everyone, why are those
grounds insufficient to generate a similar requirement in Friend?
Can it really be the case, Taurek asks, that the moral force of
those grounds is so weak that it can be overridden by the mere
fact that I know and like David? As he puts it, "generally, when
the facts are such that any impartial person would recognize a
moral obligation to do something as important to people as giving
this drug to these five would be to them, then an appeal to the
fact that one happens to be partial to the interests of some
others would do nothing to override the moral obligation"9.
Taurek adds that if the agent were, for instance, under a
contractual obligation to deliver the drug to the five, this
obligation could not be morally overridden either by the fact that
the sixth person who needs the drug is someone the agent knows and
likes, or even by the fact that the sixth person is the agent
himself. So, in Six Strangers Taurek concludes that both
alternatives are morally permissible1o , just as in First Person and
Friend. However, the Six Strangers case is unlike the Friend case
in that I don't have any reasons for a personal preference that
would ground my choice between the two morally permissible
9Taurek, p.217.
lOStrictly speaking, for Taurek these appear to be permissible outcomes
rather than permissible alternatives, since he seems to believe that
giving the drug to either group outright, without, for instance,
flipping a coin, is morally wrong. I will return to this in more
detail in Section v.
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outcomes. Taurek suggests that the fairest and morally correct
thing to do in such a case is to flip a coin, or to perform some
probabilistic equivalent, thus giving each of the strangers
involved an equal 50% chance for survival. Anything else l he
claims, would be arbitrary. If I do flip a coin, "it would seem
to best express my equal concern and respect for each person. Who
among them could complain that I have done wrong? And on what
grounds?"ll
Subsection 3: Taurek's Second Argument.
When arguing against Taurek, many philosophers concentrate on the
way he proceeds from First Person to Friend to Six Strangers in
what I call his First Argument, claiming that if there are no
grounds for a moral requirement to save the greater number in one
case, there can't be such a requirement in any of the others.
But, as I've indicated before, it is a mistake to believe that
defeating this line of reasoning is sufficient to uphold the
standard view of numbers in morality.12 since in the end, the
standard view is usually justified by some sort of an appeal to
the purported fact that by saving five people rather than one we
avoid the greater of two evils, anyone who wishes to retain the
standard view has to contend with what I will from now on refer to
llTaurek, p.220.
12For one thing, if there was no more to Taurek's arguments against the
standard view than his first argument, one could simply uphold the
standard view by denying the intuitions backing up the claim that it
is morally permissible for David to keep the drug for himself in First
Person. Of course, denying those intuitions seems to be an extremely
unattractive option.
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as Taurek's Second Argument - the argument for the conclusion
that, certain other things being equal13 , we are not avoiding a
worse outcome by saving five people rather than onei and that
there is no interpersonal objective point of view from which it is
just plain better if five people continue to live than if just one
does14 .15 For reasons that will emerge in later sections, the
second argument is a better, stronger and more interesting one
than the first argument. In fact, at the end of the day, it is
the second argument, but apparently not the first, that will
remain standing to challenge the standard view of the role of
numbers in morality. So let's look in detail at Taurek's
13The reason the claim has to be qualified with ~certain other things
being equal", is that I would like to retain the hope, against certain
Relativist views, that there is, indeed, some interpersonal
perspective from which it is, for instance, better that a serial
killer be allowed to die than five, or even just one, of his potential
victims.
14It has been argued by several philosophers, Judith Thomson among
them, that there is no such property as goodness simpliciter and no
such relation as being better than simpliciter. By talking about one
alternative being better than another, I by no means wish to beg the
question against this view. The reason I talk this way is that both
Taurek and all of his critics that I am familiar with make free use of
such locutions. Thus I choose to carryon this discussion on their
common terms and table the very difficult issue of whether or not
goodness and betterness exist for the purposes of this paper.
15Ra l ph Wedgwood has suggested that perhaps it can be argued that it is
an intuitively obvious brute fact about morality that the size of the
group facing a deadly threat is relevant. If so, then Taurek would be
wrong in demanding an explanation for this purported fact from
proponents of the standard view. But I do not find this suggestion at
all plausible. There are, indeed, it seems, intuitively obvious brute
facts about morality, such as, perhaps, that human suffering and death
are morally significant. But the alleged fact about the role of
numbers in morality doesn't have the same intuitive feel - it seems
that if true, it should be justifiable using more basic facts about
morality.
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discussion of the claim that by saving more people we would
prevent a worse outcome from obtaining.
It is, I think, helpful to keep in mind throughout my
presentation of this argument that it is, in essence, a negative
argument. Taurek doesn't claim to prove that there cannot, in
principle, be a reason why it is morally preferable if five people
are saved in a case like Six Strangers. What he tries to show is
that the reason that most naturally comes to mind and that is
likely to be cited by anyone who feels the need to justify the
standard intuitions - that the deaths of five people involve more
suffering, or a greater loss, than the death of just one person -
is not a defensible reason; it cannot justify the standard view of
the role of numbers in morality.
First, Taurek reiterates his refusal to think of human beings
in the same way in which one would think of inanimate possessions
- "it is not my way to think of them [the six strangers] as each
having a certain objective value, determined however it is we
determine the objective value of things, and then to make some
estimate of the combined value of the five as against the one"16.
What matters to Taurek, and this is quite possibly one of the most
important points of his paper, is "the loss to the individual, not
the loss of the individual"17. This is how he explains it: "The
loss of an arm of the Pieta means something to me not because the
Pieta will miss it. But the loss of an arm of a creature like me
means something to me only because I know he will miss it, just as
16Taurek, p. 222.
17Taurek, p.220.
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I would miss mine. It is the loss to this person that I focus on.
I lose nothing of value to me should he lose his arm. But if I
have a concern for him, I shall wish he might be spared his
10SS.1I18
Next, Taurek argues that we can't add up different people's
losses or suffering in a morally significant way. In six
Strangers, each of the six strangers involved would lose something
very important to him if he does not get the drug - his life. But
it seems wrong to argue that the loss that anyone of the five
strangers, each of whom requires only one-fifth of the drug, would
endure, can be increased by the fact that four others will also
not get the drug and share his fate. No one of the six strangers
is in danger of suffering a loss greater than the loss of one's
life. Should I choose to give the drug to the one rather than the
five, no one will suffer a greater loss than the one would have
suffered had my decision been different, let alone a loss five
times greater than that loss.
Taurek illustrates this point further by offering the example
in which the agent can spare someone a minor loss by suffering a
much larger one. Very special circumstances aside, there is no
sound moral reason for the agent to agree to such a tradeoff. Now
suppose that the same agent can spare three people that minor loss
by suffering a much greater loss himself. It seems clear that
there is no better reason in this case than in the previous one
for the agent to accept the tradeoff. That is because if the
18Taurek, p. 220.
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agent were to agree to the tradeoff, no one would be spared a loss
close in intensity to the one he would suffer - all he would
achieve is that each of the three other people involved would be
spared a minor loss, the same loss the agent would have spared one
person had he accepted the tradeoff in the original example.
If the agent refuses the tradeoff, three people will indeed
suffer a minor loss A, but no one will suffer the loss 3A, or, in
fact, any loss greater than A, as a result. Thus there is no way
to make sense of the claim that the total of suffering in this
eventuality would be 3A in such a way that it could serve as an
impetus for the agent to reconsider agreeing to the tradeoff,
assuming, of course, that he would not have agreed to it in the
initial one-one situation. Adding two extra people to the
equation doesn't seem to make a moral difference. 19 In contrast,
had the agent had the opportunity to spare one person three losses
equivalent to the minor loss in the previous examples, instead of
19 It has been suggested by Judith Thomson that preventing the suffering
of three people rather than the equivalent suffering of just one
person, while it doesn't maximize goodness because there is no such
property (see footnote 14), maximizes goodness-for in the sense that
it is good for three people rather than just one. This seems
reasonable enough; and it may be a promising avenue of thought for
anti-Taurek theorists to pursue. However, I see no serious reason at
this point why morality should be concerned with maximizing goodness-
for in this way. Thus, until I am faced with an explicit argument to
the contrary, I choose to table this discussion for lack of evidence
that is threatening to Taurek's views.
A suggestion offered by Alex Byrne, that is, perhaps, roughly along
the same lines, is that in cases where you prevent the suffering of
many, the result is better than the sum of its parts (i.e. the
prevented suffering of individuals). Again, I see no reason to
believe that this is the case and so no prima facie reason to discuss
the idea in detail until and unless I am faced with an explicit
argument that threatens to undermine Taurek's position.
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just one, he would perhaps have had a new reason to consider
making the tradeoff.
The moral of this part of the story is that if there is no
compelling reason for the agent to agree to trade his loss A for
the loss B of anyone of the individuals involved, there is no
compelling reason for the agent to agree to trade his loss A for
the loss B of every individual involved. Note that the conclusion
appears to stay in effect even if the number of people that are
facing the prospect of suffering B is changed from 3 to 10, or 25,
or even 1,000,000. Similarly, Taurek believes, since no special
considerations are involved t if there 1S no reason for me to
prefer saving anyone of the five in six Strangers individually to
saving the sixth stranger t it seems that there is no reason for me
to prefer giving the drug to the five rather than the one. Thus,
in order to be fair to everyone, I should flip a coin.
This concludes my presentation of Taurekts views. It should
not come as a surprise that his controversial arguments and
conclusions have come under a lot of fire from every direction
ever since his article was first published~ It iS t on the other
hand t rather surprising that philosophers in general, and
ethicists in particular, have to a large extent rejected the main
points of Taurek's article out of hand, without giving full and
fair consideration to the complexity of the problem and the truly
compelling parts of his arguments. In discussions of somewhat
related problems in moral theorYt such as the Trolley Problem or
the significance of the killing/letting die distinction, it has
become common practice to just drop a footnote acknowledging that
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Taurek disagrees with the view that numbers should matter in
morality, and then simply refer the reader to one of the more
famous critiques of his article, thus believing the case to have
been closed. In the sections that follow, I will attempt to reply
to some of the more serious objections that have been leveled
against Taurek's views by his opponents, in the hope of showing
that Taurek's conclusions cannot be dismissed so easily and that,
contrary to what most philosophers seem to believe, the case is
far from closed.
Section III.
Derek Parfit and Agent-Relative Pe~issions.
In "Innumerate Ethics", Derek Parfit's response to Taurek's
"Should the Numbers Count?", Parfit disputes Taurek's conclusion
that numbers do not matter in morality. First, in subsections 1
and 2, I want to discuss Parfit's argument for the claim that all
other things being equal, it is a worse thing when more, rather
than fewer people die20 . Should Parfit's arguments for that
proposition fall short and thus fail to derail Taurek's second
2°Those who object to talking about worse things or worse outcomes
without specifying who or what they are worse for (see also
footnote 14), can replace the offending expressions with "outcomes
that there are moral reasons to avoid". For the purposes of this
paper I will use these expressions interchangeably, as in most cases
just saying ~worse" as shorthand for the much longer but less
controversial expression is very convenient. Parfit says something
very similar in footnote 10 of his article.
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argument, as I believe they do, I will argue that Parfit will
already have failed to reach his objective of disproving Taurek's
main conclusion, regardless of anything he can add to counteract
other arguments and claims made by Taurek in "should the Numbers
Count?". Then, in subsection 3, I will proceed to discuss the
other part of Parfit's paper, the one dealing with Taurek's first
argument and agent-relative permissions, anyway, as I believe that
some very important issues will inevitably be raised in the
process.
Subsection 1: Parfit vs. Taurek's Second Argument - "Sums of
Suffering".
To strike down Taurek's conclusion Parfit wants to show that
Taurek is wrong in claiming that if everyone cannot be saved,
there is no moral reason for saving five strangers rather than
just one. Taurek suggests that if there were such a reason, it
would have to do with the amount of suffering caused by each of
the outcomes. That is , indeed, the reason why most, if not alI,
proponents of the standard view of the role of numbers in morality
defend it: they believe that all other things being equal I greater
suffering is caused by the deaths of five people than by the death
of just one person. This is not proof that no moral reason that
is not derived from the comparison of losses or suffering can
exist for preferring to save the five in six Strangers. But it is
hard to imagine what such a reason could possibly consist in, and
so the burden of proof shifts from Taurek to his opponents to show
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that such a reason can, in fact, exist21 • Thus the task at hand is
to analyze whether or not it is plausible that the amount of
suffering that would be caused by the deaths of the five strangers
in six Strangers is greater than the amount of suffering that
would be caused by the death of the one. 22
Parfit says that ~those who believe that suffering is
~additive" do not believe that many lesser pains might be the same
thing as one greater pain. What they do believe is that the
21Al t hough see footnote 19 for possible glimpses of an idea ...
22 Before I proceed, I want to digress for a moment to address an
indirect argument for the conclusion that the deaths of the five lS
not a worse outcome than the death of the one. Taurek uses this
argument in his discussion of the Friend case. Parfit summarizes it
in the following way:
First Premise: If we prefer the worse of two outcomes we are
morally deficient.
Second Premise: David would not be morally deficient if he
preferred that we save him rather than the five.
Conclusion: The deaths of the five cannot be a worse outcome
than the death of David.
Parfit is quite correct in pointing out that there is no reason why
the first premise has to be true. It is far from obvious that
preferring a morally worse outcome is always a sign of a moral
deficiency. It is also far from obvious that the second premise is
true. It is very natural for someone in David's position to want to
be the one saved and, in fact, almost anyone would have just that
preference. That, however, does not rule out the possibility that
David is morally deficient for having such a preference, as is
everyone else who would prefer to be saved in his place. As far as
both premises are concerned, Taurek is just relying on his intuitions
without further justification. And those intuitions are far from
completely obvious. So, regardless of whether or not the conclusion
is true, both of the premises cannot be assumed to be true without a
much more serious discussion. So Parfit is right in discarding the
argument. However, as Parfit himself must have realized, this
argument is just a comment made by Taurek in passing to make one of
the premises for his major arguments sound more plausiblej and it is
not intended to be one of Taurek's big guns.
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lesser pains might together be as bad. "23 For one thing, Parfit
remarks, pains do seem to be additive when we are only talking
about a single individual. For instance, Taurek is unlikely to
dismiss as utter nonsense a person's decision to avoid fifty minor
headaches that would be suffered over some relatively short period
of time instead of avoiding one major migraine. The comparison
between the amount of suffering that would be caused by the
migraine and the amount of suffering that would be caused by the
fifty headaches is, indeed, very rough. One would probably be
quite incredulous if told that the suffering caused by one
migraine is precisely equal to the suffering caused by thirty
seven minor headaches. However, it certainly seems to make sense
to suppose that even though a migraine is much, much worse than a
minor headache, if the number of minor headaches that need to be
endured in order to avoid a very bad migraine is high enough (be
it fifty, a hundred, or even more), it is wiser to refuse the
tradeoff. In fact, there is probably a number high enough so that
no one in their right mind would accept the tradeoff, provided no
special factors are at play, such as that the person is in very
weak health and a major migraine could kill him whereas no amount
of minor headaches can.
Parfit now wants to make the jump from one person suffering
fifty headaches to fifty different people suffering one headache
23Derek Parfit UInnumerate Ethics", ETHICS Problems and Principles, ed.
by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
College Publishers 1992, p.231;
All future quotations from Parfit are from this article.
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each. He believes that the sum of suffering would be about as
great in the two cases, where the phrase ~sum of suffering" is to
be understood the same way in the case of fifty different headache
sufferers as in the case of one person suffering fifty headaches.
In both cases, he argues, any comparison between such a ~sum of
suffering" and a single loss by a single individual (or another
~sum of suffering") would be rough and imprecise, but not
meaningless, as Taurek might have us believe. After quoting a
passage from C.S. Lewis that supports Taurek's contention that all
attempts at morally significant interpersonal aggregation of
suffering are nonsensical, Parfit asks: "like Taurek, Lewis
assumes that any ~surn of suffering" must be felt by a single
person. Why not add that it must be felt at a single time? That
would reduce even further the Problem of Pain ... "24 But, he
responds, both requirements are unjustified - "suffering at other
times is more suffering. So is the suffering of other people. "25
Parfit claims not to see any difference between the two cases.
But I believe that his analogy is very strained. The reason why
we seem to care about suffering in the first place, and why we
believe that it is relevant to morality, is that somebody suffers
it. When we are talking about someone enduring fifty minor
headaches, the reason why it is important that we are talking
about fifty headaches and not just one, is that there is a person,
a conscious living being, who suffers (and, presumably, remembers
suffering) all of them. And it is much worse for any such being
24parfit, p.232.
25parfit, p.232.
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to suffer fifty headaches than to suffer just one, which is why a
person's pain does not necessarily have to be suffered at one
instant in order for its aggregate to have moral significance.
However, in the case of fifty different headache sufferers there
is no being, self-aware or otherwise, that suffers an aggregate
pain of more than one headache. If the universe itself were
conscious and aware of the pains of the parts that make it up,
then and only then would it perhaps make sense in this case to
talk of a morally significant aggregate of suffering roughly
equivalent to that of fifty headaches.
Parfit offers the following: UI suggest that he [Lewis]
confused two different claims. He makes the factual claim that
the suffering of more people cannot be more suffering. He may
have meant the moral claim that it cannot matter more. He may
have thought the suffering of one person to be as great an evil as
the suffering of a million,,26. He adds, "when he [Taurek] says
that usuffering is not additive", he too may not mean that the
pains of different people cannot be more pain. He may mean that
these pains cannot be morally summed - that they cannot together
make an outcome worse.,,27 I agree that this is, indeed, what
Taurek and Lewis both claim. But it is unclear to me what kind of
confusion Parfit is accusing them of. You can, of course, attach
some meaning to the claim that the Usum of suffering" of five
people with a headache is greater than the suffering of just one
person with the same kind of headache. After all, there are four
26parfit, p.232.
27 Parfit, p.232.
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more people suffering the headache in the former case than in the
latter. But that was never in dispute. What was and still is in
dispute is whether the fact that there are more people suffering a
pain or a loss A makes the Usum of suffering" greater than A In
any meaningful way - in particular, in a way that is morally
significant.
Taurek's point and, I presume, Lewis' as well, lS that no
moral significance can be attached to such an aggregate of
suffering because there is no one who suffers it. Of course, that
doesn't mean that people can't agree on a non-moral convention
that considers five people's suffering of A a greater amount of
suffering than the suffering of A by one person, provided that the
convention is not in itself intended to carry any moral
significance. In fact, such an agreement seems to be in place in
everyday discourse, which is why we have to be extremely careful
about not drawing any moral conclusions from the convention
without further justification, which it seems that Parfit was
unable to provide. Parfit's analogy with one person's suffering
of fifty minor headaches fails to counteract the arguments by
Taurek and Lewis, as in such a case there is someone, namely that
person, who suffers all of those headaches. Thus, so far, Parfit
seems to have been quite unsuccessful in his struggle against
Taurek's second argument.
Subsection 2: Parfit vs. Taurek's Second Argument Continued -
Maximin.
While I believe that Parfit has not made any kind of a dent in
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Taurek's claim that individual losses suffered by different people
cannot be morally summed, he does make an additional attempt to
undermine one of the ways in which Taurek arrives at that claim.
Before discussing it, however, I do want to point out that even
should Parfit's objection succeed, in light of what's been said in
the preceding subsection, he will still have failed to bring down
Taurek's main conclusion altogether, having only managed to
discard one supporting argument. The best Parfit can hope for
here is to make Taurek's claim sound slightly less plausible.
Parfit's criticism is focused on a principle derived from our
intuitions regarding rather uncontroversial cases, such as the
ones discussed towards the end of section II.
principle
Parfit calls this
(N) : We ought to save one person from harm rather than saving
any nwnber from smaller harms. 28
The first remark that needs to be made is that this is certainly
not Taurek's view. The most he would commit himself to is that
there is a moral reason for saving one person from a great harm
rather than any number from a smaller harm. It should be clear
from his discussion of choosing between saving one person's arm
and another person's life, however, that he would never accept the
\\ought" in the formulation of principle (N). Whether or not he is
correct in this opinion is a separate issue, which, fortunately,
is besides the point here.
That objection aside, this is how Parfit reconstructs Taurek's
28parfit, p.232.
86
argument. unless we believe that
(M): If one person is harmed, that would be just as bad as if
any number are each equally harrned29 30
is true, he has Taurek arguing, we can't explain the truth of (N)
or even the truth of the much more obviously intuitively true
(0) : We ought to save one person from harm rather than saving
any number from much smaller harms. 31
Parfit suggests that instead of (0) we should accept
Maximin: We should give priority to helping those people who
would be the worst off if they aren't helped32
as the principle that best describes what we should have in mind
for the kind of tradeoff cases that Taurek considers. Parfit then
tries to argue that Maximin, unlike (N) or (0), can be explained
without reference to (M).
This is how I understand what Parfit is saying here. He
believes that it is Maximin, rather than (N) or (0), that is
really our, as well as Taurek's, view. (0), he claims, gives us
the intuitively correct answers only when those answers coincide
29 parfit, p.232.
300 f course, we would need to insert some sort of an "all other things
being equal" clause here if we want to be precise.
31 parfi t, p. 232.
32Here I will once again gloss over the fact that Taurek would never
accept any principle like this which includes a "should" or an
"ought", even if he agrees that there is a moral reason to do what
such a principle tells us to do.
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with the answers that Maximin would give. But Maximin, unlike (0)
or (N), has, at least at first glance , nothing to do with any kind
of a notion of a ~sum of suffering". Therefore , Parfit believes
that Maximin can be justified without relying on a thesis like
(M), and so Maximin can explain all the intuitions that Taurek
claims we need (N) or (0) to explain, without committing us to any
Taurek-like conclusions about cases like six Strangers. 33 Parfit's
hope is that in cases like six Strangers, where each of the six
strangers involved stands to lose as much and end up as badly off
as anyone of the others, we can then still conclude that it is
the five strangers that should be saved rather than the one
because more suffering would be caused by the deaths of the five.
I see many problems lurking here. First, Parfit relies in the
end on claiming that he has already established that there is, in
a morally significant way, more suffering involved in the deaths
of five strangers than in the death of just one. And unless the
"sum of suffering" if five die would be greater than the suffering
involved in the death of the one, it seems that Parfit has no
grounds for arguing, as he does, that numbers should be used as a
tiebreaker when Maximin fails to deliver a verdict, as, for
instance, in six Strangers. However, as I have claimed earlier,
33 1 am very far from convinced that Maximin can possibly be justified
without appealing to a principle like (M). It seems to me that even
though, prima facie, it appears as if Maximin has a lot less (if
anything at all) to do with aggregates of losses or suffering across
individuals than (0) does, it would ultimately turn out to be the case
that this is an illusion and that it would be exactly as hard (or as
easy) to justify Maximin without falling back on a principle like (M)
as it would be to justify (0). But I have enough bones to pick with
Maximin, as stated by Parfit, and with Parfit/s entire argument, to
not need to place much weight on this objection.
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it seems that Parfit has failed in his attempt to argue for
morally significant sums of suffering.
Second, even if Parfit were allowed to make the "sum of
suffering" assumption, it is unclear what would justify using
Maximin in cases of "uneven" suffering, but relying on some sort
of a "sum of suffering" argument as a tiebreaker when Maximin
can't give you an answer because everyone stands to end up in the
same boat (in Charon's boat, if we are talking about six
Strangers). Why not flip a coin when Maximin has nothing to say?
That's a conclusion Taurek would be quite happy with. And
finally, I am unclear about how Maximin, as stated by Parfit, is
to be justified, and about how it can fit in with the intuitions
that (0) fits so well. These concerns support my belief that
Parfit is wrong in claiming that (0) is not our real view.
Parfit seems to assume that when Taurek talks about the loss
that someone would incur or the harm that would come to them, no
facts about the prior condition of the person are included in the
deliberations. But does that really make sense? It is a much
greater loss for a blind person to also become deaf than it is for
a person who is not blind. It is also probably a much greater
loss for someone who is already paralyzed to also become blind
than it is for someone who is not paralyzed. And there is a
greater amount of suffering involved in enduring an additional ten
minutes of a migraine headache for a person who has had a nonstop
migraine for ten hours already, than there is in having a ten
minute long migraine headache for someone who has been feeling
fine for a long time. Parfit suggests the following example,
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which I will call
Agony: ~For each of many people, yesterday was agony. For
some other single person [call him Z] I it was a day of minor
pain. Ought we now to save this person from a day of agony
rather than saving each of the many from a day of minor pain?"34
First of all, it has to be made absolutely clear that there is no
issue of unfairness involved here l or at least there shouldn't be
if the example is to be of any use to us in our current
enterprise. The way Parfit phrases the example, it might sound as
if Z somehow deserved to be in agony yesterday but managed to
escape it in some sneaky way. If that were the easel the example
would be entirely useless to us. So let's assume that that isn/t
the case. Parfit believes that there is no moral reason for
helping Z which is what he claims Maximin would dictate as well.
On the other hand, Parfit claims that according to (0) it is Z
that should be helped and spared the agony.
But why does Parfit say that? I can see only two alternatives
in analyzing Agony. The first alternative is that having suffered
through the agony makes it much more difficult to endure the
additional minor suffering. In that case I believe that Parfit is
wrong in maintaining that (0) tells us to help Z, as the potential
harm to each of the many today would not be much smaller than the
potential harm to Z today. The second alternative is that the
agony that was suffered yesterday does not make it more difficult
to endure the minor suffering today or, perhaps I does make it more
difficult but only slightly. In that case, (0) would, indeed,
34parfit, p.233.
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tell us to help Z. But then Parfit would seem to be wrong in
maintaining that there is no moral reason to help Z. In fact, I
believe that even Maximin would not support that claim of his
under the circumstances. In either case, Parfit's verdict
regarding (0) seems to be misguided, leaving him with no grounds
for stating that it is Maximin rather than (0) that should be
adopted.
As for Parfit's example of saving one arthritic from blindness
rather than saving any number of the blind from arthritis, the
same argument seems to apply as to the Agony case. We should
determine, assuming that such a determination is, indeed,
possible, whether or not it is a much greater loss for an
arthritic to become blind than it is for a blind person to become
afflicted with arthritis. If it is, then I think it is obvious
that regardless of what Maximin would say about it, we should help
the arthritic, as (0) would, indeed, tell us to. If it isn't,
then, contrary to what Parfit would apparently say, (0) would not
require us to help the arthritic (a possibility which I do not, in
all honesty, find very plausible). In that unlikely, bordering on
impossible, case, we would not be compelled to help the arthritic
even if the tradeoff involved only one blind person, even though
we would, perhaps, have a moral reason for helping the arthritic
anyway since his potential suffering would still likely be at
least somewhat greater.
In general, I believe that Parfit has failed to discredit (0).
I also have serious reservations about Maximin. Unless the person
somehow deserved to have lost or suffered more in the past than he
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has, especially under circumstances that relate to the current
dilemma, it is unclear how much we should take into account who
would be the worst off altogether, provided that there is a great
disparity between the losses that would actually be suffered as a
result of our decision. If I were given a choice between saving
the arm of a person who had previously lost his little toe and
saving the little toe of a person who had previously lost his arm,
why on Earth wouldn't I have a valid reason to save the first
guy's arm? To me it seems ridiculous to do what Maximin, at least
under Parfit's interpretation of it, would dictate, and to be
guided by the fact that if I help no one the two would end up
equally badly off, rather than by the much more morally relevant
great disparity between the potential losses. And what looks even
worse for Parfit's Maximin is that it apparently concludes that a
"fully intact" person's arm ought not to be saved if doing so
would mean that a one-armed person would lose his little toe.
Maximin, as formulated and applied by Parfit, just doesn't seem to
be a morally valid principle.
I believe I have shown that Parfit has not managed to
discredit (0) and thus appears to be unable to explain some of our
moral intuitions without referring to a principle like (M).
Therefore, he has failed to impeach this particular argument for
(M); and from (M) Taurek's main conclusion seems to follow quite
easily. In addition, as I've argued in subsection 1, Parfit's
direct attempts to argue for the opposite of (M) have apparently
fallen short. Thus I have to conclude that Parfit has not
succeeded in undermining Taurek's second argument.
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Subsection 3: Parfit vs. Taurek's First Argument - Agent Relative
Pe~issions.
In the first part of his paper, Parfit tries, through his use of
the notion of agent-relative permissions, to argue that Taurek's
first argument, i.e. the line of reasoning that proceeds from the
First Person and Friend cases to the six Strangers case, is
flawed. Parfit maintains that in Six Strangers the agent ought to
save the five rather than the one. However, in First Person, as
well as perhaps even in Friend, the agent has an agent-relative
permission to save the one rather than the five. But, in light of
the fact that the second part of Parfit's paper has apparently not
been successful, Parfit cannot hope to achieve all of his
objectives. Without a successful defense against Taurek's second
argument for his conclusion in Six Strangers, Parfit has failed to
show that I ought not flip a coin in six Strangers to determine
who to save. Thus the most Parfit can conclude, at least without
presupposing his own desired conclusion, is that Taurek's first
argument is flawed and what is really going on in First Person, as
well as perhaps in Friend, is that the agent has an agent-relative
permission to forgo the coin toss and simply save the one rather
than the five. That conclusion would hardly be very damaging to
any of Taurek's main theses or argurnents 35 • However, I believe
that it's worth it to consider Parfit's argument regarding agent-
relative permissions for its own sake. And the topic of agent-
3SAt least it seems that way now. See section V for a less optimistic
(as far as Taurek is concerned) analysis of this problem from a
slightly different angle.
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relative permissions will resurface in section V.
In this part of his paper Parfit focuses on a case which
Taurek himself considers as a potential counterexample against his
first argument - the example involving a tradeoff situation where
one person stands to lose his life while the other stands to lose
only his arm. Taurek believes that just as it is morally
permissible for David in the First Person case to save his own
life rather than the lives of five strangers, it would be morally
permissible for David to save his own arm even if that would
prevent him from saving somebody else's life. I am not entirely
convinced that this is correct, but I will not get into this issue
here as it is not very crucial for the purposes of the discussion
at hand. If Taurek's first argument is valid, a similar line of
reasoning would lead to the conclusion that it is morally
permissible for me to save one stranger's arm at the cost of not
being able to save another stranger's life. 36 Taurek does not have
a problem with this as he explicitly embraces the seemingly
counterintuitive claim in his paper.
conclusion too outrageous to swallow.
Parfit, however, finds the
This is how Parfit reconstructs Taurek's argument:
assumes
Taurek
(D): "It would not be true that we ought to save this
stranger's life at the cost of our own arm".37
360 f course, we are only talking about situations that don't involve
any of the special considerations that were discussed at the beginning
of section II.
37Parfit, p. 22 8 .
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and
(C): ~Whether we ought to save this stranger's life cannot
depend on whether it would cost us nothing, or our own arm"i 38
and so concludes that the following is false -
(A): ~If we could save either one stranger's life or another
stranger's arm, and it would cost us nothing to do either, we
ought to save the first stranger's life"39.
For now we have agreed to let (B) pass. So, as Parfit points out,
we now have to choose between (A) and (C). He finds (A) to be
much more plausible, and thus believes that it would be much more
reasonable to reject (C) than to give up (A). However, I believe
that the way Parfit phrases (C) has a lot to do with the ease with
which he arrives at the choice he favors. Consider the following
modification,
(C)': Whether we ought to save this stranger's life cannot
depend on whether it would cost us or someone else an arm.
I believe that (C') captures what Taurek had in mind a lot better
than (C). Exactly how implausible does (C') seem? I don't think
Parfit would be as quick in judging the negation of (C') to be
less counterintuitive than the negation of (A), as he was with (C)
in place of (C'). In fact, if I had to choose between (C') and
(A), I believe I would discard (A). I will return to C' and
explain why I believe that it is true, shortly, but first let's
consider Parfit's argument.
38parfit, p.229.
39parfit, p.228.
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Parfit gives an explanation for why he thinks that (C) is
false. Since the difference between (C) and (C') is mostly
psychological (the latter simply draws attention to a factor that
the former glosses over - namely, that someone else stands to lose
an arm and that the only difference is that it's not the agent
himself who will suffer the loss), Parfit's explanation, if valid,
also justifies the rejection of (C'). In any case, it leaves
Parfit free to keep (A) and, by analogy, the standard view of the
role of numbers in morali ty40 .
Parfit says that along with Taurek he believes that one may
give priority to one's own welfare. That priority is, of course,
limited, e.g. "perhaps Y could save his arm rather than X's life,
but he ought to save X rather than his own umbrella"41. Parfit
also believes that we may give priority to the welfare of others,
e.g. our children and, perhaps, other family members or loved
ones. It is also possible that we may give priority to the
welfare of close friends. But that, Parfit argues, is as far as
the unequal weighing of people'S welfare can go. This is why,
Parfit explains, it is morally permissible for David to keep the
drug for himself in First Person, and why it might be morally
permissible for me to give the drug to David in Friend, although
we would be on much safer ground if David were a relative or a
4° Provided, of course, that we reject Taurek's second argument against
the standard view, which, I have argued, Parfit has failed to convince
us to do.
41parfit, p.229.
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loved one, or at least a close friend42 . But, according to Parfit,
it is not morally permissible for me to give the drug to the one
stranger rather than the five in Six Strangers, with or without
tossing a coin first. The permission in First Person is agent-
relative. 43
Agent-relative permissions might also be useful in responding
to Taurek's comment that were we under contract or military duty
to give the drug to the five, it would not matter one iota whether
or not we or someone we know and like, or even someone we love,
needed the drug. Parfit responds that ~contracts and military
duties give rise to special obligations. Perhaps we ought to
carry out these even at a heavy cost to ourselves. But this need
not be true of everything we ought to do.
saving the lives of strangers"44.
It may not be true of
42 parfit does not believe that the agent-relative permission to not
give the drug to the five applies to the case where the one is someone
the agent knows and likes, even though it would apply if the one were
a close relative or a loved one. But there is no reason why we have
to agree with Parfit on where to draw the line if we are willing to
draw it in the first place.
43As ide from the objections to agent-relative permissions that I am
about to discuss, there is also the following complaint: it seems that
without a much deeper explanation of what is going on and what
justifies agent-relative permissions in the first place, Parfit can be
accused of simply restating alleged facts by using a new term when he
attempts to explain his moral intuitions by claiming that agent-
relative permissions are involved. What Parfit is doing can, perhaps,
be perceived in the same way as if a hypothetical proponent of the
standard view of the role of numbers in morality tried to explain the
purported difference between six Strangers and a case in which I have
to choose which one of two people to save, by claiming that the moral
permission to save one person in the latter case is numbers-relative,
and argued that the issue is thus settled. Such a remark would hardly
be illuminating. I thank Judith Thomson for directing my attention to
this problem.
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But how plausible is Parfit's explanation? First, we may ask
with Taurek why exactly it is the case that we may give priority
to the welfare of ourselves and certain special others, but not to
the welfare of strangers. I don't find what Parfit says
sufficient to answer this question. Second, I'd like to offer an
example that I think causes problems for the notion of agent-
relative permissions. Consider the Five-One-One case -
Five-One-One: I have a quantity of the life-saving drug.
I need all of it in order to survive. A stranger, let's call
him Jack, also needs all of my drug in order to survive. Each
of five strangers, A, B, C, D, and E, needs only one-fifth of
the drug in order to survive.
According to Parfit, I have an agent-relative permission to keep
the drug for myself even though iri general one ought to save five
people rather than just one. However, Parfit is apparently
committed to saying that if I choose not to act on my agent-
relative permission to keep the drug, I ought to give it to the
five because, agent-relative permissions aside, one ought to save
five people rather than one.
I find that conclusion unacceptable. Selflessness 1S usually
considered a virtue and, at the very least, it is very rarely
considered a vice. If I am morally permitted to withhold the drug
from A, B, C, D, and E, I fail to see how it can be the case that
I am not then morally permitted to perform a selfless act and
sacrifice my life in exchange for Jack's. That may, indeed, seem
like a very strange thing for me to do, but that's beside the
44parfit, p.230.
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point. This is one reason why I believe that the notion of agent-
relative permissions may be inherently flawed. Another reason is
that I think it is generally wrong to sacrifice something that
belongs to someone else, especially if you would not be willing to
make the same sacrifice for the same goal in that person's place.
Similarly, I believe that it can't be morally impermissible for me
to allow a very bad outcome A (e.g. the deaths of five people) to
obtain in order to prevent a loss B (e.g. death) from befalling
someone, if it would not, under similar circumstances, also be
morally impermissible for me to allow A to obtain in order to
prevent B from happening to me.
As an example, consider a variant of the standard Trolley
case. Suppose that I am the only passenger on a trolley, and the
trolley driver has just died of a heart attack. This way issues
of job-related duties shouldn't enter into our moral
considerations in a way in which they might have had to if the
agent were himself the trolley driver. Suppose also that if the
trolley continues straight ahead, it will derail and hit a nuclear
power plant, causing a nuclear explosion that will kill millions,
including me and everyone else involved. My options are to turn
right, which would result in five deaths, or to turn left, which
would result in only one death. It seems clear that whatever else
I decide, I should turn the trolley one way or the other. I just
don't see how the true theory of morality can possibly require me
to divert the trolley so that it kills one person rather than
five, if it wouldn't also require me, under otherwise similar
circumstances, to divert the trolley so that it goes over a cliff
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and I die in order to avoid the deaths of the same five people as
well as the deaths of millions of others. 45 That is the reason why
I prefer (C') to (C) - (C') emphasizes the fact that someone's arm
will be lost to save a life, the only question is whose arm it
will be. As is by now clear from my thoughts on the subject, I
think that regardless of anything else (C') should be accepted.
If we keep (C'), we have to choose between (A) and (B).
Either, special circumstances aside, one is both morally required
to refrain from saving one's own arm instead of a stranger's life
and to refrain from saving another stranger's arm instead of the
first stranger's life; or, special circumstances aside, one is
never morally required to save B's life rather than C's arm.
Taurek is convinced that the latter is the case. I am not so
sure, but I am definitely inclined to agree that (A) and (B)
cannot be true at the same time46 • I also agree with Taurek's
psychological explanation for why many of us want to have it both
ways. He suggests that most people believe that in general a
45This connects in interesting ways to the issue of externalizing
costs, which is fascinating in its own right. Unfortunately, it falls
outside the scope of this paper and so I have to leave a discussion of
it for a later time.
46 In fact, 1 definitely disagree with the choice Taurek makes as, even
laying initial intuitions aside, accepting (B) and the negation of (A)
leads to what appear to be quite absurd and objectionable consequences
for a stranger's arm vs. another stranger's life tradeoff situation.
Should we flip a coin in that case just as in Six Strangers? Taurek
is not definitely ~ornmitted to that as (1 will discuss this in section
V) he can maintain that it is not arbitrary, although not obligatory
either, to prevent the maximum amount of suffering to anyone person.
But it seems to me somewhat counterintuitive that it is could even be
morally permissible to flip a coin in such a case. Would flipping a
coin then also be permissible in a finger vs. a life case? A toenail
vs. a life? An umbrella vs. a life?
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life should be saved rather than an arm, provided that both cannot
be saved. But they recognize the weakness of human nature in
themselves and admit that they would, because of the great
personal cost involved, find it virtually, if not entirely,
impossible to give up a chance to save their own arm in order to
save a stranger's life. On the other hand, that personal cost
isn't there if the choice is between saving B's life and C's arm.
That is what makes keeping both (A) and (B) so attractive. It
allows people to retain a general view that they believe to be
correct, while avoiding having to face very unpleasant
consequences of that view, which, if confronted, might brand them
morally deficient. However, I think that Taurek does,
unfortunately, have it right in maintaining that this easy way out
can't be morally justified and we have to choose between (A) and
(B) after all.
Since I believe it to be possible and, in fact, quite likely
that (B) is true while (A) is false, I also have to admit, by
analogy, the possibility that Taurek's judgments regarding the
First Person and six Strangers cases are both false, provided, of
course, that I temporarily disregard Taurek's second argument for
his conclusion in six Strangers. I find that to be a highly
unlikely possibility. Apparently Parfit does too. Whatever his
beliefs about Six Strangers, Parfit definitely thinks that one is
morally permitted, special circumstances aside, to save one's own
life rather than the lives of five strangers. Thus I believe that
at this point I have no reason to consider Taurek's first argument
against the standard view of the role of numbers in morality to be
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ln any peril as a consequence of arguments offered by Parfit 47 •
Combined with what I perceive to be a failure of Parfit's in his
attempts to undermine Taurek's second argument, that leads me to
the conclusion that Parfit has struck out and Taurek's view
remains a viable alternative to the standard one, at the very
least until the next section.
Section IV.
The Objection From Transitivity and Other criticisms by
Gregory Kavka.
Subsection 1: Taurek on Rights and Obligations.
In section 1 of the first part of his paper "The Numbers Should
Count", another critique of Taurek's views and arguments, Gregory
s. Kavka also discusses something along the lines of agent-
relative permissions, although he doesn't call them by that name.
He points out, quite correctly, that if morality permits
partiality to one's own very important interests, as well as the
very important interests of loved ones and friends, then Taurek's
judgments regarding the First Person and Friend cases shed
virtually no light on the problem of numbers in morality - at
47 I will, however, return to this topic briefly in section V, as I
believe that the analysis that will be required in order to discuss
objections by Gregory Kavka and Ken Dickey shows that there may be a
reason for Taurek to be gravely concerned about agent-relative
permissions after all.
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most, we can find out that there are some considerations that can
override the numbers even if numbers do, indeed, matter. Such a
view of morality would make it very difficult for Taurek to reach
any interesting conclusions regarding six Strangers by analogy
with those two cases, and thus would invalidate Taurek's first
argument, although it would, of course, leave Taurek's second
argument untouched.
Unlike Parfit, Kavka offers some reasons for accepting
something like agent-relative permissions. In particular, he
argues that a system of morality is more practical and socially
valuable if it incorporates rules allowing, under certain
circumstances, partiality to one's own interests and the interests
of loved ones. However, in light of the discussion in the
previous section, and especially since this line of criticism
doesn't target Taurek's second argument at all, I have to conclude
that Kavka doesn't give us a sufficient reason to reopen the
discussion of agent-relative permissions until, as I have
promised, section V.
In the second section of the first part of his paper, Kavka
discusses Taurek's views on moral obligations and how those views
affect Taurek's first argurnent 48 • This line of criticism doesn't
concern Taurek's second argument either, and so by itself doesn't
48The term 'obligation', used more or less indiscriminately in the
literature without much clarification of what is meant by it, is very
murky. However, since all of the philosophers involved in this
discussion use it, I will often have little choice but to do the same
in the course of my paper. If you feel great discomfort at the sight
of "A is obligated to ... ", or "A has an obligation to", feel free to
mentally replace them with "A is under moral pressure to ... ", or some
equivalent expression.
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threaten to disprove Taurek's conclusions, but the discussion is
very interesting and, I believe, does have crucial repercussions
for Taurek's view of morality as a whole. Kavka argues that
Taurek subscribes to what he calls ~the libertarian account of
moral obligation". He describes the libertarian account as the
view that recognizes only three kinds of moral obligations -
"duties of non-interference, that require one not to assault or
kill others (except to repel or punish an attack), and not to
interfere with their actions or chosen uses of their property
(except insofar as such acts and uses violate the rights of
others) _._ contractual and quasi-contractual obligations ...
[and] duties of restitution that require one to compensate another
if he has suffered harm as the result of one's unjust, reckless,
or negligent acts"49. A key part of such a view is the belief that
"there lS no right to survive that would impose obligations on
others to use their property to keep one alive"50.
Kavka does, indeed, have good reasons to ascribe some such
view to Taurek. Perhaps the most serious reason is Taurek's
continued insistence that special circumstances aside, the owner
of the drug violates no one's rights by choosing not to give any
of it to people who need it to survive. Taurek can even be
interpreted as saying that if there are no special considerations
involved, the agent isn't morally required to help anyone. The
49Gregory S. Kavka "The Numbers Should Count", ETHICS Problems and
Principles, ed. by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich College Publishers 1992, p.239;
All future quotations from Kavka are from this article.
50Kavka, p.239.
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key factor in his explanation of these opinions seems to be simply
that the agent owns the drug and so doesn't violate anybody's
rights by not giving it to them unless special considerations are
involved. And it is important to note that the absence of special
considerations, as discussed at the beginning of section II,
precisely rules out the second and third kinds of duties in
Kavka's account of the libertarian view, while the first kind is
inapplicable to cases like six Strangers to begin with. As a
result of this and other remarks which Taurek makes in ~Should the
Numbers Count?", I will concede without argument that Taurek holds
some sort of a libertarian view.
Kavka suggests that, as most people holding some kind of a
libertarian view of moral obligation, Taurek subscribes to some
sort of a Libertarian Aid Principle (LAP)
(LAP): ~Person A is obligated to aid person B only if either
(i)A has contracted to do so (or is bound to do so in virtue of
some quasi-contractual relationship) or (ii)A is responsible for
B's needing aid or owes B compensation for other past harms"51.
As Kavka immediately points out, it seems to be the case that
(LAP) has ~some very counter-intuitive consequences. It implies,
for example, that it is permissible for the owner 1n case 2 [the
Friend case] to simply pour the drug down a sewer, and save
neither his friend nor the five strangers."52 Also, if it is
something like (LAP) that Taurek uses to justify his verdicts in
First Person and Friend, then his discussion of those cases can't
51Kavka, p.240.
52 Kavka, p.240.
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succeed in telling us much about the role of numbers in morality.
Kavka also argues that any thesis about the role of numbers in
morality follows from (LAP) only if we also accept the following
principle
CO): "Moral reasoning and decision making about giving aid is
concerned solely with determining onels moral obligations (in
the libertarian sense) II • 53
The conjunction of (LAP) and (0) does, indeed, appear to imply
that numbers don't matter in morality. Unfortunately, that
conjunction also implies that virtually nothing matters in
morality, including many things that all of us, including Taurek,
want to turn out to matter l such as whether or not human lives are
at stake. For instance, to use an example that Kavka offers, if
in Friend or Six Strangers the agent doesn't need the drug for his
survival but feels like drinking it because, for instance, he
likes the way it tastes, (LAP) and (0) together imply that it is
morally permissible for the agent to drink the drug and let all
six die.
I doubt that Taurek wants things to come out that way. And I
don't know what Taurek's views actually are regarding (LAP) and
(0), and whether or not he has a way of making them compatible
with cornman sense and his other views. But my task in this paper
is not to defend everything that Taurek says or believes, but only
to defend his challenge to the standard view of the role of
numbers in morality. And I believe that there is an easy way to
53 Kavka, p. 240.
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make Taurek's main arguments work in spite of this problem.
Whether or not Taurek would endorse this kind of a V1ew is a
separate question, although I hope that he may have had something
roughly like this in mind.
I think that Taurek is wrong from the outset when he tries to
justify his judgments regarding Friend and First Person by an
appeal to the purported fact that the agent would be violating no
one's rights if he gave the drug to the one rather than the five.
And the reason I believe this is a mistake is exactly the reason
that Kavka hints at. The question of whether or not anyone's
rights are violated, especially if rights are construed as
narrowly as they are on the libertarian account presented by
Kavka, doesn't entirely settle the issue of whether or not an
action is morally permissible. For instance, it should, at least
in principle, be possible that the agent violates no one's rights
by keeping the drug for himself (say, to save his own arm) and, in
fact, even has the right to do so, but it is still morally wrong
for him to do it. 54
Especially if rights are construed in a libertarian way, one's
moral theory has to leave room for the possibility that the agent
would violate no one's rights by doing P and yet would be doing
54 It also seems possible (depending, of course, on what the correct
theory of rights is) that an agent may find himself in a situation
where he has to violate someone's rights if he is to do the morally
correct thing. This is, perhaps, yet another reason why, unless
Taurek is willing to offer a convincing and comprehensive theory of
rights to go along with his arguments, he might be better off if he
stays away from basing his conclusions on the contentious question of
whether or not someone's rights are violated if they don't get the
life-saving drug.
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something morally impermissible if he did P. This appears to be
precisely the case with the action of drinking the drug for its
good taste and letting all six people who need the drug in order
to survive die. Any theory of rights, even if not fully
libertarian, that respects some notion of private property, would
probably say that the agent has the right to withhold the drug for
himself even if he doesn't really need it. However, I don't see
how it can be morally permissible to drink the drug for its good
taste and let innocent people die.
The way for Taurek to keep his first argument on this view of
rights and moral permissibility is to back his judgments about the
First Person and Friend cases by nothing but intuitions about what
is and what is not morally permissible, unless, of course, Taurek
can find new arguments that are different from the ones criticized
by Kavka. After all, few would disagree with its being morally
permissible to save someone you know and like rather than five
strangers. And almost no one, if anyone at all, would disagree
with the intuition that it is morally permissible to take the drug
to save one's own life rather than give it away to save the lives
of five strangers. Someone who doesn't share that intuition,
however, is in a position to pretty much completely disregard all
of Taurek's first argument. But such people would have been in a
position to do that even with regard to the original version of
the argument. That's one reason why on the whole I think that
Taurek's second argument is much stronger and much more difficult
to refute than his first one - the former isn't founded solely on
intuitions and controversial principles that are very easy to just
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deny at the outset.
The way I have just described is, perhaps, not the only way to
fix Taurek's first argument so that it doesn't need to rely on
(LAP) and (0) at the same time (in fact, it's possible, if not
likely, that neither one needs to be accepted), but it seems to me
to be a good way. My suggestion also seems to be consistent with
Taurek's expressed views, at least insofar as that is possible, as
Kavka does seem to have latched on to some contradictions in
Taurek's position. Be that as it may, any defender of the
standard view of the role of numbers in morality still has a
modified and seemingly consistent version of Taurek's first
argument to contend with, as well as his second argument, which, I
think, is where the really important issues lie anyway.
subsection 2: The Transitivity Objection.
The second part of Kavka's paper focuses on Taurek's second
argument, as well as the compatibility of Taurek's main conclusion
with certain widely accepted principles. Kavka's analogy between
morality and prudence does not, I believe, deserve any additional
attention from us. It adds nothing to Parfit's analogy between
the moral summing of different people's suffering and the moral
summing of the suffering endured by one person at different times.
And that is an analogy which, I think has been sufficiently
discussed in section III and subsequently rejected.
Kavka's remaining objection, however, deserves much closer
attention. The objection is aimed at the heart of Taurek's main
conclusion. Kavka argues against the claim that the agent in six
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Strangers should be morally indifferent between saving the one and
saving the five by offering a version of Six Strangers that is
slightly modified as far as the options that the agent has, call
it case six' -
Six': "Let us name the six strangers, calling the one who
needs all the drug Sam, and the others Mel, Tim, Art, Cal, and
Len. Let Ai be the act of giving the whole dose to Sam, and A2
be the act of giving one-fifth of it to each of the others ...
[also], he [the agent] could, for example, give one-fifth of the
drug to each of Mel, Tim, Art, and Cal, and pour the rest on the
ground. Call this act A3."55
We need to keep in mind that on Taurek's view we should be morally
indifferent between Ai and A2. Now Kavka invites us to compare Al
and A3. Kavka believes that according to Taurek we should be
morally indifferent between Ai and A3 as well. That is a claim to
which I will come back later. But, assuming we grant Kavka's
contention, the point is that "it is a general presupposition of
rational choice that indifference (i.e. the absence of preference)
is a transitive relation. It follows, therefore, that we should
also be indifferent between A2 and A3."56 But this conclusion is
completely unacceptable as it implies that it is a matter of no
moral consequence, should we choose to save Mel, Tim, Art, and
Cal, whether or not we save Len as well. As Kavka correctly
remarks, this conclusion would be especially hard to sell to Len.
Thus, Kavka concludes, Taurek's main thesis is in contradiction
with an "accepted general principle of rational choice", and thus
should be rejected.
55Kavka, p.241.
56Kavka, p. 241 .
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Kavka is correct in pointing out that Taurek can't escape this
difficulty by simply appealing to the fact that he is not
interested in cases involving overlapping groups of people. After
all, if his theory regarding non-overlapping groups of people has
contradictory or absurd consequences for situations involving
overlapping groups, Taurek is in trouble whether or not his
original interests included overlapping groups. Kavka also
maintains that Taurek is not in a position to rule out A3 as a
legitimate option on a par with Al and A2, even though A3, unlike
Al or A2, involves the wasting of a potentially life-saving
portion of the drug on a whim. Taurek, however, definitely seems
to believe in some sort of a non-arbitrariness requirement, i.e.
that, at least in situations that are as important to the people
involved as the situation in Six' is, the agent ought not act
arbitrarily. For instance, when he discusses the Six Strangers
case, Taurek expresses concern that \\any preference I might show,
therefore, if it is not to be thought arbitrary, would require
grounding U57 , which is why he concludes that he must flip a coin. 58
57Taurek, p.221.
58Ral p h Wedgwood and a few others have objected that flipping a coin is
an action that's as arbitrary as an action can get. In reply, I want
to suggest that the disagreement is merely terminological. What I,
and presumably Taurek as well, mean by saying that an action was
arbitrary is that there were no moral reasons to prefer it to its
alternatives, and that it was selected via an illegitimate procedure,
in the sense which includes, but is not limited to (I do not have a
precise definition in mind), the procedure's being unfair. For
instance, selecting who to save based merely on the race, religious
affiliation, or height of those involved constitutes, in my idiolect,
an illegitimate procedure; any decision derived solely from such a
procedure would be arbitrary, as would be the resulting action.
Taurek argues that the size of the group that shares the threatening
situation with a person should be on the list with race, religion, and
111
Pouring out one fifth of the drug most definitely would,
according to Taurek, constitute an arbitrary, ungrounded action.
It is, however, difficult to see how Taurek would incorporate some
sort of a non-arbitrariness principle into his, on the whole
seemingly libertarian, framework59 • So, perhaps Kavka is right
when he says that Taurek is hard put to reject A3 as a legitimate
option. I, on the other hand, as a provisional defender of
Taurek's main conclusion who is not, however, bound to the defense
of the rest of his views, seem to be in a very good position to
reject A3 as an illegitimate alternative, since I have shown that
there is a way to retain a slightly slimmed down version of
Taurek's first argument, not to mention his second argument,
without accepting both (LAP) and (0). There is no reason why some
sort of a non-arbitrariness principle cannot be part of the kind
of framework that I've suggested a Taurek defender can accept. In
fact, I would be surprised if some sort of a principle like that
were not part of such a framework. Thus I definitely may be in a
position to reject A3 on the spot as a morally impermissible
alternative.
However, there are difficulties. Kavka might object that I
owe him the details of the alternative framework, as well as an
explicit formulation of the non-arbitrariness principle I've been
speaking of; and supplying an adequate response to this objection
height. There is, however, it seems to me, nothing arbitrary in that
way about using a random and fair procedure, such as a coin toss, to
choose between morally equivalent alternatives.
59For a discussion of such a principle and where the adoption of it
would lead Taurek, see section V.
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might prove to be a very difficult and unrewarding task. Also, I
can't completely rule out the possibility that a more complex
example can be constructed in place of Six/, in which the
counterpart of A3 will not be so easy to rule out. So, to take
the simple way out of this conundrum, I will simply reject Kavka's
objection after showing that the principle of transitivity of
moral indifference, if applied in the way that Kavka applies it,
also leads to counterintuitive and, in fact, seemingly absurd
consequences unrelated to the Taurek controversy.
Consider the Migraine case -
Migraine: I am the only person in town who is both in
possession of medications and capable of administering them
safely. I can save either Mary's or John's life by delivering a
dose of a drug to one of them. I only have one dose
of the drug and cannot obtain any more in time to save both John
and Mary. John and Mary live on opposite sides of town. If I
choose to save John, I will be located close enough to Mike to
be able to give him a pill that will immediately relieve his
migraine headache. If I do not give Mike the pill, his migraine
will go away in ten minutes anyway, and there will be no serious
ill effects, either in the long or in the short run, of Mike's
having had the migraine for an additional ten minutes. There
are, of course, no special considerations involved.
Let Ml be the option of saving Mary's life, M2 - the option of
saving John's life and relieving Mike's migraine, and M3 - the
option of saving John's life and then going home without bothering
with Mike's migraine. In the Migraine case, M3 is definitely a
legitimate option, even if some sort of a non-arbitrariness
principle is endorsed. It may be the case that if it costs me
virtually nothing (say, a five minute walk) to save sorneone's
life, then, even though I have the right to decline the
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opportunity, I really ought to save the person's life. But it
would be outrageous to claim that, very special considerations
aside, I am under a similar kind of moral pressure to save someone
from an extra ten minutes of a migraine headache.
It is obvious that one should be morally indifferent between
Ml and M3. After all, in each case one life of a total stranger
is saved, and neglecting to relieve someone's ten-minute migraine
is, barring extraordinarily special circumstances, morally
permissible. I also maintain that one should be morally
indifferent between Ml and M2. The minor suffering inflicted by a
ten minute migraine headache is not even close to being
sufficient, on anybody's view I think, to tip the moral balance
between saving John and saving Mary in John's favor. Even Mike, I
believe, would agree with that. So, if we accept the transitivity
principle, we should, according to Kavka, then also be morally
indifferent between M2 and M3.
But that means that once I save John, there is no moral
difference whatsoever between my going home and my assisting Mike.
Granted, I am morally permitted to ignore Mike's quite mild and
short-lived suffering, and would be performing a supererogatory
act by assisting Mike, but can one really say that it is not
morally preferable that I help Mike at basically no cost to myself
rather than do nothing? Perhaps the case can be made even more
convincing by increasing Mike's suffering considerably, while
still making sure that it falls far short of death or permanent
disability. But even as stated, I believe the Migraine case shows
that the principle of transitivity of indifference cannot be
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safely applied to moral decision-making in the way suggested by
Kavka.
It occurs to me that some might doubt my claim that there is a
moral reason to prefer M2 to M3, even though we should be morally
indifferent between Ml and M2. After all, in both comparisons we
have a death on each side and a migraine on only one of the sides.
I believe that my claim is clearly true and would be surprised to
see someone argue otherwise. However, for such skeptics I think
that I can offer an even more convincing example by, so to speak,
internalizing Mike. The discussion of this case will also suggest
at least one possible way of analyzing such examples without
having to outright abandon the principle of transitivity of moral
indifference. Consider the case of
Broken Ribs: I am the only person who can save either John or
Mary, but I cannot save both of them. There are, as usual, no
special considerations involved. There are, however, two
procedures by means of which I can save Mary'S life. One of the
procedures would result in the breaking of several of her ribs.
Let's call the option of saving John Rl, the option of saving Mary
without breaking her ribs R2, and the option of saving Mary while
breaking her ribs R3.
Clearly, we should be morally indifferent between Rl and R2.
But suppose R2 were unavailable for some reason. In that case,
there seems no way to deny that we should be morally indifferent
between Rl and R3. What would we say to try to convince Mary that
we ought to prefer saving John to saving her? "Surely", we might
say, "it is better to save a person's life without any damage to
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his or her body than to save another person/s life while
inflicting an injurYI even if it's not permanent or life-
threatening." But that/s not likely to be very convincing. Mary
would probably reply that she wants to live as much as John does
and has just as much of a reason for it as John, even if the
option R2 is no longer available to her. If the only way to
survive is to endure the pain of several broken ribs for a few
weeks I then so be it! The price is not even close to being
comparable to the potential gain.
In this easel unlike Migraine l there isn't a third person to
even suggest that the moral considerations on one side can
possibly outweigh the ones on the other in comparing Rl and R3.
If we apply the principle of transitivity of moral indifference
the way Kavka appears to be applying it, it seems that we should
be morally indifferent between R2 and R3. But can we be? How can
R2 not be morally preferable to R3? If in doubt, just ask Mary
whether or not she prefers the option that would allow her not to
suffer through several weeks of pain and limited mobility because
of multiple broken ribs.
It looks as if the principle of transitivity of moral
indifference ~s in trouble. But it seems grossly counterintuitive
to abandon the principle of transitivity of indifference for
rational choice. I see at least two alternatives. The first is
to argue that transitivity of indifference does hold for rational
choice, but not for moral choice. After all, even though both
relations in question are called "indifference" I no argument has
been given either for the claim that the two are l in facti the
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same relation (i.e., to be more precise, that one is a subset of
the other), or for the claim that at least they must have similar
properties. This alternative, however, is hardly very intuitive
either. Also, examples somewhat similar to my Migraine and Broken
Ribs cases have been brought up in discussions of rational non-
moral choice as well. GO Thus it is, after all, likely that the
principle of transitivity of indifference for rational choice and
the principle of transitivity of moral indifference stand or fall
together in the face of the objection stemming from my examples
and others like them.
The second option is to define the preferences and absences of
preference more finely with respect to the other alternatives that
are available. For example, in Broken Ribs one might say that we
should only be morally indifferent between Rl and R3 if R2 is
unavailable. If, on the other hand, R2 is available, then we
should prefer Rl to R3 and thus only choose between R1 and R2.
Similarly, perhaps we should only be morally indifferent between
Ml and M3 if M2 is unavailable (although that might be a little
bit harder to swallow). Otherwise, we should prefer Ml to M3 and
thus only choose between Ml and M2. If so, the principle of
transitivity of moral indifference is not endangered by my
examples, and neither is the principle of transitivity of
60 Such examples have come up, for instance, in the context of
discussions regarding incomparability and incommensurability. See,
for example, Ruth Chang's discussion of "arguments from small
improvements" in her Introduction to Incommensurability,
Incomparability and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, 1997)i
although those examples were not intended to directly target either
transitivity of indifference or transitivity of the relation ~better
than n •
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indifference for rational non-moral choice. But then, of course,
this very same strategy, applied to the Six' case, invalidates
Kavka's objection to Taurek's conclusion, as Taurek is no longer
committed to maintaining that one should be morally indifferent
between Al and A3 in the presence of A2.
There may be, and probably are, at least a few other
strategies that Kavka can resort to ln defending the principle of
transitivity of moral indifference from my objection. 61 But it
seems clear that any such strategy can subsequently be used to
invalidate his own objection against Taurek. Thus Kavka has
failed to discredit Taurek's non-standard view of the role of
numbers in morality. We now move on to section V in which, while
I believe that I will still be able to defend Taurek's main
conclusion, his first argument, at least if it is to be an
argument for precisely the conclusion he must have had in mind,
will meet its untimely but well-deserved demise.
Section v.
Arbitrariness, Restrictions on Knowledge and Other
Objections by Ken Dickey.
In his article ~Why I May Count the Numbers", Ken Dickey
61 1 certainly don't see the Migraine and Broken Ribs cases as
counterexamples to the principle of transitivity of moral
indifference, but only as problems to be overcome by modifying the
principle while retaining the general idea behind it.
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offers an objection to Taurek's views which, I will argue, is
entirely ineffective and unsuccessful. In the process, however,
without I think realizing it at all, Ken Dickey helps strike down
Taurek's first argument for the conclusion that all other things
being equal, it is morally permissible to save one person rather
than five. At the very least, especially in light of our
discussions of the first argument in preceding sections, it
appears that Taurek has to abandon the first argument unless he is
willing to make his main conclusion much weaker and much less
plausible than he wants it to be.
Subsection 1: Arbitrariness and the Inadvertent Demise of
Taurek's First Argument.
As a consequence of the Non-Relativity Principle which I discuss
in section 11 62 , as well as Taurek's judgments regarding the First
Person and Friend cases, we arrive at the conclusion that Taurek
should believe that in Six Strangers it is not only morally
permissible for the agent to give the drug to the one (which ~s
understandably the part of the conclusion that Taurek concentrates
on since it's the part that directly challenges the standard view
62A reminder:
Non-Relativity Principle: "if it would be morally permissible
for B to choose to spare himself a certain loss, H, instead of
sparing another person, C, a loss, H', in a situation where he
cannot spare C and himself as well, then it must be permissible
for someone else, not under any relevant obligations to the
contrary, to take B's perspective, that is, to choose to secure
the outcome most favorable to B instead of the outcome most
favorable to C, if he cannot secure what would be best for each".
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of the role of numbers in morality), but also to give the drug to
the five. So, Dickey asks, why can't the agent just act on his
non-agent-relative permission to save the five simply because he
likes the idea of saving the greater number of people? Taurek
definitely seems to think that to do so, rather than to flip a
coin, or perform some probabilistic equivalent thereof, and thus
give everyone involved an equal chance for survival, would not be
the right thing to do. Assuming that Taurek means here that it
would be morally wrong not to flip a coin in six Strangers, rather.
than that it's simply a worse alternative or just that he
personally doesn't approve of it, he seems to be contradicting his
own Non-Relativity Principle.
Here is what Dickey has to say: "I believe the best way of
characterizing Taurek's position to avoid this dilemma is to say
that, according to Taurek, while I have a non-agent-relative
permission to save either the one or the five in Case 3 [Six
Strangers], I should not act on this non-agent-relative permission
in an arbi trary manner" 63 • I concur. Furthermore, I agree with
Dickey that Taurek most definitely believes that special
considerations aside, deciding who to save based solely on the
relative numbers of people involved is arbitrary. Based on what
we already know about Taurek's views, Dickey formulates the
following
63 Ken Dickey "Why I May Count the Numbers" I ETHICS Problems and
Principles, ed. by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich College Publishers 1992, p.245i
All future quotations from Dickey are from this article.
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Arbitrariness Principle (AP): "In conflict cases of the type
under consideration, I should not act on non-agent-relative
permissions in an arbitrary manner, where "arbitrary manner"
(i) includes acting on the basis of the relative numbers of
people involved, in itself, as a significant factor in making a
decision, and (ii)does not include acting in order to save
someone I know and like,,64.
of course/ Dickey should also add that one does not act
arbitrarily in saving oneself. And, in addition/ clause (ii) is
quite controversial. In fact, Parfit doesn't really agree with it
and I am not so sure that I do either65 . But I certainly think
that Dickey correctly captures the relevant parts of what Taurek
has in mind. I also want to point out that we probably want to
endorse some sort of a non-arbitrariness principle regardless of
the Taurek controversy, as presumably in all kinds of tradeoff
situations we do not want to allow for choices based, for
instance, on the race, ethnicity, hair color, eye color/ or height
of the people involved. 66
There is another arbitrariness-related issue left to
64Dickey, p. 246.
65See section VII for a little bit more on that topic.
66Some may object to adopting any kind of a non-arbitrariness principle
and claim that if there is no moral reason to prefer one alternative
to another, the agent is morally permitted to pick whichever
alternative pleases him more for any reason/ even if the preference is
based on a complete whim. In particular, then/ on this assumption,
Taurek's claim which I will be discussing in a few paragraphs is wrong
and an agent would be morally permitted to give the drug to the five
outright in six Strangers. But that would still not mean that numbers
are a factor relevant to morality; just as even if we refused to adopt
some form of a non-arbitrariness principle about race/ and thus
assumed that a white racist was morally free, all other things being
equal, to save a white person over a black one for no reason other
than the colors of their skins, that would still in no way imply that
race is a morally relevant factor.
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consider. Taurek is very concerned about the losses to persons,
even though he is not concerned about the losses of persons. Even
though he does not believe that he is morally required to save a
stranger's life rather than another stranger's arm, he clearly
does not think that it would be arbitrary for him to do so, given
that the loss of one's life is a much greater loss to a person
than the loss of one's arm. In general, Taurek definitely does
not claim that it is arbitrary to act so as to prevent the
greatest amount of loss to anyone person, at the very least when
that loss is considerably greater than any loss that we could
prevent someone from suffering by acting otherwise.
Dickey's
Hence
Modified Arbitrariness Principle (MAP): ~In conflict cases of
the type under consideration, I should not act on non-agent-
relative permissions in an arbitrary manner/ where ~arbitrary
manner" (i) includes acting on the basis of the relative numbers
of people involved, in itself, as a significant factor in making
a decision, (ii)does not include acting in order to save someone
I know and like, and (iii)does not include acting so as to
prevent the greatest amount of loss to anyone person,,67.
Dickey is now ready to present his argument against Taurek. But
before I address that argument, I want to mention a major
consequence of this discussion that Dickey apparently neither
intended nor noticed.
On several occasions in the course of his discussion Dickey
draws our attention to the word "should" in Taurek's claim that
one should not act arbitrarily on one's non-agent-relative
67 Dickey, p. 247 .
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permissions. What kind of force is the nshould" supposed to have
here? I would suggest that Taurek intends it to have the
strongest possible force - that of "ought". The reason I believe
this to be the case is that the alternatives seem to be too weak
for Taurek's purposes. For suppose that all he means is at best 68
that flipping a coin is morally preferable to just acting on one
of the agent's two non-agent-relative permissions without flipping
a coin first, but that all three alternatives are morally
permissible. That would basically mean that while there is no
moral reason to prefer saving five people to saving one person,
which would already be a major victory for anyone opposed to the
standard view of the role of numbers in morality, whether or not
to count the numbers is up to the individual. Perhaps, it is
morally preferable to flip a coin. But if one happens to have a
preference for saving larger numbers of people, he or she is
morally permitted to act on that preference without flipping a
coin.
It is important to note that this would then also have to be
true about the opposite preference. If one happens to have a
taste for saving smaller numbers of people, he is morally
permitted to act on that preference as well. Even this conclusion
would defeat the standard view that the larger number ought to be
saved. But I believe that this kind of a conclusion is by far too
weak for what Taurek has in mind here. And, in any case, I do not
68As I said before, the nshould" could mean even less - it could,
conceivably (but just barely so); simply be expressing Taurek's
personal preferences.
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find it in the least bit plausible that such an important moral
decision as whether or not to count the numbers in tradeoff
situations, not to mention which way to count them if they are
counted, is left up to the individual tastes of agents by the true
theory of morality. Thus I am going to assume that the "should"
is intended to have the force of "ought", and that in six
Strangers Taurek maintains that the agent ought to flip a coin, or
perform some probabilistic equivalent, in order to determine who
to save.
But under this interpretation Taurek has a major problem. In
First Person, as well as in Friend, the agent is supposedly
morally permitted to forgo a coin toss and give the drug to the
one rather than the five. Presumably, that is because of the
special relationship between the agent and the one person in the
two cases. On the other hand, in six Strangers the agent 1S not
morally permitted to forgo the coin toss and give the drug to the
one outright, even though Taurek's judgments in First Person and
Friend imply the opposite when conjoined with the Non-Relativity
Principle. Presumably, in fact it appears to be the only
explanation that Taurek can consistently give, that is because
there is no special relationship between the agent and the one
person in this case, and so it would be arbitrary for the agent to
use his non-agent-relative permission to save the one, without
flipping a coin first to determine who to save. But the situation
which I have just described happens to be a paradigm of an agent-
relative permission, because there is an action A, namely forgoing
the coin toss and just giving the drug to the one, that an agent
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is morally permitted to engage in only if he has a special
relationship to the one. But Taurek doesn't believe in agent-
relative permissions. In fact, his entire first argument relies
heavily on denying the existence of agent-relative permissions 69 .
If we continue to reject the weak interpretation of ~should",
as I believe we have no choice but to do, Taurek has only two
options: (l)he can admit that agent-relative permissions exist
after all, and so give up the Non-Relativity Principle, or (2)he
can reject his initial judgments regarding the First Person and
Friend cases, which, considering his conclusion in Six Strangers,
would seem to indicate that the agent in those two cases ought to
flip a coin as well. Regardless of which option Taurek chooses,
his first argument is now deceased if he wants it to be an
argument for the strong and at least minimally plausible
conclusion that I believe he had set out to argue for70 71.
69Accepting agent-relative permissions undermines the Non-Relativity
Principle, without which Taurek's first argument cannot even get off
the ground.
70 1 stand by the grave concerns that I have expressed in section III
regarding the notion of agent-relative permissions, at least as
presented by Parfit. However, I do find reversing Taurek's judgment
in First Person extremely disturbing and counterintuitive. So, if I
am presented with a better argument for some version of agent-relative
permissions, that hopefully addresses the difficulties discussed in
section III, I will, despite some serious reservations, be more than
happy to accept agent-relative permissions in some form.
One other possibility, which, perhaps, can be worked on, is that
saving yourself outright at the expense of saving five others in First
Person is as morally impermissible as saving the one in six Strangers
outright, but saving yourself in First Person is less blameworthy,
i.e. there are no agent-relative permissions as such, but there is
agent-relative blameworthiness. If this could be made to work, we
would, so to speak, be able to have it both ways, at least to some
extent. But this option seems to have more plausibility in the case
of my arm vs. a stranger's life, than in a situation where my life is
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Ironically, it is not, as Parfit would have us believe,
Taurek's denial of agent-relative permissions that brings down the
argument, but his inadvertent and hitherto unnoticed acceptance of
them. But, as far as I am concerned, good riddance! I believed
from the outset that the first argument was a lot more trouble
than it was worth, even though a few good discussions that are
valuable for their own sake were produced by it. And the second
argument, which, as I have claimed before, is a much stronger,
interesting and illuminating one, still remalns to challenge the
standard view of the role of numbers in morality.
Subsection 2: The Argument from Probabilities.
We should now consider Dickey's actual objection against Taurek's
conclusion. Dickey suggests at the beginning of his paper that
uTaurek's position that the numbers should not count is intended
(among other things) to serve as a guide for private citizens in
making decisions in real-life situations ... "72. I see no reason to
disagree. Now, having formulated (MAP), Dickey asks whether it is
really true that, even in light of clause (iii), there is still no
non-arbitrary reason to prefer saving five people in Six
at stake.
71Trying to rebuild Taurek's first argument by starting with the claim
that in First Person and Friend it is morally permissible to flip a
coin, although not necessarily to give the drug to the one outright,
seems to be a non-starter - while this could perhaps be the conclusion
of a very complicated argument, this is hardly a sufficiently strong
and plausible intuition to serve as the initial premise of an
argument.
72 Dickey, p. 244.
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Strangers. However, since he believes that the thesis
The amount of loss to a person who dies is the same for
all persons who die the same type of death. 73
is at least somewhat plausible, and he does not wish to be
sidetracked by arguing about it in his paper, Dickey prefers to
discuss an example similar to six Strangers which, however, does
not involve potential deaths. He offers for our consideration the
following variation, let's call it
Six Strangers': "I have a supply of some right-arm-saving
drug. six people will certainly lose their right arms if not
treated with the drug. One requires all of the drug if he (or
she) is to retain his (or her) right arm. Each of the other
five requires only one-fifth of the drug. I do not know any of
the six involved and have no special obligations to any of them.
What ought I to do? ,,74
It is Dickey's declared goal to prove, by means of Six
Strangers', that "Taurek's position that the numbers should not
count is inconsistent when applied to cases in which harms other
than deaths are involved, if interpreted as an action-guiding
principle for private citizens in real-life situations,,75. He
attempts to show this by arguing that even in accordance with
Taurek's rules of engagement, there are non-arbitrary reasons for
preferring to help the five strangers instead of the one in Six
Strangers'. But, in order for his argument to proceed, he needs
to assume that he doesn't have all the relevant information about
the six people involved. This is a crucial assumption and,
73 Dickey, p. 247 .
74D ickey, p. 247 .
75D ickey, p. 244.
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because he cannot avoid making it if the argument is to have a
chance to work, that argument cannot possibly show that Taurek is
wrong in maintaining that we ought to flip a coin in cases where
we know that all the strangers involved stand to lose equally if
not helped. The most Dickey can hope to achieve with this line of
reasoning, is to show that if we do not know exactly how much each
person stands to lose, but only know that all of the potential
losses fall under a category of harm with the same generic
description, such as ~the loss of a right arm" (which is likely to
be the case in most real-life situations), there are non-arbitrary
reasons for not flipping a coin and just helping the larger group
of strangers; thus, Dickey hopes to conclude, saving the larger
group outright is, at the very least, morally permissible.
Such a claim is interesting in itself and perhaps somewhat
unpleasant for Taurek as well, since I agree with Dickey that
Taurek probably intends his conclusion to be applicable as a
~practical action-guiding principle in real-life situations".
However, it is a well known truth about philosophy that
demonstrating that it is difficult, or even practically
impossible, to apply a philosophical principle in real-life
situations, is usually insufficient to prove that principle false.
That is the case here as well: nothing that Dickey can say under
the assumption of such a ser~ous epistemic limitation can refute
Taurek's main claim that special considerations aside, when the
potential losses to all the strangers involved are equal and the
agent knows all the relevant facts, the agent should flip a coin
to decide between the two groups of strangers regardless of the
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relative sizes of the groups. If one concedes even this much to
Taurek, one denies the validity of the standard view of the role
of numbers in morality. Dickey is; of course; aware of this and
would likely be the first to admit it; but I think that it needed
to be explicitly remarked and kept in mind throughout the
discussion that is to follow.
So now that all the preliminaries are out of the way, let's
grant Dickey his epistemic assumption and see his argument
through. It presumably falls within the scope of the epistemic
constraint which we have accepted that we do not know about any
one of the strangers involved whether or not he or she is a right-
handed pitcher in Major League Baseball. But, Dickey claims; the
loss of a right arm would be a greater loss for a right-handed
pitcher in Major League Baseball than it would be for most other
people. And, he says, however small the probability, P, of any
given stranger's turning out to be a right-handed pitcher in Major
League Baseball is, it is surely greater than zero. And so, the
probability of it being the case that at least one of a group of
five strangers turns out to be a right-handed pitcher in Major
League Baseball, 5P, is greater than P. Of course; part of what
Dickey says here is false, as the probability of there being at
least one right-handed pitcher in Major League Baseball in a group
of five people is, under the assumptions we have made, not 5P, but
1-(1-P)5. This, however, makes no difference to the argument, as
1-(1-P)5 is greater than p for P between 0 and 1.
Thus, Dickey concludes, if he helps the group of five
strangers, he decreases the probability of an outcome in which at
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least one of the people he does not help, and who thereby loses
his or her right arm, is a right-handed pitcher in Major League
Baseball and thus suffers a greater than average loss associated
with losing a right arm. He adds, "if I am, as Taurek seems to
be, seriously concerned with preventing the greatest amount of
loss to anyone individual, it would be rational in Case 3' [Six
Strangers'] to act so as to maximize the probability that I am
acting so as to prevent the greatest amount of loss to any
individual ... since I can see nothing morally objectionable about
acting on relative probabilities in this way, I conclude it would
not be arbitrary, according to clause (iii) of (MAP), for me to
act in Case 3' [Six Strangers'] so as to save the five - without
first flipping a coin"76. But that implies that clause (iii) of
(MAP) contradicts clause (i) of (MAP), leading, Dickey hopes, to
his intended conclusion that Taurek's position is inconsistent if
it is evaluated as an action-guiding principle for real-life
situations. The argument, Dickey claims in his footnote 14, can
be generalized to encompass any generic category of harm.
Unfortunately for Dickey, his argument is deeply flawed in at
least several ways. For one thing, even if we grant Dickey that
the amount of loss involved in losing a right arm is greater for a
right-handed pitcher in Major League Baseball than for almost
anyone else, what is it that entitles him to claim that that loss
is the greatest loss possible under the description "losing one's
right arm"77? There isn't even a guarantee that there is a maximal
76Dickey, p. 248.
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possible loss to a person associated with the loss of a right arm.
Also, what exactly entitles Dickey to conclude that the loss of a
right arm is a greater loss for a right handed pitcher in Major
League Baseball than for almost anyone else. It seems to me like
a very presumptuous conjecture on Dickey's part. This, however,
is an issue that it is very difficult and probably quite fruitless
to argue about. So I will grant Dickey this assumption as well.
But I still maintain that even if his claim is correct, the
differential between the losses is very small as compared to the
loss itself.
I now want to draw attention to the precise formulation of
clause (iii) of (MAP). After all, if the charge against Taurek is
inconsistency, we have to make sure that the clause is stated in a
way that Taurek can accept. But I think it is clear from reading
Taurek that he would not accept clause (iii) unless it specified
that the differential between the losses being considered should
be rather large (probably quite significant in comparison with the
losses themselves) in order for a preference based on it to be
non-arbitrary. For instance, Taurek is unlikely to consider the
difference between B's losing an arm and, in addition to that,
suffering a minor headache, and C's just losing an arm,
significant enough to ground a non-arbitrary preference for
sparing B his loss rather than sparing C his loss. In addition, a
77 For instance, if we stipulate that the loss of a right arm is more of
a loss for a concert pianist than even for a right-handed pitcher in
Major League Baseball, shouldn't Dickey also worry about how his
suggested course of action fares as far as minimizing the probability
of a scenario in which a concert pianist loses his or her right arm?
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similar objection applies, I think, to the probabilities.
Considering the exceedingly small (enough to be considered
negligible in everyday life) probability, P, of a random
stranger's turning out to be a right-handed pitcher in Major
League Baseball, the difference between 1-(l-P)5 and P is
unlikely, as far as Taurek is concerned, to be sufficiently large
to ground a non-arbitrary preference for saving the group of five
people in Six Strangers'. Thus I would conclude that Dickey has
failed to bring out any inconsistency in Taurek's v~ews by
examining the six Strangers' case.
But that's not all. I believe there is yet another way to
show that Dickey's argument doesn't work. In order to do that I
will run an argument similar to his, but for the opposite
conclusion. There is a probability C, slightly greater than zero,
that any given stranger selected at random will develop a
cancerous tumor in his or her right arm that will eventually prove
fatal. In fact, that probability is quite likely to be greater
than the probability of that stranger's being a right-handed
pitcher in Major League Baseball. But then the probability of it
being the case that at least one of a group of five strangers will
at some point develop such a cancerous tumor, 1-(1-C)5, is greater
than C. By reasoning identical to that of Dickey, I have a non-
arbitrary reason for saving the one stranger instead of the five,
since by doing so I would minimize the probability of the outcome
in which at least one of the people involved suffers a much
greater than average loss associated with keeping his or her right
arm. I see no way for Dickey to reject my argument without
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abandoning his. If his argument can be generalized, as he
suggests in his footnote 14, so can mine.
Dickey might respond: ~That/s fine with me. The conclusion of
your argument, as counterintuitive and ridiculous as it, and the
reasoning behind it, sound, still shows that it is morally
permissible to count the numbers in cases such as Six Strangers',
and that Taurek is wrong (at least if he wants his conclusion to
serve as an action-guiding principle in real-life situations)". I
disagree. I think all that the conclusion of my mock argument
shows is that Dickey's argument is fatally flawed and cannot be
taken seriously. Once Dickey allows probabilities of outcomes, no
matter how insignificant, to seriously affect what is or is not
morally permitted in a particular case, he opens a Pandora's box
and all kinds of insane consequences follow. As can be seen by
comparing my argument with his, letting even negligible
probabilities playa role allows us, and, in fact, forces us/ to
see each potential loss as also a possible benefit and vice versa,
thus giving us a non-arbitrary reason to avoid a course of action
every time we have a non-arbitrary reason to prefer it (and, of
courser vice versa). That is hardly a desirable quality in a
modification to an action-guiding principle for real-life
situations! When this difficulty is combined with my other
objections to Dickey/s argument, not to mention the fact that
denying the applicability of Taurek's conclusion to real-life
situations doesn't even begin to discredit it as a true principle,
I think it is safe to conclude that Dickey's argument is not a
threat to Taurek/s views as a whole.
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Section VI.
The Problem of Fairness.
Once Taurek reaches the conclusion that it is not in any way
better to save the five strangers rather than the one in Six
Strangers (or, to put it differently, that there is no non-
arbitrary reason for preferring saving the five to saving the
one), he adds that the agent should flip a coin, as this is the
fairest and most reasonable thing to do. It does, indeed, seem
both fair and reasonable to flip a coin in order to decide between
two alternatives, neither of which we have a non-arbitrary reason
to prefer. But even this step has not been allowed to pass
without some controversy. In her book Morality, Mortality, Volume
I, Frances Kamm argues that there are procedures other than a coin
toss, or some probabilistic equivalent of a coin toss, that
perhaps qualify for being fair. Employing anyone of those
procedures would amount to allowing the numbers to count in some
way. John Broome, in his article ~Kamm on Fairness", disagrees
with Kamm and concludes that Taurek is right in that the only fair
procedure in a case like Six Strangers is a coin toss or some
probabilistic equivalent. However, he adds, ~fairness is not
everything. Fairness requires tossing a coin ... but the fairness
of tossing a coin is outweighed by the expected badness of the
result. Tossing a coin will lead you to save three lives on
average (the expectation of lives saved is three), whereas you
could save five for sure. Two lives are worth some unfairness, I
should say. Therefore, I think you should save the five without
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more ado.,,78
Karnrn disagrees that fairness should be overridden by
considerations of goodness. In her reply to Broome, she says that
if Broome were right, "why then not kill one to save two,
overriding justice?"79 I believe that Broome's view is derived
from a notion of fairness that is too narrow. He says, "when
claims are equal, I believe fairness requires them to be equally
satisfied, and that is all it requires. It does not require any
of them to be satisfied to any particular degree if a person
has a chance of having her life saved, that provides a sort of
surrogate satisfaction of her claim to have her life saved. Equal
chances provide a surrogate equality in satisfaction, and so a
degree of fairness."8D Broome also maintains that in a case where
there is no way to save everyone, the fairest thing to do is to
save no one, although we should, of course, save at least someone
out of considerations of goodness.
I would like to suggest that perhaps the notion of fairness
should be somewhat more robust. Perhaps helping no one is, in
fact, unfair to everyone, instead of being unfair to no one. With
a more robust notion of fairness it might turn out to be the case
that not only, as Kamrn thinks, you aren't morally required to
78John Broome, "Karnm on Fairness", Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, vol. LVIII, No.4, December 1998, p.955j
All quotations from Broome are from this article.
79Frances Karnrn, "Reply to Cri tics", Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, vol. LVIII, No.4, December 1998, p.972.
8DBroome, p. 956.
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sometimes allow considerations of goodness to override
considerations of fairness, but that, in fact, fairness and
goodness cannot ever conflict. And there is every reason to
believe that even on a much more demanding interpretation of what
fairness requires, it would still be the case that flipping a coin
in Six Strangers is fair. 81 But this is no more than a suggestion
and a vague hope based on an even vaguer intuition (plus some
sympathy with Kamm's refusal to accept the overriding of
fairness) .
I don't have any specifics in mind, however, and even if I
did, a long discussion would result that would take us far off the
topic and wouldn't really be worth the trouble. Fortunately,
there is no need to engage in that discussion as there is no
reason, in light of what's been said in the previous five
sections, to agree with Broome (or Karnm, for that matter) that
considerations of goodness are on the side of saving the five
rather than the one. Neither Broome nor Kamm, at least in the
process of discussing fairness, offer any new grounds for
rejecting Taurek's second argument, and so I see no need to revive
this issue82 • Thus the only question that remains for us to
81Another possibility which would allow goodness and fairness not to
conflict is, of course, that fairness is less, not more, demanding
than Broome thinks. In that case, many options would perhaps be fair,
including, proponents of the standard view of the role of numbers in
morality should hope, the option of saving the larger group without
performing a coin toss or some probabilistic equivalent. This,
though, is precisely the view that Kamm seems to advocate and that I
side with Broome in rejecting later on in this section.
82 The only argument to that effect offered by Kamm in Morality,
Mortality, volume I: Death and Whom to Save from It is centered
around a fallacy which is somewhat related to the fallacy in Kamm's
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consider is whether any of Kamrn's suggestions for fair
alternatives to flipping a coin can stand up to scrutiny.
First I will discuss the procedure Kanun dubs 'majority rule' .
It permits something Kanun refers to as 'substituting equivalents'.
She claims that there is an explanation of why the needs of the
majority outweigh the needs of a minority, that doesn't rely on
there being a suprapersonal point of view from which it is just
plain better to do what is in the best interests of the majority.
This is important to Kamrn because such a suprapersonal point of
view is something to which Taurek objects quite strongly,
articulately and convincingly. This is where the substitution of
equivalents comes in. Broome explains Kamrn's argument in the
following manner: "The claim of the one conflicts with the claims
of the five. Taken individually, it must confront the claims of
the five taken individually, and it is actually equivalent to the
claim of just one among the five. Then there are the claims of
the other four as well. So there are four uncountered claims on
one side of the dilemma. "83 Thus Kamm argues that it is actually
fair (and not just better, which is something she believes as
defense of 'substituting equivalents', which I am about to discuss.
In addition to other problems, both arguments appear to suffer from
what Shelly Kagan calls "the additive fallacy", a more or less
comprehensive discussion of which falls outside the scope of this
paper, but can be found in the next chapter of my dissertation (see
subsection 2 of section VI). As a result of the fallacious reasoning,
Kamm falsely concludes that by virtue of believing that it is no worse
if Band C both suffer the loss L than if only A suffers L, Taurek is
committed to the claim that it is no worse if Band C both suffer L
than if only B does, and then infers by modus tollens that the first
belief must be false. For a related discussion of this issue from a
slightly different angle, see also subsection 2 of section IV.
83Broome, p. 957 .
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well) to give the drug to the five simply because there are more
of them. At the same time, she believes that since no
suprapersonal point of view is presupposed and the individual
claims are not aggregated, this procedure respects people as
individuals, again offering something that should, in principle,
appease Taurek.
Before proceeding any further, I will need to clarify
something that will be important both now and for the discussion
of the next procedure that Kamrn suggests. The kind of "claim"
being talked about here, even if it is, strictly speaking, a right
(for which no argument has been given), is certainly not to be
confused with the kinds of rights which are particularly binding
in these kinds of cases, such as ownership rights, contractual
rights, or rights of restitution. The assumption that the six
strangers all have an equal claim to the drug is not to mean
something along the lines of it being the case that all six are
part-owners of the drug and thus have property rights to it, or
along the lines of it being the case that the six all have a right
to the drug as compensation for past wrongs. The kind of claim
being discussed here is something a lot less tangible - something,
perhaps, along the lines of each person's having a right to be
considered as a candidate for having his or her life saved by
anyone who has the means and the opportunity to save that life and
is aware of the victim's predicament 84 •
B4But people do not, of course, special considerations aside, have the
right to actually be saved.
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If Kamm just assumes that these kinds of claims are additive,
i.e. that adding extra claims to an equivalent single claim can
result in a stronger aggregate claim, the way Taurek admits
certain kinds of rights may be additive when he discusses the
Coast Guard examples 8s , she begs the question. I believe, however,
that she considers her argument not to be question begging. After
all, she seems to be saying, she doesn't add anything up, she just
points out that when the claim of the one cancels out, in a manner
of speaking, the claim of one of the five, four other claims
remain that have not been canceled out86 •
But this is just an illusion, from which I believe Kamm
suffers because she finds Taurek's conclusion so implausible that
she doesn't take it seriously enough. I would like at this time
to offer an analogy to better articulate what I mean. Suppose
that I am a beginner studying set theory and am entirely baffled
by the purported fact that the cardinality of w+l is not greater
than that of w. Suppose I offer the following argument to dispute
that fact: w is equivalent to the w part of w+l; and there is
8SIn "Should the Numbers Count?U, Taurek considers a possible objection
to his view, that is based on the intuition that a Coast Guard captain
ought not flip a coin to determine whether to save the larger or the
smaller group of people from a life-threatening natural disaster.
Taurek ends up agreeing that in some cases people actually have a
right, akin to partial ownership, to a life-saving resource; and in
such cases individual rights can, perhaps, be aggregated in a morally
significant way, resulting in the captain's having a duty to save the
larger group. Another way we can imagine such a duty arising is
through an agreement, explicit or implied, as to how a resource is to
be used in an emergency_ Of course, neither of these is the case in
Friend, First Person, or six Strangers.
86A l so , Kamm does explicitly state that she is not aggregating the
claims, which is central to her ability to maintain that the 'majority
rule' procedure respects everyone involved as an individual.
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still a 1 left over that is not "canceled out" (or countered, if
we wish to put it that way) by anything in w. Therefore, I
conclude that w+l has greater cardinality than w. "Surely, I am
not begging the question", I might add, "for I am not presupposing
that adding 1 to w adds something to the cardinality of w, I am
simply pointing out that you have an w on both sides but one of
the sides also has a 1 left over in addition to that".
Nobody would be convinced by such an argument. I would
probably be told that I must have been so perplexed by the initial
counterintuitiveness of what I was arguing against, that I didn't
quite understand the claim and had already unwittingly assumed the
negation of what I was trying to deny. Kamrn, I believe, makes the
same mistake. There is, of course, no literal canceling out of
the claims, just as there is no literal canceling out of the w's.
Therefore, it lS impossible to justify any conclusion by talking
about what is "left over". And since Kamrn can't assume (for fear
of blatantly begging the question) that the adding of four claims
to one equivalent claim adds anything to that single claim that is
of any significance either for the question of fairness or for the
question of goodness, her argument disintegrates. Broome is right
not to take it seriously.
The final procedure I will discuss is the procedure of
proportional chances. The procedure concedes that the fair thing
to do in the Six Strangers case (and thus, on Karnm's view, the
right thing to do as well) is to give everyone involved a chance
for survival. This would already be a major concession to Taurek
and a defeat for the standard view of the role of numbers in
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morality. However, Kamm argues that it is fair to roll a six-
sided die instead of flipping a coin, thus giving each of the
strangers a chance for survival proportional to the size of the
group he or she is in. If this were, indeed, a fair procedure,
the defenders of the standard view would win a partial victory,
or, at the very least, a consolation prize, as well. Numbers
would, in fact, count in morality, even though not in the way that
the standard view advocates.
To support her contention, Kamm offers us the Lottery analogy.
Suppose that six people have an equal chance to win a large sum of
money. But five of them decide to organize a joint venture. They
have a way of investing the money which is guaranteed to almost
immediately increase their wealth by a factor of five. So they
decide that if one of them wins, regardless of which one it is,
they will invest the winnings in that manner and split the
proceeds. Thus, In effect, if one of them wins, they all win.
Kamm argues that it would be ridiculous and unfair to prohibit the
five from doing that or to announce that the chances of winning
should now be altered so that there is a 50% chance that the one
will win. In this case, it is fair for the five to have a
proportional chance of winning, even though each would in the end
win as much, if anything at all, as the one would win. The same,
Kamm says, applies to Six Strangers.
Before I discuss this analogy and the procedure of
proportional chances as a whole, I have a little bone to pick with
Kamm. The claims that people in a lottery have to equal chances
to win, sound more like bona fide rights to me (akin to property
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rights) than simple claims, since, after all, the players did
purchase a lottery ticket. And such rights, as Taurek himself
admits, may, perhaps, quite reasonably be aggregated87 • Taurek
limits the scope of his conclusion to cases where none of the
people involved have a right to the resource in question. Thus if
Karnm hopes to defeat Taurek's conclusion, she has to stick to
claims only and, so as not to repeat the mistake she made with the
majority rule procedure, not assume at the outset that claims may
be summed in a way that affects what is and what is not fair.
Broome disagrees with this procedure as well. He says nKamm's
view resembles a particular liberal theory about the distribution
of wealth in society. Some liberals think that people ought to
have an equal start in life, but that what they make of their
opportunities is up to them, so there is no reason why wealth
should end up equally distributed. Karnrn's idea seems to be that
people should have an equal baseline chance, but if they can
improve their chances by pooling, that is their right; it is no
reason to change the baseline distribution of chances. "88 Broome
admits that Kamm's story may be correct for the case of the
lottery, as do I. But in Six Strangers, Broome argues, there is
no way to distinguish between baseline chances and final chances.
He says: nIt is not that you are initially able to save just one
person out of six, and then somehow five of the six pool their
87 See Taurek's discussion of the Coast Guard captain examples in
"Should the Numbers Count?". I briefly describe what that discussion
is about in footnote 85.
88Broome, p. 960 .
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chances".B9 Thus, he claims, Kamm's argument for why it is fair
for the six strangers to have uneven final chances for survival
becomes baseless.
Kamm responds to such objections by offering the Drifting
:Icebergs case -
Drifting :Icebergs: There are SlX strangers stranded on
individual icebergs. I can only get to one of the icebergs in
time to save its uinhabitant". But, luckily, five of the
icebergs
end up drifting close enough together so that I can save all
five of the strangers that are stranded on those icebergs.
Kamm claims that this case is equivalent to her lottery example.
Each of the six hapless polar explorers should get an equal
baseline chance of one sixth for survival. But if nature ends up
pooling the chances of five of them, so be it. It would not be
fair to deprive them of their equal baseline chances. Broome
disagrees. He responds that upeople's position should be
equalized after nature has done its business. People should be
compensated for what nature does, since that is no responsibility
of theirs. A person is only entitled to a favoured position if it
results from what she herself has done."90 In Drifting Icebergs,
the five icebergs end up close enough together for the people
stranded on them to all be rescued not as a result of something
they had done to improve their situation. It is nature, or just
mere chance, that helped them out. Thus it is unclear why those
five should get to benefit more from the lucky change in their
B9Broome, p. 960.
90Broome, p. 961 .
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situation than the remaining one. If, as Taurek would suggest, we
flip a coin, we find that the chances of each of the six have
improved equally - from one sixth to one half - which, after all,
seems only fair.
Karnm could, of course, reply with one more modification. I
will call it
Drifting Mad Scientists: There are six strangers stranded on
individual icebergs. I can only get to one of the icebergs in
time to save its "inhabitant". But, luckily, five of the six
strangers are mad scientists, who somehow invent a way to make
their five icebergs drift close enough together so that I can
save all five of them at the same time.
In this case it is not nature but that is responsible for the
pooling of the five's chances, but the five themselves. So is
Kamm right after all, at least in this special kind of variation
on six Strangers? I think not. I believe there is an argument
that defeats Kamm's conclusion for Drifting Mad Scientists and
that can also serve as another reason to reject her verdict
regarding Drifting Icebergs. For how are we to make sense of the
claim that all six strangers involved in these cases have, or
deserve to have, an equal baseline chance? It is true that if I
find out that there are six strangers afloat on six different
icebergs and I can save at most one of them, the fair procedure is
for me to roll a six-sided die, giving each of the six an equal
baseline chance of one sixth for survival. Karnm would now need to
argue that just because five of the icebergs drifted together or,
even better, were made to drift together by five of the six
strangers, it does not become fair for me to deprive each of the
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five of his or her equal baseline chance.
But one should not forget that even if Taurek's conclusion is
meant to guide the actions of people in real-life situations, it
is primarily a theoretical principle which requires that certain
conditions obtain in order for it to be applicable. In
particular, one of the conditions is that I cannot save more than
one person or group, not simply that I don't, at the time, think
that I can. If the condition does not, in fact, obtain, but I end
up rolling the die anyway because I believe that it does, I do
something wrong that results in an unfair outcome, even though I
cannot be blamed for it since I didn't, and presumably couldn't,
know any better.
Thus, even if I had already rolled a die, only to find out
later that the chances of five of the strangers were pooled,
either by nature or by their own efforts; and even if the roll had
indicated that I should save one of the five (and so, in virtue of
the pooling, all of the five), it would not be unfair for me to
now flip a coin anyway because I had not, having acted on false
information, performed a fair procedure the first time. In fact,
it would be unfair of me not to correct myself, as the five never
deserved an individual equal baseline chance of one sixth in the
first place. 91 Thus I concur with Broome that for cases such as
Six Strangers, there is no justification for using the procedure
91Broome may, in fact, have in mind something along the lines of the
argument I have just offered when he says "it is not that you are
initially able to save just one person out of six, and then somehow
five of the six pool their chances", (p.960).
145
of proportional chances either. 92 I have to agree with Taurek and
Broome that the only fair procedure in cases like Six Strangers is
the only procedure that intuitively appears fair at first glance -
the procedure which gives each group, and thus each member of each
group, an equal chance.
Section VII.
Some Final Thoughts on the Subject.
Up to this point, I believe that I have successfully defended
both Taurek's second argument and the consistency of Taurek's main
conclusion with common sense, which was placed in doubt by Kavka's
objection from transitivity as well as by Dickey's argument.
Taurek's first argument eventually had to be abandoned, but not
because there is necessarily anything wrong with the conclusion.
The argument was flawed from the outset, as it relied on quite
controversial intuitions and principles and, apparently, was based
quite heavily on the ambiguities within Taurek's views on rights
and moral obligations93 • Just to give another indication of how
92 The procedure of proportional chances may, however, be a fair
procedure for cases like the original Coast Guard Captain example
discussed by Taurek - an example in which each of the people in the
two groups has an equal right to the use of the boat and there are no
special facts about the population distribution on the island. For
such cases, even the majority rule procedure might, perhaps, be argued
to be somewhat fair, although I think the proportional chances
procedure has a far better chance.
93 r suggested one way of clearing up some of these ambiguities lil
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fraught with difficulties some of the assumptions of the first
argument are, I want to draw your attention one last time to the
Friend case.
It is tempting to agree with Taurek's judgment that it is
morally permissible in Friend to save David, who is not a close
friend, but someone I know and like94 . But what of the opposite
scenario? What if David is someone I know and dislike? Note that
David is not my archenemy - he hasn't murdered my parents, or
seduced my girlfriend, or even received the promotion that I so
richly deserved; he is just someone I dislike for one reason or
another, or perhaps even without a reason. Is it as intuitive
that it is morally permissible to save the five in this case
simply based on my dislike of David, as it is that it is morally
permissible to save David in Friend based on my liking David95 ?
For the sake of consistency, it better be!
I think this should cast some doubt on the too easily accepted
premise used in the discussion of the Friend case. Perhaps likes
and dislikes should not be taken as seriously in morality as
Taurek seems to have implied. 96 So, as I've suggested above, I
section IV.
94The intuition seems correct even on the picture of rights and
obligations which I have sketched in section IV, where property rights
and special obligations do not by themselves necessarily carry the
day.
9SA defender of the standard view of the role of numbers in morality 15
going to find even more problematic a similar case where the agent
decides to save David rather than the five, even though David is a
stranger, because he knows and dislikes just one of the five.
96 1 believe that the agent's motives do not playa role in determining
the moral status of an action at all; and so whether I am considering
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think the problem with the first argument lies not in the
conclusion but in the controversial and sometimes unclear
assumptions the argument is based on, not to mention its heavy
reliance on intuition. Fortunately for anyone suspicious of the
standard view of the role of numbers in morality, Taurek has his
second argument, which is better, stronger, not so heavily based
on potentially questionable intuitions, and which I believe I have
so far been able to successfully defend from criticism.
So, do I believe that I have conclusively shown Taurek to be
right and numbers not to matter in morality? Not quite. As I've
indicated at the outset, in section I, the best I hope to achieve
is to establish Taurek's view as a viable alternative to the
standard account. The reason for this is that I believe there are
many difficulties, as yet unmentioned, that a defender of Taurek's
position would need to address in order to bring more than a
handful of people in the world over to his or her point of view.
Even more would likely be required to entirely overthrow the, at
least initially, much more plausible and intuitive standard view,
which, as far as I know, has been dominant since the dawn of
mankind. In the remainder of this paper I will name a few of
these problems and give a brief indication of the most promising,
as far as I can tell, directions in which one can look for answers
giving (withholding) the drug to (from) David because I like (dislike)
him, or for other reasons, cannot be a factor in whether or not it is
morally permissible for me to give the drug to David. Of course, my
motives can, and do, playa very large role in determining my own
moral status. I discuss the relationship between motives and the
moral status of acts in much more detail in the next chapter of my
dissertation.
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to them. I have to confess that even I do not find my suggestions
quite satisfactory. And that is precisely the reason why I do not
claim to have helped Taurek defeat the standard view.
Among the factors which Taurek wants to exclude, just to be on
the safe side, from the cases he considers, are factors which
might make one of the people involved more nvaluable". One of the
examples he gives is that of a person who is about to invent a
cure for some horrible disease. There is, indeed, a reason to
exclude such factors from Taurek's discussion. While I am not at
all convinced that I am morally required to choose saving a doctor
who is almost certain, or even completely certain, to invent a
cure for cancer, over saving a perfect stranger, I think I very
well might have non-arbitrary grounds for doing so. At the very
least, I think the world would, so to speak, be a better place
without cancer than it would be with it. Most, if not all, people
would, I believe, agree with me. But how can Taurek explain this?
It is true that if no cure for cancer is discovered, millions of
people worldwide would die of it every year, and even more people
would suffer lesser, although still significant, harms. But many
philosophers (Kamrn, for instance) believe that those deaths cannot
be placed on the scales when choosing between saving the cancer
doctor and saving a regular person. And even if those deaths
could be factored into the equation, taking Taurek's view into
account, it wouldn't make any kind of a difference. Whether or
not we are allowed to consider those millions of deaths, we still
ought to flip a coin to decide whether or not the doctor will be
the one saved.
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Is there any recourse for Taurek? He could perhaps say that
there is a non-arbitrary reason for preferring to save the doctor
because there is a probability, almost reaching a certainty, that
sooner or later at least one of the agent's relatives, loved ones,
friends, or perhaps even the agent himself, will die of cancer if
a cure for it is not found. But that seems like a cheap cop-out.
For one thing, it just isn't plausible that the possibility that a
person who you care about will get cancer is what's behind the
intuition that there is a non-arbitrary reason to prefer saving
the doctor - it appears that the intuition remains even if we
change the example by using, instead of cancer, a much rarer
disease, and including a guarantee that no one you really like
will ever get it. Besides, especially in light of the discussion
at the end of section V, we should not want to reopen the door to
possibly allowing minute probabilities to influence such
decisions. Also, taking into consideration the problems which led
us to discard Taurek's first argument, it is unclear that Taurek
can resort to this defense anyway, unless he goes back on his
explicitly stated opinion and recognizes the existence of agent-
relative permissions. So what is one to do regarding the case of
the cancer doctor? I will hold off on my attempt at a response
until I have stated the next problem.
Taurek says that special considerations aside, he would flip a
coin to decide which group of people to save regardless of the
relative sizes of the groups. But even if we can overcome the
initial intuitive disbelief we may experience in response to
Taurek's conclusion in Six Strangers, doing so becomes harder and
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harder as the numbers grow. It is a lot more counterintuitive,
not to say appalling, to flip a coin to choose between ten million
people and one person, than it is to flip a coin in Six Strangers.
But why is that, if numbers don't matter in morality? Of course,
even if every single human who has ever lived had believed
something or had a particular intuition, that still doesn't mean
that the belief or the intuition is not, in fact, blatantly false.
That could, for all we know, be the case with my example of ten
million vs. one, as well as with the cancer doctor case. But
these intuitions are very strong, and so I think that a defender
of Taurek's position needs to have more to say about them than
just that those intuitions may, nevertheless, be erroneous. Of
course, anybody who defends Taurek already has to maintain that
pretty much everyone's moral intuitions on the subject of numbers
are mistaken. But it seems that there is a good chance that the
intuitions regarding cases involving colossal numbers have
something substantial behind them, even if the more general
intuitions regarding the role of numbers in morality do not.
There is only one suggestion that I can offer at this time to
reconcile the existence of these intuitions with Taurek's view on
the problem of numbers, aside from the obvious but somewhat
strenuous alternative of denying that those intuitions represent
moral truths. Perhaps there is something, the loss of which is
even more important to a person than the loss of one's life. I
don't know what to call that something, but I guess I can utilize
the overused term 'way of life'. By proposing this, I do not mean
to endorse what is unfortunately a widely accepted practice of
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sacrificing human lives for abstract ideals of what human society
should be like. What I intend is simply to suggest that the
destruction of a person's entire way of life, e.g. the destruction
of his or her entire ethnic, national or religious community, can
be an even greater loss to that person than the loss of his or her
life. Perhaps that kind of reasoning can , for instance, even if
Taurek's main conclusion is right, be used to ground a non-
arbitrary preference for letting one person die rather than
allowing every other human being in the world to perish.
Perhaps some of this reasoning can even trickle down to cases
where all of humanity, or even all of one nation or religion, is
not at stake, but an enormously large number of people, e.g. ten,
or even a hundred, million, is. It may be that the loss of
hundreds of millions of people is such a great blow to ours, or
somebody else'S, way of life, that there is a non-arbitrary reason
for avoiding it even at the cost of allowing someone to die. This
is all very problematic and rough, of course. And I am far from
convinced, for instance, that it can be the case that I am
actually morally required to allow even one person to die rather
than hundreds of millions.
Even more problematic is the question of whether or not there
lS a non-arbitrary reason, in the sense of some further
modification of (MAP), for choosing the alternative that causes a
great benefit to our way of life, such as saving the doctor who
will discover the cure for cancer, over saving one "insignificant"
person. I don't know what the answers should be. That's why I am
not offering this suggestion as a solution to the problems I have
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raised. At best, there is something here which can perhaps be
worked on and turned into some kind of a plausible response. One
final note on this line of reasoning, however: if there is
something to it, it could explain, even on a non-standard view of
the role of numbers in morality, why there is a non-arbitrary
reason for preferring to prevent a genocide from occurring, even
in a sparsely populated nation, when the alternative is saving
just one or several people; even while, as I strongly believe is
the case, there is no non-arbitrary reason to prefer preventing a
genocide in one nation that would kill six million people to
preventing a genocide in another nation that would kill only five
million people97 •
There is one final potential problem for Taurek's view that I
want to mention. It is, perhaps, possible to defend the standard
view of the role of numbers in morality by saying that always
acting in such a way as to save the larger number of people,
provided that no special considerations are involved, antecedently
maximizes every single person's chances for survival in tradeoff
situations, as one presumably has a greater chance of ending up in
the larger group. First of all, I am not at all convinced that a
true moral principle can be based on maximizing the probability of
everyone's survival antecedently to any facts being known, in the
way suggested. But if it can, there is only one thing that I have
97But a possible controversial consequence may be that there would then
exist a moral reason to prefer preventing all 10,000 members of some
tribe with a unique way of life from perishing over preventing 200
million Chinese people from suffering the same fate.
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noticed I should object to. As we've seen during the discussion
of fairness in section VI, there is a considerable debate as to
whether it is fairer to give everyone an equal chance before any
relevant facts become known or before the relevant situation even
obtains; or to give everyone an equal chance in every actual
tradeoff situation once it arises, provided, of course, that the
people involved are not In any way responsible for ending up in
one group or the other, which would, perhaps, add special
considerations 98 •
I lean on Broome's side of the debate. I think fairness
requires us to give an equal chance to each person in a case like
six Strangers, not to corne up with a strategy which gives
everybody an equal antecedent probability of survival (prior to
any tradeoff situations' arising or being known about), but in any
actual tradeoff situation deprives someone of any chance for
survival. Under the latter arrangement, I believe we would be
unfair to the few, even though we would be making our decision in
advance, without knowing who those few will be, and even though we
are assuming that everyone has an equal chance to end up in that
group (and so a greater chance to end up in the larger group and
be saved). That's what I think, but, once again, I do not believe
that my response is even close to being completely decisive.
98The kind of case that I have in mind here is the sort described in
one of Taurek's boat captain examples. If there are only two
population centers on an island, one much larger than the other, and
the inhabitants are free to choose in which one they live, this case
should be discussed separately from, and, perhaps, settled differently
than, Six Strangers, especially if everyone was antecedently aware of
the likelihood of a major natural disaster in the near future and of
the fact that at most one boat would be available for the rescue.
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Many problems remain unresolved, and much work still lies
ahead for anyone who wishes to join Taurek in opposing the
standard view of the role of numbers in morality. The best I can
offer at present are a few suggestions in that direction. But I
believe that Taurek's paper addresses genuine and valid concerns
regarding the standard view and gives a lot to think about to
anyone who holds it. 99 I also believe that my defense of Taurek's
second argument and his main conclusion is on the whole
successful, and so Taurek's view of the role of numbers in
morality remains a viable alternative to the standard account.
There is, of course, a lot that remains to be said by both sides
in the debate as they search for the truth. And that truth may
very well lie in neither camp.
99Especially in connection with the very intuitive and seemingly
justified, although not easily satisfied, need to have our moral
theory respect each person as an individual and each person's
suffering as the suffering of an individual (see especially sections
II and III) .
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-Chapter 3-
The Return of The Trolley
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THE RETURN OF THE TROLLEY.
Section I.
Introduction to the Trolley Problem.
What is the Trolley Problem? Consider the following pair of
cases:
Transplant: Five people are about to die of organ failure.
But, "luckily", a healthy young patient walks in for a checkup,
and he is compatible with the five as a potential organ donorl .
I, a doctor, -can save the five by hitting the one over the head,
removing his organs and transplanting them into the five. Of
course, the one will die;
and
Trolley: A runaway trolley is headed for five track workmen.
They cannot get off the tracks quickly enough to get out of the
way and will all be killed should the trolley reach them. But
I, a bystander, can get to a switch which will redirect the
trolley to a spare piece of track. The five will be saved, but
the lone workman on the second track will be killed.
People's intuitions regarding these two cases seem to be quite
uniform - in fact, they appear to be virtually unanimous. An
overwhelming majority would say that I may not proceed with saving
the five in Transplant, but that, at the very least, it is morally
lUnless I specify otherwise, it will be assumed in all of the cases we
will discuss that no special considerations are in effect with regard
to any of the people involved. In particular, they are all strangers
to me, I am under no moral obligation, or an obligation of any other
kind, towards any of them, none of them are in any way "more valuable"
than the others, none of them are serial killers, none of them bear
any responsibility for the fact that the situation we are considering
obtains in the first place, etc., etc.
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permissible for me to redirect the trolley ~n Trolley. Some may
even go so far as to claim that I ought to save the five in
Trolley.
If one is not presented with the Trolley case for comparison,
the natural tendency is to explain the impermissibility of acting
in Transplant, despite what is widely perceived as a possibility
of achieving an otherwise preferable state of affairs, by
appealing to the distinction between killing and letting die, a
particular case of the making/allowing distinction. After all, if
I do not save the five ~n Transplant, I will only be letting them
die, but in saving them I would be killing the one2 • However, as
Judith Thomson points out in her ~Killing, Letting Die and the
Trolley Problem" (1976), Trolley is exactly parallel to Transplant
as far as the killing/letting die distinction is concerned. In
deciding whether or not to divert the trolley, I am also choosing
between letting the five die and saving them by killing the one.
Thomson goes on to conclude that something other than the
killing/letting die distinction must be at work in making it
morally impermissible for me to save the five in Transplant.
Roughly speaking, the Trolley Problem is the problem of
explaining why it is morally permissible for me to save the five
in Trolley, but not in Transplant. A large amount of literature
has appeared on the subject in what is now almost a quarter of a
century since Thomson's article was published. Additional
20ne way of spelling out what underlies this explanation is to say that
the negative duty to refrain from killing is more stringent than the
positive duty to aid someone who would die if not helped.
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examples, some of which will be mentioned later on, have sprung up
as counterexamples to potential solutions, indicating an
unavoidable increase in the scope of the problem3 • Considering
the amount of literature available on the Trolley Problem, a
comprehensive survey of proposed solutions would be neither wise
nor possible. However, I will discuss two of them in detail, and
say a few things about several of the others.
In the second half of this paper I will argue that not only
are none of the proposed solutions satisfactory, but, furthermore,
that all attempts in similar directions seem to contain inherent
flaws which cannot be overcome. However, it is entirely
unacceptable to suppose that it is morally permissible to save the
five in Trolley, although not in Transplant, despite there being
no explanation whatsoever for the moral difference. So, I
believe, if there is no explanation, there is no moral difference.
But instead of looking for yet another solution to the Trolley
Problem, I will take up and defend a radically different position
- I will argue, for reasons that I will go into later, that even
though it is almost a consensus that I am at the very least
morally permitted to save the five in Trolley, that is, in fact,
not the case. In the process, since I believe that the
killing/letting die distinction has a very important role to play
here, I will have to revisit that distinction and, after
concluding my discussion of the Trolley Problem itself, defend its
30 £ course, these further examples are extremely helpful in clarifying
our intuitions and in weeding out attempted solutions which are
carefully crafted to fit the already available group of cases, but are
not generalizable to fit our intuitions in other relevant situations.
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significance for morality against some prominent objections.
As I will conclude towards the end of this paper, there may be
some relatively minor, or even not so minor, differences between
Trolley and Transplant, each of which renders saving the five in
the latter case more morally objectionable, or, at the very least,
makes it seem that it is more objectionable. However, I will
argue that saving the five is morally impermissible in both cases.
Thus, in effect, my solution to the Trolley Problem will consist
in claiming that it doesn't exist. This, of course, will force me
into my final challenge - the unenviable task of explaining how
everyone, philosophers included, can be so ready to jump to a
conclusion which I am claiming is wrong, and even sustain their
belief in that conclusion upon a considerable amount of
reflection.
But before we embark on our journey on the trolley, there is
one more issue that I feel I should address. In light of my
previous chapter, one might ask: ~Why should you bother with the
Trolley Problem at all if you believe that numbers don't count in
morality and so there is no moral reason to turn the trolley onto
the one in the first place"? In fact, several philosophers
writing on the Trolley Problem did find it necessary to include
footnotes at some point in their articles, signifying that they
are aware of Taurek's challenge, and referring the reader to
alleged refutations of Taurek's conclusion. But I think it 1S
important to notice that given that the predominant view is that
it is morally permissible to divert the trolley in Trolley, a
possible position for a convert to Taurekism to take is that it is
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morally permissible to flip a coin4 in order to determine whether
or not to divert the trolley. On the other hand, hardly anyone on
either side of the Taurek controversy would argue that it is
morally permissible for me to flip a coin in Transplant in order
to determine whether or not to kill the one healthy patient, cut
him up, and take his organs. Thus, even if Taurek is right, that
does not necessarily do anything to defuse the Trolley Problem.
Section II.
Some attempted solutions.
Subsection 1: Introduction and the Doctrine of Double Effect.
Before proceeding to a more detailed discussion of a couple of
proposed solutions to the Trolley Problem, I want to briefly
address some very obvious and a few not so obvious, attempts to
rise to the challenge. As we have already seen, the
killing/letting die distinction, at least by itself, cannot be the
answer, since Trolley and Transplant are symmetric with regard to
that distinction. Can some sort of a Kantian injunction be the
answer we seek? After all, the one in Transplant would be used as
a means to the survival of the five - if the one's organs are not
made available, the five will die; whereas the one in Trolley lS
not needed to ensure the survival of the five - in fact, if the
40r perform some probabilistic equivalent, physically or mentally.
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spare track were empty, that would make me very happy as I would
not even need to hesitate before saving five lives at the cost of
none. However/ things are not that simple. In "The Trolley
Problem" (1985), Judith Thomson offers the following case -
Loop: A runaway trolley is about to kill five track workmen.
But I can get to a switch which will divert the trolley to a
spare track on which only one track workman will be killed.
However, the diverging pieces of track loop back. The only
reason the five would be spared if I divert the trolley is that
the one is fat enough to stop the trolley on impact. The five
are/ perhaps, thinner, but their combined weight will be
sufficient to prevent the trolley from looping back and reaching
the one if I choose not to divert the trolley.
Virtually everyone who believes that it is morally permissible to
divert the trolley in Trolley believes that it is also permissible
to divert the trolley in Loop. Almost everyone will even agree
that killing the one to save the five is permissible in
Modified Loop: This is just like Loop except the spare piece
of track loops back in such a way that while the death of the
one is necessary in order to prevent the trolley from coming
back to kill the five anyway/ should I divert the trolley; if I
do not divert, even if the five do not stop the trolley, it will
just keep going in a straight line rather than loop back to kill
the ones.
But in these two cases, the one is also needed as a means to
saving the five. So a Kantian solution doesn't seem to work.
Another attempted solution which is often brought up in
articles concerning the Trolley Problem involves the infamous
Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). Much has been written to
hopefully discredit the DDE for good.
SOne known exception is Michael J. Costa.
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So, it would not be prudent
to go into a detailed discussion of the DDE. However I I think a
brief review of the major problems for the DDE is in order, mostly
for the sake of introducing several examples and one major
distinction which will be very important later on in this paper.
First, a quick reminder of what the Doctrine of Double Effect
lS.
The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE): It is sometimes morally
permissible to perform an act which has both a good and a bad
consequence, but only if the following conditions obtain:
1) the good consequence outweighs the bad (in some sense, the
world is a better place if both take place than if neither
does) ;
2) the agent intends the good consequence, but does not intend
the bad one - he or she merely foresees it;
3) the bad consequence is not a means to the good consequence,
as it is assumed that the agent cannot intend the end without
intending the means.
It seems that the DDE can handle explaining the difference between
Trolley and Transplant. After all, in Transplant the death of the
one is the means to the continued life of the five, whereas in
Trolley the means to preventing the deaths of the five is my
redirecting the trolley - the death of the one is merely a
foreseen tragic consequence, which, on the traditional view of the
role of numbers ~n morality, is outweighed by the good of saving
five lives. Now I will quickly run down the list of four major
problems with the DDE, which show that in addition to problems of
interpretation, the DDE clearly issues the wrong verdict in many
cases, and even the ones it gets right, it gets right for the
wrong reasons.
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The first problem, indicating that the DDE is too permissive,
was brought up by Philippa Foot in nThe Problem of Abortion and
the Doctrine of the Double Effect ff (1975), the article that first
introduced an early version of the Trolley example. Consider the
case of the
Lethal Fumes: " ... There are five patients in a hospital whose
lives could be saved by the manufacture of a certain gas, but
. .. this inevitably releases lethal fumes into the room of
another patient whom for some reason we are unable to move ff6 •
Foot claims that it is clearly impermissible to proceed with the
manufacture of the gas even though, according to the DDE, there is
no reason why that should be the case because the death of the one
is not intended and is not a means to saving the five. Many
philosophers working on the Trolley Problem agree with her, and,
as far as I know, no one has disagreed. Thus it definitely
appears to be the case that while it fits the intuitions of the
majority regarding the Trolley and Transplant cases, the DDE fails
to fit other intuitions which are held just as firmly by those
very same people.
Of course, the DDE is supposed to only provide us with
necessary conditions for moral permissibility, and not with
sufficient ones. Thus, even if, in fact, it is morally wrong to
produce the gas in Lethal Fumes, that in itself doesn't invalidate
the DDE because the DDE never tells us that an action is morally
6Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double
Effect ff , reprinted in ETHICS Problems and Principles (EPR) , ed. by
John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
College Publishers 1992, p.65.
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permissible. But, if we are right about Lethal Fumes, we can
already conclude that the DDE by itself cannot serve as a solution
to the extended Trolley Problem, which, as I explained in section
I, encompasses not only Trolley and Transplant, but a family of
related cases as well. And, in the discussion that is to follow,
I will, I hope, successfully argue that the DDE cannot be a part
of a solution to the Trolley Problem either. However, I find the
judgment regarding Lethal Fumes to be very problematic in any case
for those who believe that saving the five is morally permissible
in Trolley7. So, I wouldn't want my argument against the DDE to
rest on Lethal Fumes entirely. It is, at any rate, better to
slightly postpone the discussion of Lethal Fumes.
The second problem is that the DOE is also too restrictive.
It seems that according to the DDE, diverting the trolley is
impermissible in Loop, since the death of the one would serve as a
means to saving the five. However, as I've mentioned before,
almost everyone who believes that saving the five is morally
permissible in Trolley, believes that the same is true of Loop,
and even of Modified Loop. So, once again, the results that the
DDE yields seem to go against the moral intuitions of the
majority.
But there are two even more serious problems lurking here.
71 even find that for those who believe that it is permissible to
divert the trolley in Trolley, the judgment that saving the five is
impermissible is problematic in Lethal Fumes 2, a case just like
Lethal Fumes but with the difference that the five are actually saved
by a surgical procedure requiring the manufacture of the gas; which,
for reasons that will become clear later on, is considered even more
morally troublesome by some who have worked on the Trolley Problem,
than the manufacture of the gas in Lethal Fumes.
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One is the problem of individuation of events. To use examples
that often come up in related discussions, if I crush the fetus'
skull while performing a craniotomy in order to save the mother's
life, have I thereby killed the baby or merely caused it to die?
If I run over a person on the road, have I thereby killed her, or
only caused her to, say, bleed to death? In fact, if I cut up the
one in Transplant and take his organs - will I have killed him by
that act, or will I have just caused him to die?
The importance of these questions lies in the fact that while
it is assumed that I cannot intend the end without intending the
necessary means, I should be able to intend the end without
intending something that is merely caused by the means, as
otherwise condition 2 of the DDE will never be fulfilled in cases
where the only way to save five people is to do something that
results in the death of some other person. So, if I merely cause
the baby to die in performing the craniotomy, or merely cause the
one to die in Transplant by removing his organs 8 , it seems that I
can intend to perform the craniotomy without intending that the
baby die, and that I can also intend to save the five in
Transplant without intending that the one whose organs I take die.
Thus it appears that according to the DDE I may proceed with
saving the five in Transplant after all. But even if some uniform
way can be found of distinguishing the act itself from the causal
consequences of that act, a deeper question arises: why should
8Perhaps I can make this more plausible by crossing over into the realm
of science-fiction and offering some sort of an instantaneous, or
nearly instantaneous, matter-energy transporter of the Star Trek
variety as the method used for the transplant.
168
determinations like this have any bearing on the moral
permissibility of acts such as cutting up the one in Transplant?
This issue will also be relevant to the discussion of Kamm's
solution in the next section9 •
And the most serious blow to the DDE is that it seems that
what underlies it is a serious error regarding the very nature of
ethics. As has already been pointed out in the literature, most
notably by Judith Thomson, there are two kinds of ethical
questions that one can ask with regard to an actIO. The first
concerns the moral properties of the act itself, e.g. whether or
not it is morally permissible, whether or not it violates
someone's property rights, etc. The second question deals with
9In "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double
Effect (1989), reprinted in EPR, Warren So Quinn suggests a
modification of the DDE which at first glance seems to avoid this
objection - we cannot engage in harmful direct agency - "agency in
which harm comes to some victims ... from the agent's deliberately
involving them in something in order to further his purpose precisely
by way of their being so involved". Aside from still leaving the DDE
open to the three other major objections that I raise, there is
another problem - if "involved" is interpreted as not allowing even
merely foreseen involvement, the DDE becomes useless as it prohibits
action in all redirection cases; but if foreseeing involvement is
allowed, then consider the following modification of the famous Terror
Bomber case - I drop a bomb on a major population center of an evil
enemy country, that contains a device which will create a telepathic
field affecting the entire country in the following way: everyone
outside the region will believe that the region has been turned into a
desolate wasteland by some new weapon and, in addition, their minds
will filter out all attempted communication from the people in the
region. This will cause the evil country to surrender, but, by the
way, the telepathic field will kill everyone in the region within 24
hours as a foreseen side effect. This case is clearly morally
equivalent to the standard Terror Bomber case, but it seems that
Quinn's modification will have to allow this kind of bombing.
lOJonathan Bennett also points this out in section lS of The Act
Itself.
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how the act reflects on the moral character of the agent
performing it. The agent's intentions, as well as perhaps some of
the agent's other mental states, are very relevant to the second
type of questions, but have nothing to do with the first.
If Jack goes on a killing spree in a local preschool while
under the influence of a mind-controlling drug which was planted
in his breakfast cereal by an evil scientist, we might decide that
this says nothing about Jack's moral character since he cannot be
held responsible for his actions under the circumstances, but we
should not conclude that going on a killing spree in a local
preschool is sometimes morally permissible. Similarly, if I want
the one on the spare track in Trolley to die because I hate him or
his entire race, or if I just want to experience the feeling of
knowing that I killed someone but will not be punished for it, we
should say that this has bad implications for my moral character -
I am probably not a very good person; but it seems grossly
counterintuitive to say that because of this it is not morally
permissible for me to divert the trolley, if simply changing my
state of mind could have made it permissible to perform that very
same act. Also, if I ask someone whether or not it is permissible
for me to divert the trolley, it would be a strange response,
indeed, if I heard in reply that the answer depends on my
intentions - if I merely foresee that the one will die, but don't
want him to or don't care, then it's OK, but if I want him to die,
then it's no longer OKll12
I1Judith Thomson makes a similar argument in "Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Two Moral Arguments", Ethics 109 (April 1999).
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I believe we should conclude that intentions are not the
proper basis for judging the moral permissibility of actions, and
thus all attempts to bring a version of the DDE to bear on the
Trolley Problem are inevitably doomed to fail 13 • If, however,
defenders of the DDE try to shift from the actual intentions of
the agent to the issue of whether or not it is possible in
principle for an agent to act in the manner in question without
intending the negative consequence, it is easy to see that we are
not really talking about intentions at all any more - we are
reducing the DDE to a principle concerned solely with means, ends,
and causal relations. Some such principles will be discussed
later on.
Subsection 2: New Threats versus Old Threats.
Some philosophers, e.g. Michael J. Costa, have tried to defend the
DDE from the charge that it delivers the wrong verdicts in some
cases by modifying it to include an injunction against creating a
new threat instead of simply redirecting an already existing one.
12 r want to point out that it is not the case that I can positively
influence my moral worth by refraining, because my intentions are
inappropriate, from doing something that is morally permissible -
there is no tradeoff going on here. My intentions speak poorly of me,
but my not doing something (because of my intentions) that is morally
permissible and, in fact, might even be considered praiseworthy, can
only, depending on the precise circumstances, either leave me with the
same poor moral standing or make things even worse.
13As a side note, I want to point out that it is not surprising to find
the DDE making such a fundamental mistake, as it originated as a
religious doctrine, and religious doctrines are usually a lot more
concerned with the moral worth of agents than with the moral
permissibility of acts in themselves.
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Of course, in light of what I offered as the third and fourth
objections to the DDE, this modification appears to be a case of
Utoo little, too late". However, the distinction between
redirecting a pre-existing threat and creating a new one has been
brought up for reasons unrelated to the DDE as well, for instance,
in Judith Thomson's "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley
Problem" (1976) - the article that framed the Trolley Problem and
also featured Thomson's first crack at it - and her ~The Trolley
Problem'i (1985) 14. So, I think there is sufficient reason to say a
few things about this distinction.
Costa talks about an act that introduces a new threat as "an
act that is itself prima facie evil and one that is more difficult
to justify"1516. And Thomson discusses in her 1985 paper of a
'\'distributive exemption', which permits arranging that something
that will do harm anyway shall be better distributed than it
otherwise would be - shall do harm to fewer rather than more;;17. I
see several problems with this approach to the Trolley Problem.
The first, in response to Costa, is that I fail to see why
creating a new threat is necessarily evil - more evil than
redirecting an already existing threat18 . Of course, if you
14Both reprinted ln EPR.
15EPR , p. 306.
16Thomas Nagel seems to be expressing a similar concern in "Ethics",
also reprinted in EPR.
17 EPR , p.287.
18And it would be hard to argue that no explanation is necessary for
why it is worse, all other things being equal, to create a new threat
than to redirect an old one i as it seems to be highly implausible that
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conjure up an image of a mad scientist creating a hitherto unknown
deadly virus to wipeout all mankind, what we are imagining is an
evil act. But if we are talking about manufacturing a gas needed
to save five people, or, say, stopping a runaway trolley by the
only means available, which, in turn, causes a threatening
avalanche, why exactly is that intrinsically more evil than
diverting a trolley to a previously unthreatened person? I will
return to this issue a little bit later.
The second difficulty concerns determining what constitutes a
new threat as opposed to an old threat. It is not always easy to
draw the line. If I manage to stop the trolley, but its stopping
causes an avalanche, the avalanche is presumably a new threat.
But what if the trolley'S stopping causes it to explode, and the
explosion threatens a bystander? Is the explosion a new threat?
What if I stop the trolley in a way that causes it to be ripped in
half, and one of the halves proceeds to fly over the spare track
towards the one? Is that half a new threat, or is it still the
original trolley threat?19 More importantly, why should any truth
about morality depend on the answers to those questions and others
like it? If I am not mistaken, similar considerations may have
been part of the reason why Thomson has apparently given up on the
such a controversial claim with, as I will argue shortly, some very
counterintuitive consequences, can simply be a brute fact about
morality.
19In Morality, Mortality: Volume II, chapter 7, p. 175, Frances M. Kamrn
even goes so far as to claim that the trolley's looping back towards
the five in Loop, in case the one's body fails to stop it for some
reason, would constitute a new threat to the five, as the trolley
would approach from a different direction!
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view that the new-threat/old-threat distinction in itself has any
bearing on the Trolley Problem.
And now I would like to introduce a few more examples into the
picture, which, I believe, will illustrate the fact that our moral
intuitions do not support the hypothesis that whether we create a
new threat, or simply deflect an already existing one, has any
moral significance. Let's consider the cases of
Two Buttons: There is a runaway trolley headed for five
people who can not get out of the way in time. .There is a spare
piece of track on which one person is standing. I can get to a
panel with two buttons, A and B, in time to save the five. If I
push button A, the trolley will be diverted to the spare track
and the one will be killed. If I push button B, a huge wall of
iron will come out of the ground in front of the trolley and
stop it. But the impact of the trolley against the wall will
cause an avalanche which will kill the one. There are no other
ways in which I can save the five;
Three Buttons: This is just like Two Buttons, except there is
also a third button, C. If I push C, an iron wall will also
come out of the ground to stop the trolley, but in this case it
will be the emergence of the wall itself, and not the impact of
the trolley against the wall, that will cause the avalanche. As
in Two Buttons, there are no other ways in which I can save the
five20 ;
and
Four Buttons: This is just like Three Buttons, except that in
addition to the panel containing buttons A, B, and C, there is
also a separate panel containing button D. Pressing D will also
cause the iron wall to emerge from the Underworld, but this time
it will be my running over to the panel containing D that will
trigger the avalanche.
2°The importance of this case, as well as of Four Buttons, and of the
difference between Two Buttons and Three Buttons, will not become
clear until the next section.
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If A were the only button available to me in Two Buttons, the case
would be identical to Trolley, i.e., according to everyone writing
on, the Trolley Problem, it would be morally permissible for me to
push A.
Now consider
Avalanche: There is a runaway trolley headed for five
people who can not get out of the way in time. I can get to a
button, my pushing of which will cause a huge wall of
iron to come out of the ground in front of the trolley and
stop it. But the impact of the trolley against the wall will
cause an avalanche which will kill an innocent bystander. There
are no other ways in which I can save the five.
If B were the only button available to me in Two Buttons, the
dilemma would be the same as in Avalanche, and structurally
analogous to Lethal Fumes21 , i.e. it would allegedly be
impermissible for me to push the button. Now, it seems to be a
reasonable assumption that the following is true -
Firm Boundaries Principle: If there is a desirable outcome 0,
and it would be morally permissible for me to adopt a course of
action A in order to achieve 0, provided that it is the only way
to achieve 0, but it would not be permissible for me to adopt a
course of action B in order to achieve 0, provided that it is
the only way to achieve 0; then should both alternatives be
available, if there is no other way I can achieve 0, I ought to
either do A or forfeit 0. In either case, B should still be off
limits morally.
21The only difference I can think of is that hospitals have a special
obligation towards their patients not to harm them, even in order to
help other patients. This may make a difference in causing saving the
five to be impermissible in Lethal Fumes. But I am assuming that this
can't possibly be all that Foot, Thomson, and others mean when say
they say that manufacturing the gas is impermissible, otherwise all
that the example would show is that it was chosen poorly and needs to
be restated so as to eliminate the factor in question.
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For example, if, for argument's sake, I am not morally permitted
to cut off a person's arm to save someone else's life, but I am
morally permitted to steal $5 for the same purpose; should a
relevantly similar situation arise in which the only two ways for
me to save a life are to either steal $5 or to cut off someone
else's arm, it seems that I ought to either refrain from saving
the life altogether, or to steal $5, but I ought not cut off
anyone's arm.
But I can see no reason why, especially in light of the Firm
Boundaries Principle, I, the one, God, or anyone else should care
whether I push A or B in Two Buttons, assuming that on some morbid
scale being run over by a trolley ranks as being a death roughly
equal in unpleasantness to being buried by an avalanche22 • In
either case the one will be killed so that the five may live. In
either case the death of the one is not, strictly speaking, the
means to saving the five, but, to use a DDE term, only a foreseen
consequence. So where is the morally relevant difference in
virtue of which one course of action is permissible and the other
is not?23 In fact, I can even imagine a case where the one has
22 Perhaps I could make my argument even stronger by making the original
threat an avalanche as well, instead of a trolley; but I think that is
unnecessary - the Two Buttons case should be able to speak for itself.
23Another example which might be very helpful in illustrating this
point is
Pushing Trolley: This is just like Trolley, except that should I
choose to divert the trolley, it will actually stop, but in so doing
push another trolley, which until then is stationary, causing it to
go down the spare track and kill the one.
It seems obvious that if it is morally permissible for us to save the
five in Trolley, it should be morally permissible for us to do it in
176
previously expressed a preference for death by being buried by an
avalanche over death by trolley. Such a preference cannot change
anything as far as the permissibility of pushing B ln cases
equivalent to Lethal Fumes, such as Avalanche, but it seems
ludicrous to suggest that still I ought to either push A or do
nothing at all in Two Buttons because it is not morally
permissible to push B24 •
To sum up, I can see absolutely no moral difference between
pushing A and pushing B in Two Buttons, and, therefore, I do not
believe that there can be any moral difference between Trolley and
Avalanche, and so between Trolley and Lethal Fumes. This is the
reason why I claimed earlier that the prevalent intuition
regarding Lethal Fumes is problematic. Similarly, I do not see
how there can be any moral difference between pushing A, B, or C
in Three Buttons, as the difference in causal structure between
what happens if I push B and what happens if I push C, equivalent
to the difference between Lethal Fumes and Lethal
Pushing Trolley as well, contrary to what those who defend the
diverting-old-threat/creating-new-threat solution to the Trolley
Problem seem to be forced to maintain.
24There may be small room for concern that I am being so overwhelmed by
the fact that in either case the one dies, that I end up ignoring a
real moral difference which is, nevertheless, there to be found;
however, I believe that this concern can be easily alleviated by
changing the example so that pushing each button kills a different
person. I still see no possible grounds for a moral difference.
Also, I can see quite a difference, if the one is on a bridge
overlooking the tracks and there is a spare piece of track going to
the bridge as well, between pushing a button that will catapult him
off the bridge into the path of the trolley, his body then halting the
trolley's progress, and pushing the button which will redirect the
trolley towards him, despite the fact that he dies either way in this
case as well.
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Fumes 2 (see footnote 7), seems to be entirely morally inert.
Thus I believe that if saving the five is permissible in Trolley,
it has to be permissible in Lethal Fumes and Lethal Fumes 2 as
well. Therefore, the new-threat/old-threat distinction cannot
supply us with a solution to the Trolley Problem.
The solution just considered, based on the new-threat/old-
threat distinction, fails on three very important counts. First,
it introduces a distinction which is very hard to draw in some
cases, and, which in fact, might have to be drawn by fiat in many
situations. That wouldn't necessarily be an insurmountable
problem, if not for the fact that it is unclear why the
distinction should matter in those cases in the first place, even
if it can be drawn in a reasonable manner25 • And, finally, once we
move beyond the Trolley and Transplant cases, the criterion based
on the diverting-an-old-threatlintroducing-a-new-threat
distinction no longer seems to deliver verdicts which agree with
our intuitions. This is in general something we need to watch out
for when considering proposed solutions to the Trolley Problem -
any criterion carefully crafted to fit our intuitions regarding
several famous cases is very likely not to be generalizable, l.e.
it is very likely to be open to counterexamples.
25 In fact, I think it would be quite irrational for me to disavow my
moral intuitions about a case involving, say, five people threatened
by a trolley and a person who would be killed by a flying half of that
trolley should I intervene to save the five, simply because someone
convinces me that my original intuitions regarding whether or not a
flying half of a trolley is the same threat as the whole trolley were
mistaken.
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Subsection 3: A Few More Attempted Solutions.
The next ill-fated attempt to solve the Trolley Problem that I
want to mention belongs to Robert Hanna. He bases his response on
the distinction between being a participant and being a bystander
in a given situation. As he phrases his own criterion, "in cases
in which there is the option of either (a) harming one bystander by
forcing him into the threat-situation, or (b) harming one or five
participants in the same threat-situation only in order to bring
about the best possible distribution of the threat, it is
impermissible to do (a) but sometimes permissible to do (b)"26.
This criterion, unlike the last one that we were looking at, has
the advantage that it seems intuitively clear, assuming we can
come up with a reasonable way to differentiate bystanders from
participants, why the distinction it is based on could make a
moral difference - as Hanna puts it, we can have a valid complaint
against a person for involving us in a dangerous situation, but we
can't have a complaint against the world for doing so. But this
criterion fares even worse than its predecessor as far as being
able to fit our intuitions. Also, the criterion is spelled out in
a manner which appears to be more or less arbitrarily contrived to
deal with the few original cases, and thus proves to be impossible
to generalize.
Hanna claims that the healthy individual in Transplant is
clearly a bystander and not a participant. But, he goes on to
say, "the one in The Trolley Driver [his version of the case I am
26Robert Hanna, "Morality De Re: Reflections on the Trolley Problem",
printed in EPR, pp.330-331.
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calling 'Trolley'] is clearly a participant, since one of the
pathways of the ongoing trolley-event will make him a victim. The
mere existence of the possible pathway, as physically represented
by the switching mechanism and spur, is sufficient to implicate
the one"27 [in what??]. This seems very wrong. The one feature
that Trolley and Transplant definitely appear to have in common is
that the one in both cases is not really involved in any way
unless and until I do something to threaten him. Hanna seems to
be saying that the presence of an extra piece of track and a
switch makes the one in Trolley a participant, even though the
presence of a knife and an operating table does not make the one a
participant in Transplant, but that appears to be a completely
arbitrary judgrnent 28 . For one thing, if the threat in question is
a missile, and I have the means to divert it to virtually any
inhabited place on the globe, but not to an uninhabited one, is
almost every person in the world to be considered a participant in
this crisis?29 That does not seem reasonable. Second, suppose
that in Trolley there is yet another piece of track to which the
Trolley can be diverted, which is empty. Does that mean that the
one is no longer a participant, despite the presence of the piece
27 EPR , p. 331.
28It is also suspect as far as possibly relying on the distinction
between redirecting a threat and creating a new one, which we have
already discussed and rejected as being irrelevant to solving the
Trolley Problem.
29This question is inspired by a similar example from F.M. Kamrn's
Morality, Mortality vol.2, where it is part of an objection to
Montmarquet, who appears to be making unsuccessful attempts to solve
the Trolley Problem that are reminiscent of Hanna's.
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of track leading up to him and a switch? If not, how can Hanna
explain that? If yes, why can't we turn the trolley onto him, as
surely we ought not in this case?
And, last but not least, we should consider yet another case
which appears to be morally equivalent to Transplant -
Fat Man: A runaway trolley is headed towards five people. I,
a bystander, am located on a bridge overlooking the tracks.
The only way to save the five is to throw a fat man, who is
standing next to me on the bridge, onto the tracks in front of
the trolley. His body would then prevent the trolley from
proceeding to kill the five.
Clearly, it is not morally permissible to either throw the fat man
off the bridge, or even just wobble the handrail slightly so that
he will fallon his own. Shockingly, Hanna claims that the fat
man, unlike the one on the tracks, is a mere bystander! In this
case, the presence of the bridge over the tracks, coupled with my
ability to throw him off or wobble the handrail, which I can even
supplement by making a button available to me which will catapult
the fat man off the bridge, is somehow insufficient to make the
fat man a participant. Is it because there are no tracks leading
up to where he is? Would the verdict be different if the tracks
diverged and one piece of track led up to the bridge where the fat
man is standing? If so, why?30 This attempted solution seems to
30Some may try to respond that the one in Trolley assumes a certain
amount of risk by walking out onto the tracks, which is not the case
with the fat man in Fat Man. But there are many ways to rule out this
asymmetry, even if it is significant, without affecting the heart of
the problem that Hanna is facing. We can, for instance, stipulate
that the spare piece of track in Trolley has not been used in 20
years, and for that reason there aren't even any warning signs posted
in the vicinity. Or we can also stipulate that there is some risk
that the fat man assumes by going on the bridge, e.g. that there is
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be a complete non-starter because any pre-theoretical intuitive
notion of "bystander" fails to yield the results that Hanna needs,
and without such an intuitive notion Hanna's purported solution is
circular - it appears to use moral intuitions to derive some
technical notion of being a bystander, and then turns around and
uses that notion to justify those very same intuitions.
The final suggestion that I want to address in this section
can be found in Thomson's "The Trolley Problem". She argues that
in the relevant kinds of cases it is permissible for me to kill
one in order to avoid letting five die, provided that (l)I.will be
doing so by diverting an already existing threat, and (2)the
action by which I will be achieving this outcome will not in
itself infringe on a stringent right of the one31 . We have
discussed the requirement in (1) already, and this in itself makes
the proposed solution inadequate as it stands, but (2) still makes
it worthy of discussion, as Thomson is suggesting a new approach
here - looking at features of the cases which are intrinsically
related to ethics.
It is clear that in cutting up the healthy patient in
also a piece of track on the bridge itself, but which has also not
been in use for 20 years. It just doesn't seem that there is any room
for a would-be defender of Hanna's view to maneuver here, especially
since we can, in principle, quite easily switch from runaway trolley
cases to crashing airplane and nuclear missile cases, in which there
would be no tracks and so absolutely no reason to say that the people
to whom the threat would be diverted assumed any risk by being where
they are.
31The part about stringency is needed in order to differentiate between
violations of such rights as the right not to be pushed off a bridge
or the right not to have one's organs forcibly removed, and rights
such as, say, the right not to have your property trespassed on in
order for me to get to a switch which is located on your land.
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Transplant I surely violate a stringent right of his, especially
since, in our society at least, organ donation is purely
voluntary, and so it may even be considered a violation of a
stringent right of his to use his organs once he is dead without
his prior consent. It lS equally clear that I violate a stringent
right of the fat man in Fat Man if I push him off the bridge.
But, as Thomson herself admits, while diverting the trolley is in
itself an inoffensive act, if there is a person on the track to
which you are diverting the trolley, it seems to violate a right
of his as well, as becomes immediately clear if we consider a
modified version of Trolley in which there are no five people
threatened by the trolley.32 However, Thomson argues, Trolley is
different because the means which I use to save the five, i.e.
diverting the trolley to a different track, "is not itself an
infringement of a right of anybody's. The agent would do the one
no wrong at all if he turned the trolley onto the right-hand track
and by some miracle the trolley did not hit him [the one] ."33
First, I have to disagree with the last quoted sentence - if
someone shoots a bullet at my head but by some miracle it falls on
the ground 1 mm short of penetrating my forehead, I still believe
that the shooter violated a very stringent right of mine by doing
something that would normally result in my acquiring an extra
orifice in my skull. It's just that both of us would get lucky -
320ne can respond that causing someone harm is a violation of his or
her rights only if he or she lS harmed unjustly. But that, of course,
would render any application of a rights-based approach to the Trolley
Problem hopelessly circular.
33 EPR , p.288.
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I would get to continue living, and criminal charges against the
shooter would be downgraded from murder to attempted murder. 34
Second, I am not sure that it is possible to square this claim
made by Thomson with what she has previously admitted about the
violation of rights resulting from my diverting the trolley to an
"inhabited" piece of track35 • Thomson herself accepts this in her
footnote 2 to chapter 7 of The Realm of Rights, where she
repudiates her previous attempts to solve the Trolley Problem and
offers an entirely different approach which I will discuss in
section IV.
And, last but not least, there is the problem of the Handrail
case.
Handrail: This is a variant of Fat Man, ~n which all I need to
do to save the five is slightly wobble the handrail of the
bridge. That will cause the fat man to lose his balance and
falloff the bridge onto the tracks, thus halting the progress
of the trolley.
The problem is that the means to saving the five in Handrail is
simply the wobbling of the handrail, which is an action hardly
34Thomson disagrees - she believes that in cases where no actual harm,
physical, psychological, or of any other kind, is done, an attempt to
harm doesn't constitute an infringement on anyone's rights, as
evidenced by the putative fact that no compensation is owed to the
victim. I am not convinced that this is true, but I want to sidestep
this issue, as nothing of any importance rests on it in this paper.
35At least it might be problematic without lapsing into the kind of
debacle that the DDE faced, i.e. that I would also not be violating
the rights of the one by cutting him up in Transplant because I will
be saving the five by means of making cutting motions with my right
hand, which would not be a violation of the one's rights if his body
didn't happen to be in the space where I am making the motions, or if,
by some miracle, my cutting motions didn't hurt him even though his
body was "in the way fI •
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more offensive in itself than diverting the trolley onto a
different track. However, it is clearly morally impermissible for
me to wobble the handrail. Thomson suggests that we should opt
for a wider notion of "means" - if "you get a trolley to threaten
the one instead of five by wobbling the handrail, ... , the means
you take to get the trolley to threaten the one instead of the
five include wobbling the handrail, and all those further things
that you would have to succeed in doing by wobbling the handrail
if the trolley is to threaten the one instead of the five"36. This
makes wobbling the handrail impermissible because the means to
saving the five would then include having the one falloff the
bridge as a result of my actions, which presumably violates his
rights quite severely. But, surprisingly, Thomson does not seem
to notice that this apparently exposes her answer to the same
counterexample as she herself proposed for the Kantian solution -
the Loop case. In Loop, by the same criterion, the means would
have to include the one's being hit by the trolley in such a way
that his body stops the trolley - a violation of a very stringent
right of his, I believe. Thomson, however, repeats just a few
pages earlier that she believes it is permissible to save the five
in Loop.
In conclusion, I want to mention one last point from
Thomson's article. She argues that it is important, as far as the
issue of rights is concerned, whether something is done to the one
or to the threat in order to save the five.
36 EPR , p.289.
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I think that in this
she may be right, and, perhaps, there is a moral difference
between the two kinds of cases37 38 But, as Thomson herself
admits in The Realm of Rights, that difference in itself, even if
it exists, seems to be insufficient to account for the enormous
difference between our intuitions in Trolley, and Transplant or
Fat Man, as well as for our intuitions regarding the entire array
of Trolley-Problem-related examples, especially in light of the
apparent overall collapse of the ~rights approach" to the problem.
Therefore, this difference cannot be the basis for a satisfactory
solution to the Trolley Problem39 .
Section III.
Kamm and her Principle of Pe~issible Ha~.
Frances M. Karnm has offered two very closely related purported
solutions to the Trolley Problem, which will be the topic of this
37Al t hough I still have a concern here regarding the issue of how to
morally distinguish Loop from Handrail to a sufficient degree without
exposing oneself to easy counterexamples.
38In addition, this intuition is not uncontroversial - Karnm, for
instance, strongly disagrees with it when she presents her Lazy Suzan
cases in the chapters on the Trolley Problem in Morality, Mortality
vol.2. I, however, strongly disagree with Karnm's intuitions ...
39 I f it were the solution, it would also, I think, be a problem for
Thomson's and others' view that saving the five is impermissible in
Lethal Fumes. But, of course, as I argued earlier, I don't think that
this view is defensible in any case for those who share the standard
intuition regarding Trolley.
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section. The first attempt 40 I will dub the
Causal Chain Length Principle (CCLP): "It is permissible to
cause harm to some in the course of achieving the greater good
of saving a greater number of others from comparable harm, if
events that produce the greater good are not more intimately
causally related to the production of harm or to other intrusion
onto the person or what is his which leads to such harm, than
they are to the production of the greater good (or its
structurally equivalent component) ".41
Kamm's second, revised and much more complicated, attempt is the
principle of Pe~issible Ha~ (PPH) , for which she offers two
different and, by her own admission, not necessarily equivalent
formulations, PPH(l) and PPH(2) -
PPH(l): "1. It is permissible that greater good (or its
structurally equivalent component) have lesser harm as one of
its aspects or as its direct or indirect effect, even when this
harm sustains that greater good.
2. It is permissible that a mere means to a greater
good have lesser harm as an effect, if and only if the greater
good (or its structurally equivalent component) is an aspect of
the means or noncausally its flipside, even when this harm
sustains the greater good. "42;
and
PPH(2): "1. It is permissible that a greater number of people
being saved from all death threats already facing them have
lesser harm as one of its aspects or as its direct or indirect
effect if and only if their being saved from all death threats
40It originally appeared in "Harming Some to Save Others",
Philosophical Studies 57 (3) (November, 1989): 227-260.
41Frances M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality: Volume II - Rights, Duties and
Status, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press 1996, p. 201
(footnote 1);
Unless specified otherwise, all future quotations from Kamm are from
that volwne.
42Kamrn , p .183.
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already facing them is aimed to accomplish the greater good of
saving those very same people43 •
2. It is permissible that a means to saving a
greater number of people from all death threats already facing
them have lesser harm as an effect if and only if (a) saving
those people from the threats already facing them is an aspect
of the means or its noncausal flipside, and (b) this saving is
aimed to accomplish the greater good of saving those very same
people. ,,44
The PPH, in both of its formulations, is supposed to represent
Kamm's improvements on the CCLP, the main difference being that
the PPH, unlike the CCLP, requires not only that the action in
question be more closely causally related to the good it creates
than to the evil, but also that the action, if it is merely a
means to the good, be noncausally related to it. However, the PPH
and the CCLP are based on the same underlying principles and
intuitions, and so most of my objections to Kamm will apply
equally to the CCLP and to either formulation of the PPH. And
many of the problems facing Karnrn's account are very similar in
kind, and in some cases in substance as well, to the problems
faced by the DDE and the attempted solution based on the
redirecting-old-threat/creating-new-threat distinction.
The first problem is the problem of determining the length of
relevant causal chains. Is it always clear when something that
serves as a means has the end as its noncausal flipside, and when
it causes the end? Of the original Trolley case, Karnrn says that
"the turning of the trolley is conceived of as a good event in
itself, or one very intimately noncausally related to the greater
43 This is intended to deal with cases such as Loop.
44Ka:mm, p .183.
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good, which causes the lesser evil of the one being killed"45. But
Kamm seems to be cheating a bit here. It appears to me that the
action of diverting the trolley is as closely related to
prolonging the life of the five, as it is to the death of the one.
If, indeed, the turning of the trolley is noncausally related to
the good in Trolley, then that good must be the five/s becoming
free of the deadly threat. But then it seems only fair to count
as the evil the creation of a deadly threat to the one, thus
making it the case that the evil too is noncausally related to the
turning of the trolley. If, on the other hand, the evil is merely
caused by the turning of the trolley, and so the evil must be
something along the lines of the trolley's hitting and killing the
one at some time t, I think it is only fair that the good in
question be the trolley's not hitting and killing the five at t',
where t' is the time at which the trolley would have hit the five,
had I not diverted it. But then the good turns out to be causally
related to my turning the trolley, as it is my turning the trolley
that causes it to be elsewhere at t'. This is not crucial to the
application of the CCLP to Trolley, (even though it reemerges as a
concern in more complicated cases), since the CCLP only requires
that the action be no more intimately connected to the evil than
to the good, but it becomes very important in applying the PPH, as
the PPH is more restrictive and only allows an action that causes
harm, or is itself harmful, if it is noncausally related to the
good.
45Kamm , p .172.
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The problem addressed in the previous paragraph raises an
objection of the same kind as the one that carne up in the course
of a similar discussion about what counts as the same threat - why
should answers to questions regarding the true length of some
causal chains have any bearing on morality? Kamm says that
morally permissible actions should be at least as closely related
to the good as to the evil, but why should that be, especially in
light of the fact that Karruu admits that is not, all other things
being equal, less morally objectionable to create evil through a
longer causal chain than through a shorter one46 ?
The more restrictive PPH actually demands that the lesser evil
not be brought about by a mere causal means - it should be
produced by the good itself, or by an aspect of the good, or. by
what is noncausally related to the good. But even putting aside
the very problematic issue of telling when something is
noncausally related to the end and when it is not, I fail to
understand the moral significance of this distinction. Surely, it
is bad if the means to an end are themselves evil or produce evil,
hence the saying that the end does not justify the means. But
isn't it at least as bad if the end itself, or something more
intimately related to it than means operating causally, is a
46Assuming, of course, that the causal role my action plays in bringing
about the causally remote outcome is as significant as the causal role
of my alternative action with the causally proximate outcome would be
- if my going to the store tomorrow inadvertently causes the Earth to
be destroyed by aliens in the year 2576, my going to the store
tomorrow is still not likely to be a morally impermissible action; but
the explanatorily relevant factor will be not the length of the causal
chain in itself, but rather the various other causes, e.g. the aliens,
that will playa much, much larger causal role in the destruction of
our home planet than my going to the store.
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source of evil?
The two concerns that I have just raised seem to be backed up
by our moral intuitions about cases. Going back to Three Buttons
and Four Buttons, which I introduced 1n the previous section47 ,
there just doesn't seem to be any moral difference between the
option in which the means causes the lesser harm, and the option
in which the end itself causes the lesser harm, or between the
former and the option where a causally-twice-removed means causes
the lesser harm48 • But this is not the only way in which the CCLP
and the PPH fail to capture our intuitions properly. Pushing C in
Three Buttons or Four Buttons is definitely impermissible
according to the PPH, and pushing D in Four Buttons is certainly
impermissible according to both the CCLP and the PPH, even though,
as I've argued earlier, I believe that anyone who claims that it
is permissible to turn the trolley in Trolley has to disagree with
those conclusions. But now I want to offer some cases where the
CCLP, and even the more restrictive PPH, judge an action to be
morally permissible when it is clearly not.
Consider the case of the
Transporter: This is just like Transplant, but the manner in
which the five would get the one's organs is different - I would
be using a Star Trek-like matter-energy transporter. What I
would need to do is to enter the appropriate instructions into
470r , alternatively, the variants of those cases in which the harmful
options involve different single potential victims, discussed in
footnote 24.
48 p l us , once again, we have the problem of whether the trolley's impact
with the iron wall is causally or noncausally related to the good - a
problem, the resolution of which, on Kamm's account, implausibly bears
enormous moral weight.
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the machine, and then, if I push the red button, the following
complicated event will happen - instantaneously, the organs of
the one will end up where the afflicted organs of the five are
right now, whereas the afflicted organs themselves will
materialize in the waste basket.
I think it is clear that this case is morally on a par with
Transplant, especially if we assume that the death of the one In
both cases is equally painful or painless. I believe we have one
event here which has a good aspect or noncausal effect49 , i.e. the
saving of the five, and a bad aspect or noncausal effect which is
its flipside, i.e. the death of the one. It appears that
according to the PPH, and the CCLP as well, it should be morally
permissible for me to push the red button, which is, indeed, a bad
feature for a purported solution to the Trolley Problem to have.
Kamm could try to argue that pushing the button is noncausally
related to the one's death, but only causes the five to be saved,
and so both the CCLP and the PPH prohibit it, but, as I've argued
with regard to the Trolley case, such an approach seems to involve
cheating. Whatever relationship, causal or noncausal, exists
between the removal of someone's vital organs and their death, is
precisely the relationship that exists between the endowment of
someone with replacement vital organs and their being saved. If,
however, Karnm responds that both are cases of causing, and so
pushing the button in Transporter is permitted by the CCLP, but
not the PPH, whichever account of causation she offers to support
that contention can easily be used to argue that diverting the
49 I am not quite sure how Kamm wants to draw the line between the two,
but fortunately it is not very important as far as the PPH is
concerned.
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trolley only causes the five to be saved in Trolley, thus
rendering turning the trolley in that case impermissible according
to the PPH50 •
I can think of only one more objection to my Transporter case
- it might be argued that my example is too science-fictional and
that, in fact, I am just trying to conceal, by using the word
"instantaneously", the inescapable truth that the organs have to
be removed from the one's body first in order to be placed into
the bodies of the five. That would, of course, make saving the
five in Transporter impermissible both according to the PPH and
according to the CCLP. I am not sure that this is a valid
objection, as philosophers frequently tend to cross the boundaries
of physical possibility in describing their thought experiments,
but that is usually not considered to have much of an effect on
the validity of the resulting intuitions, so perhaps I should be
allowed philosophic license to reinvent physical possibility in
this case as well. However, instead of arguing about this, I
might be better off just offering a different example -
Cloning Machine: This is once again very similar to
50 r can also see someone pointing out that my pushing the button may be
considered to be merely the cause of the complex event which I
describe in the Transporter case. That may be true, but in any case,
as far as the PPH is concerned, Kamm has to be talking only about the
last event in the causal picture of the case before the causal chains
leading to the good and the bad effects part companYi otherwise,
whether or not it is morally permissible for me to turn the trolley in
Trolley would depend on how causally complicated the mechanism is by
which I can divert the trolley, which is certainly a morally
irrelevant factor, unless, perhaps, it is something in that causal
chain, and not the redirection of the trolley itself, that would cause
the death of the one.
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Transplant, except this time I have yet another
science-fictional device - a cloning machine. Let's assume that
the five's afflicted organs were already unusable and had to be
removed, but that I possess a futuristic life-support device,
which can keep them alive for a few more minutes. The way I can
save them is by pushing the blue button on the cloning machine,
which will immediately place a functioning cloned version of the
one's organs into the five. Unfortunately, it is a fact about
the cloning procedure that the original organs become unusable
as soon as the cloned copies are in use, therefore the one will
die5l •
I think it is clear that this magical case is also morally on a
par with Transplant, even though the actual organs of the one are
never removed. It is equally clear, especially ln light of our
little discussion of possible objections to the Transporter case,
that pushing the blue button is permissible according to both the
CCLP and the PPH. Thus we have to conclude that the PPH is not
only too restrictive, but also too permissive. 52
There are other problems with the PPH as well. The talk of
5lIt may occur to the reader that this case is very similar in
structure to Lethal Fumes. That is true, although I think there may
be some morally releyant differences. The main reason why I want to
introduce the Cloning Machine case in addition to Lethal Fumes, is
that while on a pre-theoretical level it may be quite easy for someone
to maintain that saving the five is permissible in Lethal Fumes,
although not in Transplant, it should be next to impossible to claim
that saving the five is permissible in Cloning Machine, but not in
Transplant.
52 It might also be interesting to note that while the PPH and the CCLP
rule out saving the five in Lethal Fumes 2, which I describe in
footnote 7, and which is similar to Operation - a case Kamrn introduces
and discusses on page 151, it is unclear what happens with regard to
Lethal Fumes, as the case is underdescribed in the sense that we don't
know whether it is the production of the gas itself that saves the
five, or whether the production of the gas only causes the five to be
saved. Supposing that the relationship between the production of the
gas and the saving of the five is a noncausal one, the PPH renders it
permissible to produce the gas in Lethal Fumes, contradicting the
generally accepted view which apparently doesn't depend on which
interpretation we pick.
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"structurally equivalent components" is introduced by Kamm in
order to justify diverting the trolley in cases like Loop, even
though the death of the one is clearly a means to saving the five.
The rough idea behind this justification is that we would turn the
trolley in Loop or Modified Loop in order to achieve a state of
affairs which is structurally equivalent to the good which we are
seeking, i.e. a state where the five are free from all of the
lethal threats that they are currently facing; and that is
permissible, even though we need the one to be killed, and we need
his body to stop the trolley in order to maintain the good state
of affairs, and even though if the one were not there to be killed
we would not turn the trolley, especially in Modified Loop, where
turning would mean killing six instead of letting five die should
the one's body fail to halt the trolley's progress.
however, unclear why we should be convinced by this justification,
especially since Kamm's defense of it makes use of two
distinctions which we have already found objectionable in the
course of our discussion in section II.
The first is the distinction she introduces between turning the
trolley because the one will be killed, and turning the trolley in
order that the one be killed. That distinction, just like the
DDE, relies on facts about the intentions of the agent, and that,
as we have seen earlier, is extremely problematic, if not outright
disastrous, as part of a principle meant to judge the moral
permissibility of actions rather than the moral worth of agents.
The second problematic distinction that Kamm relies on, especially
for applications of the PPH(2) to multiple or strangely-behaving
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threat situations53 , is the old-threat/new-threat distinction,
which she draws so finely that even the same trolley's coming back
from a different direction is to count as a new threat. On the
whole, Kamm's explanation of this part of the PPH is less than
convincing, and without it she can't account for the commonly
accepted intuitions regarding Loop, Modified Loop, and other
similar cases.
1 have to conclude that the PPH and the CCLP fail on all three
of the major counts which discredited both the DDE and the
redirection/new-threat distinction as potential solutions to the
Trolley Problem - Kamm's principles rely on a distinction, the
lines for which are very controversial even in the simplest of
cases which we have to consider; it is unclear why the distinction
could have any moral significance even if drawn cleanlYi and, last
but not least, the CCLP and the PPH don't fit our moral intuitions
regarding a large group of situations, both in the direction of
being too permissive and in the direction of being too
restrictive, which is, of course, to be expected considering the
difficulties with the distinctions on which the principles are
based54 •
53 1 have numerous complaints against Kamm's moral intuitions regarding
many of these cases to begin with, but 1 don't think it would be
useful to discuss them in this paper.
54Kamm makes further modifications to the PPH in her, as yet
unpublished, manuscript "Toward the Essence of Nonconsequentialism".
1 find these modifications highly problematic as well, but since the
heart of the PPH remains the same, and the objections against the PPH,
as well as against the CCLP, are numerous and, apparently,
insurmountable, 1 think it would not be wise at this time to go into
those modifications in detail in this paper. It would also not be
prudent to discuss the problems 1 have with many of Kamm's moral
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Section IV.
Judith Thomson and Hypothetical Prior Consent.
In chapter 7 of her book The Realm of Rights, Judith Thomson
introduces a very different approach to the Trolley Problem.
First, she points out some features of the Transplant case that
are not present in Trolley. For one thing, people dying of organ
failure presumably have had some time to deal with their situation
and put their affairs in order, but the one who would be killed
would not get that chance. But also, even more importantly, in
our world there is normally a connection between the way we lead
our lives and the medical condition of our major organs. It seems
utterly unfair, not to mention morally wrong, to penalize someone
who has lived a healthy life full of exercise and poorly tasting,
but medically inoffensive foods, by killing him and using his
organs to save five people who have ignored health concerns in
order to avoid denying themselves any of life's pleasures.
It is, however, part of my footnote 1 stipulation for the
Trolley case that none of the six people involved are in any way
responsible for the fact that the situation in question has
arisen. That automatically excludes the kinds of examples that
Thomson wants to rule out at the beginning of her chapter, such as
cases where the five are not supposed to be on the tracks in the
first place, e.g. cases in which the five are thrill seekers who
intuitions - most notably, those regarding the various Lazy Suzan
cases and the examples involving killing someone to whom the agent 1S
providing supererogatory life-saving aid.
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are deliberately ignoring warning signs. It is, perhaps, helpful,
although not necessary, to think of the six as track workmen55 , who
are voluntarily doing their job and are aware of the risks that it
may entail, but who, nevertheless, have every right to be on the
tracks, and who should be saved if there is any morally
permissible way to save them.
Thomson argues that there is a very important feature of the
Trolley case that has hitherto gone unnoticed. Suppose that the
runaway trolley incident in Trolley occurs at 3 P.M. Suppose,
furthermore, that there is no specialization required among the
group of workmen we are concerned with, and that at 8 A.M. the six
draw lots to determine which five of them will work on the main
piece of track, and which one will work on the spare piece of
track. Each one of the six has an equal 1/6 chance to be the lone
person on the spare track. Under the circumstances, Thomson says,
it would be reasonable for all six to agree, prior to 8 A.M., that
should a runaway trolley situation arise, the trolley will be
diverted to the one, as that would increase everyone's chances for
survival from 1/6, if the situation arises but the trolley is not
diverted, to 5/6. 56 • Thomson argues that this hypothetical
consent, which would be given despite the fact that at 3 P.M.
there clearly could be one track workman to whose advantage it
55Which is why I was calling them track workmen in my original
formulation of the Trolley case.
56 I f we look at the trolley threat more generally, without knowing
which track the runaway trolley will be on, the chances for survival,
if the trolley is not diverted, would be 1/2 for each one of the six
workmen. 5/6 is still a significant improvement.
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would be if the trolley was not diverted, is the reason why it 1S
morally permissible to turn the trolley at 3 P.M.
By contrast, it is unlikely that the six in Transplant, or any
other randomly chosen six people, for that matter, would agree 1n
advance to have one of them cut up in order to save the other five
from organ failure. For one thing, Thomson says, that is because
there is never a time when we are completely ignorant about
whether or not our organs are likely to fail in the near future,
as normally whether or not our organs fail depends on our past
medical history, habits, etc. There is no equivalent of a random
drawing to determine who will be among the five and who will be
the one, and so there is no equivalent of the time before the
drawing at which it would have been reasonable for all involved to
agree to a transplant should the appropriate need arise. That is
why it is not morally permissible for me to proceed with the
operation in Transplant.
There are a few minor details that need to be cleared up
before we can proceed to evaluate Thomson's approach. First, is
it always morally permissible to turn the trolley in Trolley,
provided that the six are all track workmen and that their
location for the day was determined by a fair random procedure?
Thomson is not committed to that. She says that if some of the
six have religious or moral beliefs that require them not to
benefit from actions such as the turning of the trolley in
Trolley, that may, indeed, affect the permissibility of diverting
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the trolleys7. After all, we would no longer be entitled to
conclude that an agreement to divert the trolley, should the need
arise, would have been to the advantage of all six.
Of course, in considering cases such as Trolley, we usually
assume that the agent is a stranger to all six of the people
involved; therefore, presumably, he will know nothing about their
religious and moral beliefs. I think we should keep it in the
back of our minds as a potential concern, however, that there is a
real possibility that in diverting the trolley I might be doing
something so objectionable even to one of the five, that it is not
to his overall benefit that I turn the trolley - in fact, he might
not have consented to it, had I had the chance to ask him. I
believe there is a realistic chance that this moral/religious
minority may outnumber the few people who would object to having
their legs amputated even if that were the only way to save their
lives, which is an example that Thomson uses several times in her
chapter on the Trolley Problem. However, I think it may be best
to table this concern for the rest of this discussion, and just
assume that none of the people involved hold such beliefs.
The second clarification concerns the question of whether or
not raising the probability of one's survival already counts as a
real gain, even for the one that actually ends up dying. Thomson
argues that it does, using the example of a man, Edward, whose
57This may, of course, raise some unpleasant issues. For instance, if
only one of the five has such religious or moral beliefs, can that
affect the permissibility of diverting the trolley? This is a tough
question, but, fortunately, I don't think there is a real need to
consider it here.
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life can probably, although not with certainty, be saved if his
leg is amputated; if it is not amputated, however, he will
definitely die. Thomson points out that it is to Edward's
advantage for him to undergo the amputation, even if, in fact, he
ends up dying, because the surgery would increase his chances for
survival. Similarly, Thomson claims, it is to the advantage of
all six in Trolley if an agreement is made at 8 A.M. to turn the
trolley, as it would increase everyone's chances for survival.
There is a slight asymmetry between the case of Edward and
Trolley, as Edward stands to lose nothing if the surgery is
performed - without it he will surely die, but one of the six
stands to lose a lot, i.e. his life, if I turn the trolley. But I
think we should nevertheless accept Thomson's conclusion that it
is in a very real sense advantageous for all six to reach an
agreement at 8 A.M. that the trolley be diverted, should the need
arise.
There is one last detail to be cleared up. Thomson is very
careful not to have her criterion be about what someone would have
said had he or she been asked. As she points out, if an
amputation is necessary and sufficient to save a patient's life
and the patient is unconscious, it hardly matters if, should the
patient be woken up, he would be so disoriented and in so much
pain that he would either not be able to understand any questions
posed to him, or would not be able to respond intelligibly, and so
no consent would result. What matters in general is not what one
or another person would have said had he or she been asked, but
the facts which make it the case that it would have been rational
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for the person to consent if given the chance.
of course, we have to be extra cautious here, since if, for
instance, Edward does get a chance to voice his opinion in the
amputation case, and, especially, if he is in his right mind while
doing SOi regardless of whether or not it is reasonable for him to
say what he does, it seems that we may have to stop what we are
doing should he request it 58 • I will not dwell on this point, as
there are more important issues to be discussed, but it seems to
me that it follows that if someone has, at some point, especially
prior to his situation's being determined by random events or
procedures, explicitly expressed the desire not to have his
chances of survival maximized by a sacrificing arrangement, it may
be the case that we cannot use the hypothetical consent approach
to justify killing him in order to save five others, should the
appropriate circumstances arise.
We are now ready to discuss the merits of Thomson's solution.
The first issue that I would like to raise is that even actual
consent at the time immediately prior to the action in question
doesn't necessarily make the action morally permissible. Thomson
concedes as much in saying that "it might be true of a man that he
would consent to your slitting his throat in that he has the mad
idea that he killed Cock Robin, and deserves throat slitting for
iti the fact that he would consent does not make it permissible
58Another problem is that it seems that if the six actually discuss the
possibility of a runaway trolley situation's arising at 8 A.M. and
reject the alternative of diverting the trolley, it should no longer
matter whether or not it was reasonable for them to reject it. An
actual rejection should, I think, nearly always trump grounds for
rational hypothetical consent.
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for you to proceed"59. The reason for this is that, as I've
mentioned before, what's important is not the consent itself, but
the underlying facts which would make consent reasonable under the
circumstances. Obviously, it is not reasonable for the person in
question to consent to having his throat slit, and, equally
obviously, it is not morally permissible for me to slit his
throat. But let's consider a more sane potential victim.
Sacrifice: Suppose that there is a tribe somewhere which is
suffering as a result of severe drought. The elders, as well as
the entire tribe, are convinced that the tribe's chances for
survival are slim unless the Gods are appeased by an act of
human sacrifice. So, the entire adult population of the tribe
agrees to draw lots to see who gets to be the sacrifice. Let's
suppose that everyone wholeheartedly wants the sacrifice to
proceed, including even the unlucky one who loses the drawing,
and his or her entire family.
I think that despite the consent, it is still morally wrong for
the sacrifice to take place. And, especially, I believe that if
the tribe's religion calls for an outsider to perform the ritual
in order to make it legitimate, and I happen to be in the
neighborhood and am asked to assist, it would be morally wrong for
me to oblige this poor misguided tribe60 •
Now, one may respond that even though the people in this
example are not certifiably mad, unlike the alleged murderer of
Cock Robin, the facts that would make it reasonable for the one
59Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (ROR), Cambridge, MA -
London, Harvard University Press 1990; p.188.
60 Some people believe that the same is true with regard to the death
penalty, i.e. that it is not morally permissible to execute murderers,
even if all of society believes that it is beneficial for them to be
killed, and even the murderers themselves consent to their own
executions.
203
who lost the drawing to consent to the sacrifice are still lacking
- it is not really to the benefit of anyone that he or she die.
But, first of all, that is not necessarily the case - perhaps
the belief that Gods have been appeased would restore long lost
hope to the entire tribe and make them persevere in spite of the
drought. And, secondly and more importantly, I do not see any
rational grounds for discounting the moral relevance of the
religious beliefs of this tribe, while taking notice of religious
beliefs of Christian Scientists and Jehovah's Witnesses, as
Thomson does in her discussion of amputation cases. I think that
if Edward's being a Christian Scientist is sufficient grounds for
it not to be the case that it would be reasonable for him to
consent to the amputation, and so a sufficient reason for the
surgeon not to proceed if he is aware of the fact that Edward is a
Christian Scientist, then in Sacrifice we have a case where it is
reasonable for the one to consent to being killed and yet we may
not kill him even if he provides actual on-the-spot consent~ Of
course, I do not wish to place too much weight on this point
alone, as the problem may, for instance, be easily, although not
altogether comfortably, remedied by retracting the claim that we
may not proceed with a life-saving surgical procedure without
consent, if we are aware of the fact that the patient is a devout
Christian Scientist.
Next, let's consider the following problem. Let's assume that
it is reasonable for a father to consent to have his kidney
transplanted into his dying daughter, at the very least, provided
that that is the only way to save the child's life, and that the
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father's life will not be endangered by the transplant. But
suppose the father is unconscious and cannot consent; he has also
never expressed consent in the past. I think it may be, and, in
fact, probably is, morally impermissible to take his kidney. But,
even more importantly, even if the father agrees in advance, but
then at the last moment changes his mind and refuses to proceed,
it is morally impermissible for us to knock him out and perform
the transplant anyway. In this case, it is reasonable for the
father to have given his consent earlier, and, in fact, he has
given it. Furthermore, it is still, presumably, reasonable for
him to consent to the procedure at the time when it is supposed to
take place, but, because he refuses to consent, we cannot proceed.
To me this suggests that in cases where prior consent is
justified, but at-the-time consent 1S no longer advantageous, if
the "victim" protests, we may have to refrain from whatever we
were otherwise about to do Gl • By Thomson's admission, it is very
likely that the one in Trolley would, given the chance, protest at
3 P.M. But the fact that in actuality he does not get a chance to
object should not matter, as, according to Thomson, if we know
that Frank, who will survive if and only if we amputate his leg,
would protest against the amputation if he were conscious and in a
clear state of mind, say, because he 1S a Christian Scientist, we
may not proceed, even though Frank does not actually get a chance
to protest. As I've already indicated, to me that suggests a
GlAt the very least, in cases where the would-be ~victim" has not
greatly and irreversibly benefited at somebody else's expense in
exchange for giving prior consent in the first place. I thank Judith
Thomson for pointing out this concern to me.
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problem with turning the trolley in Trolley based on the
reasonableness of prior consent.
It could be replied that what happens in the father-daughter
kidney transplant case is that at first the father considers the
life of his daughter to be more important to him than his kidney,
and so it is actually on balance good for him if the transplant
takes place; but later he changes his mind and finds his kidney to
be more important to him than the life of his child, so perhaps it
is no longer on balance good for him that we proceed; or, perhaps,
it never was on balance good for him that the transplant be
performed, and he had just been mistaken for a while. I don't
think that any of these are good descriptions of what is going on
in this situation. But I can offer a different example, where it
should be relatively clear what is on balance good for each
participant -
Balloon: Suppose that there is a hot air balloon adrift in
bad weather with six people onboard. If all of them stay in the
balloon, it will crash and five of the six will die62 .
They are all aware of this, although they don't know who would
be the lucky one. They are also aware of the fact that should
one of them jump, or be pushed, out of the basket, the balloon
will be able to maneuver to safety because of reduced weight.
We seem to be dealing with the exact same spread in Balloon as
in Trolley. If all six agree to roll a fair die, with the loser
being committed to jumping to his death, each of them increases
his chances of survival from 1/6 to 5/6. Suppose they agree to do
62 I realize that this sounds somewhat strange, but I'd rather not be
forced to come up with a crazy reason why it is that exactly one of
the six will survive the crash.
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this, but then the one who loses the roll of the die backs out and
refuses to jump. I think that if the five push him overboard
anyway, it would be a morally impermissible killing at best,
murder at worst. Many would, perhaps, disagree with me and argue
that it is only fair that the one forfeit his right not to be
killed in case he loses the roll of the die. He did, after all,
agree to the arrangement of his own free will, knowing that while
it would increase his chances for survival, it might still result
in his death. I disagree63 • But regardless of that, even if
actual prior consent can override the one's right not to be
killed, it seems clear that mere hypothetical consent, or grounds
for such, cannot do so, despite the advantages of consent in terms
of probabilities of survival.
In further support of this claim, consider a variation of
Balloon -
Ground control: Suppose that I am on the ground and have
access to buttons which operate levers on the balloon with which
I can eject any person from the basket. Suppose that if five
of the six are to be saved, action has to be taken within 10
seconds, so there is no time for me to discuss the situation
with them, even though there is a radio connection between me
and the balloon. But I have a list of their names in
alphabetical order and a six-sided die. I can quickly roll it,
pick the corresponding name off the list, and press the
appropriate button.
Suppose that once I roll the die and pick Fred's name off the
63Al t hough the situation can get much more complicated if the one
actually accepts some form of highly valuable and irreplaceable, at
least under the circumstances, compensation for participating in the
arrangement, and then still refuses to jump after receiving his
compensation and losing the roll of the die. Thanks to Judith Thomson
for directing my attention to this possibility.
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list, I can hear Fred saying over the radio that he would not want
to risk being sacrificed in order to improve his chances for
survivali furthermore, even if he had agreed beforehand, he would
have refused to jump had he lost. Can I push the button? I think
not. Can I push the button if Fred remains silent throughout, but
I have no reason to believe that he would not have protested, had
I had the time to tell him what I am about to do? Once again, I
think not. Yet, in terms of probabilistic reasons grounding
reasonable hypothetical consent, Ground Control is eerily similar
to Trolley. It seems that even if we can bypass the lack of
current consent in some tradeoff cases where prior consent lS
present, we can only do it if the prior consent is actual.
Another problem is presented by the Fat Man case. I am
assuming that Thomson believes that throwing the fat man off the
bridge is impermissible even if he is also a track workman, and
if, in addition, his assignment was determined by drawing lots
earlier in the day - he got the bridge assignment and five others
got the main track assignment. Furthermore, it doesn't seem to be
a crucial feature of the case that the one on the bridge is fat.
We can either stipulate that all six track workmen are fat, or,
alternatively, that even a thin man's body is sufficient to halt
the trolley's progress. None of the above-mentioned stipulations
seem to change anything that's morally relevant. Yet on Thomson's
account, they appear to do so. For under the circumstances, it
seems that it would be reasonable for all six to agree, prior to
drawing lots, that should the threat arise, the one on the bridge
will be thrown off into the path of the runaway trolley, so that
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the other five may be saved. Thus it seems that contrary to
Thomson's own intuitions, it would be morally permissible, based
on her criterion, to throw the one off the bridge64 •
And, finally, let's go back to Transplant-like cases. Let's
begin by taking a look at
Two People Car: Suppose that there are two people in a car
that ends up being forced off the road. The resulting injuries
are not related to facts about who was sitting where, or to any
other decisions made by either of the passengers. Suppose that
Fred and Mary are both unconscious, but Fred's life is not in
danger, while Mary has suffered massive internal damage and will
surely and quickly die unless one of Fred's kidneys and one of
Fred's lungs are transplanted into her.
It is probably impermissible for me to operate, considering that
Fred's permission cannot be obtained. At the very least, if I
proceed, it seems that once Fred finds out what I have ,done, he
will be justified In being upset with me and demanding
compensation for the violation of his rights. Yet, if Fred and
Mary were asked 5 minutes before the accident what should be done
if one of them would die unless a lung and a kidney from his or
her unconscious companion were transplanted, it would have been
reasonable for both of them to consent to the procedure, as such
consent would have raised their chances of survival from 50% to
100%.
Now let's take a look at a variation of Two People Car -
six People Car: Suppose that, instead of two people, there
are six people in the car and five of them have suffered severe
internal injuries, which will prove fatal unless organs from the
64Karnm expresses similar concerns about Thomson's proposed solution in
chapter 6 of Morality, Mortality: Volume II.
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one, who is also unconscious, but whose life is not in danger,
are transplanted into them, thereby killing him65 •
Once again, it seems that there are grounds for rational prior
consent here. But I think it is clear that I cannot proceed with
the transplant. Thomson claims that if we imagine a hypothetical
world in which organ failure came upon us suddenly, without
warning, without any relation to our lifestyles, or any other
choices we have made, and, furthermore, should fresh organs be
provided to the "victims", the probability of their failing would
be no higher than the probability of any other person's organs'
failing; we would likely find that it is permissible to save the
five in that world's equivalent of Transplant 66 • I think that
Thomson is wrong about this, and that my car accident examples,
which seem morally equivalent to that other-worldly Transplant
case, support me on this point.
If it can be shown that the other-worldly Transplant case is
morally equivalent to Trolley, then so much the worse, I think,
for the opinion that it is permissible to redirect the trolley in
Trolley. If, on the other hand, there are other features of the
cases that make other-worldly Transplant, and our-worldly, but
slightly modified, Fat Man, different from Trolley, than it is
those features, and not the ones underlying the would-be
651 should also add the stipulation that medicine has advanced to the
point of being able to rule out organ rejection, and therefore the
five will survive as surely as the one will die.
66Perhaps I can even help the plausibility of this claim by offering
the use of my cloning machine instead of the usual gory cutting and
pasting.
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reasonableness of hypothetical prior consent, that would need to
form the basis of the solution to the Trolley Problem. Thus, even
though it is clear that consent-related issues could be morally
relevant - after all, if everyone involved, including the one,
asks me to kill the one to save the five, it might, under some
circumstances, be morally permissible for me to do so, even if it
would not be permissible without such a request; I believe that
Thomson's hypothetical prior consent approach fails to provide a
satisfactory resolution of the Trolley Problem.
Section v.
Back to the Killing/Letting Die Distinction.
As we have seen during the discussion of proposed solutions in
sections II-IV, all of them suffer from very serious deficiencies.
None of them are generalizable to the entire array of Trolley-
Problem-related cases. And most of them rely on distinctions
whose moral significance is dubious at best, and which are drawn
in very controversial ways to begin with. Should we be looking
for a different solution? Well, it certainly would be
preposterous to maintain that it 1S morally permissible to save
the five in Trolley, although not in Transplant, but there is
absolutely no explanation for this moral phenomenon. So, it seems
that if there is no solution to the Trolley Problem to be found,
that can only be because the premises of the problem are mistaken,
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and either saving the five is permissible in both cases, or in
neither one. I will now argue that we have ample reason to think
that there can't be a satisfactory solution to the Trolley
Problem.
I want to point out that while everyone who has written on the
Trolley Problem believes that it is permissible to divert the
trolley in Trolley, they all have to draw the line of moral
permissibility somewhere short of cases clearly morally equivalent
to Transplant. In her early work, Thomson drew the line at
introducing a different threat, as in Avalanche or Lethal Furnes.
Costa draws the line between Loop and Modified Loop. Karnrn's line
separates the lone-option equivalent of pushing B in Four Buttons,
i.e. Avalanche, from the lone-option equivalents of pushing C or D
in Four Buttons. The list could go on for a while. But as we
have already seen, none of the above-mentioned red lines are
defensible.
Of course, there must be a threshold somewhere if there is a
solution to the Trolley Problem. What strikes me as plausible,
however, is that everyone who has written on the Trolley Problem
experiences great, even if sometimes subconscious, moral
discomfort regarding all the cases that we have looked at, in
which the agent can kill one in order to save five. Sooner or
later, as the cases get more and more objectionable (or only seem
to), that discomfort just can't be ignored any longer, and the
philosopher arrives at the conclusion that saving the five 1S
morally impermissible in the case being considered, and all cases
that are as bad or worse. But by constructing more complicated
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examples, or comparison cases such as Three Buttons or Four
Buttons, we can see that there is no room for the line of moral
permissibility to be drawn there, at least for the authors listed
above. In "Thoughts on the Trolley Problem"67, John Martin Fischer
even constructs a sequence of cases which, he claims, shows that
Fat Man and Trolley are morally on a par. I disagree with his
argument, but I would not be surprised if a better one could be
constructed. I think we should seriously consider the possibility
that no line needs to, or can bel drawn in the first place,
because saving five by killing one is already impermissible in
Trolley.
So, why do I think that the killing/letting die distinction
has a role to play in Trolley-Problem-related examples? In the
process of her discussion of the Health-Pebble example in
"Killing, Letting Die and the Trolley Problem"1 Thomson makes the
following claim: "There is no Principle of Moral Inertia: there
is no prima facie duty to refrain from interfering with existing
states of affairs just because they are existing states of
affairs"68. The implication is that there is no overriding moral
pressure on us to avoid altering pre-existing distributions of
benefits and threats, even if the benefits are potentially life-
saving, or if the threats are potentially lethal. While I
certainly believe that in some cases we might have no moral duty
to "refrain from interfering with existing states of affairs just
67Unpublished, printed in EPR.
68EPRI p. 72 .
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because they are existing states of affairs", I strongly disagree
with Thomson's claim as a general principle. In order to explain
why, I will first introduce Thomson's case -
Health-Pebble: There are six men on a beach who are all
dying. Five are standing together, and the sixth is on another
part of the beach. There is a magical Health-Pebble, capable of
curing whichever ailments you have, floating towards the beach.
If I do nothing, it will float towards the one and save his
life. If I deflect it, it will instead reach the five, and they
will be saved, as each of them, unlike the one who needs the
entire pebble, only requires one-fifth of the pebble in order to
survive.
Thomson argues that, assuming that the one has no more of a claim
on the pebble than the five do, it 1S morally permissible for me
to divert the pebble to the five, and thus ensure the allegedly
better distribution of it. It is therefore reasonable to add some
further assumptions to the case: the pebble does not belong to
anyone, I am under no obligation towards any of the six, none of
the six are responsible for their, or anybody else'S, being
involved in this predicament, the six did not determine their
locations on the beach by participating in some sort of a lottery
with full knowledge that a health-pebble was on the way that at
most five of them will be able to use, etc., etc. But, Thomson
argues, and this is where that claim that I quoted a bit earlier
comes in, the one does not have any more of a claim on the pebble
simply in virtue of the fact that he would gain possession of it
if I do not intervene.
Thomson proceeds, by analogy, to explain the permissibility of
diverting existing threats, as in Trolley, although not of
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creating new ones, as in Transplant, or of otherwise doing
something to the one in order to produce a better distribution of
the good or the threat, such as pushing the one on the beach out
of the way, or killing him in order to prevent him from using the
pebble. I have to agree that I feel much less of a discomfort at
the thought of redirecting the health-pebble than I feel at the
thought of diverting the trolley. But the reason for that is that
I do not believe Trolley and Health-Pebble to be analogous, even
in respects other than that the pebble is a good and the trolley
is a threat. If the pebble is unowned and no one has any claim on
it, I can, if I want to, take possession of it and make it my
pebble. After that, I should have the right to distribute that
pebble any way I want to69 •
Most would say that the best thing for me to do is to give the
pebble to the five, although I have argued in my previous chapter
that the best thing to do in such cases might be to flip a coin,
thus giving all six an equal chance for survival. But, regardless
of that, if I take possession of the pebble and become, so to
speak, its rightful owner, the direction in which the pebble was
headed, which determines who would have come into possession of it
if I did not, stops being a factor in determining the moral
69Al t hough I do believe, as I have argued in the previous chapter, that
this is compatible with it being the case that I ought not distribute
it in some ways. For instance, supposing that the pebble is only
useful for another half-hour, and neither I nor anybody else I could
get the pebble to in the next 30 minutes, other than the six on the
beach, have any ailments worth mentioning, it is probably morally
wrong of me to give it to no one and keep it as part of my pebble
collection.
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permissibility of actions; just as if I find an envelope with
$1,000,000 in cash, which has just miraculously appeared on the
sidewalk and is unowned, should I pick it up, the fact that there
is a person walking right behind me who would have taken the
envelope if I had not, becomes a non-factor in determining the
moral permissibility of my actions concerning the money, even if
the $1,000,000 can save that person's life7o .
The crucial point here is that while I might, under certain
circumstances, such as when the good in question can save somebody
else's life, need a good reason in order for it to be morally
permissible for me to keep the good for myself 71 , even though I
have the right to do so, I don't need much of a reason for taking
possession of an unowned good in the first place. And if I do
take possession of an unowned good, it no longer matters who would
have come to own it if I hadn't72 • But this does not seem to be
7°Clearly, since the envelope is unowned, I also have every right to
kick it to a different spot, or pick it up and throw it on a different
sidewalk, even if that changes who will find it.
71 Such a reason is, of course, a lot easier to find with regard to one
million dollars than with regard to a health-pebble, the peculiar
usefulness of which will be exhausted within 30 minutes.
72A concern may be voiced here about cases in which I can't take
possession of the pebble, but can only deflect it. One can conjure up
a complex deflection mechanism operated by a push of a button from
thousands of miles away. I think that in many, if not all, cases,
such deflection activity, provided it violates no one's rights in
itself, can be viewed as taking temporary possession of the good -
what I am doing is as right or as wrong as literally picking up an
unowned good and then, say, handing it over to somebody else of my own
free will, even though I have a right not to. But the less plausible
such an interpretation appears to be in a particular case, the more it
seems that I need a good reason for diverting the good in question -
the kind of serious reason that in possession cases I would need if I
were to keep the good for myself and let all involved die, and the
kind of serious reason that I believe I would need in order to divert
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the case in examples where the action in question is diverting a
threat, such as a trolley or a nuclear missile. The threat is not
an unowned something that I can make mine, even temporarily, and
thus acquire the right, let alone the moral permission, to
distribute it in any way I see fit. It is unclear what it would
mean for me to take possession of a threat like this in the first
place, and even if it were, people certainly don't have a right or
a moral permission to distribute threats (as opposed to goods)
that they own any way they wish. I have the right to dispense my
$1,000,000 any way I see fit, subject to certain constraints such
as, perhaps, not using them to fund terrorist activities, but I
don't have the right to dispose of the contents of my vial of
anthrax just any old way that strikes my f ancy73. Thus I believe
that the analogy between Trolley and Health-Pebble breaks down,
and that some sort of a principle of moral inertia is in effect at
least for some threat cases.
The explanation for this phenomenon lies, I think, in the moral
significance of the killing/letting die distinction for cases such
as Trolley. In order to illustrate why I believe that the
distinction is morally relevant in Trolley, I first need to
introduce the following variant of Trolley -
One-One Trolley: This case is just like Trolley, but there is
a mortal threat from one group to another. I will discuss this need
for reasons in more detail slightly later on.
730n one, I believe quite common, view, it is always supererogatory to
give away a good that you rightfully own, but there can and should be
very strict moral rules regarding the distribution of threats, even,
or perhaps especially, if the threat emanates from something you own.
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only one person trapped on each piece of track. Let's call the
one who is on the main piece of track, and who will be killed if
I do nothing, John. And let's call the one who is on the spare
piece of track, and who will die if I divert the trolley, Mike.
As I've just argued, the health-pebble analogy gives us no reason
to believe that the alternative of killing Mike is morally
equivalent to the alternative of letting John die, even though the
two outcomes are clearly equivalent - in both cases one man dies
and, by an assumption that we make for all of these cases, John
deserves death no more and no less than Mike does. Furthermore, I
believe that lowe John's family no explanation for not turning
the trolley, beyond relating the circumstances of the case to them
and pointing out that I would have needed to kill Mike in order to
save John. If they are able to think rationally at this point,
there is nothing further for them to inquire about - there is no
reason why I should have substituted the death of another for
John's death, provided that I am not responsible for the threat,
and, if I had done nothing, John would have died.
However, what am I to tell Mike's family if I do divert the
trolley? Simply explaining the setup won't do - they will, quite
understandably, want to know what gave me the right to substitute
Mike's death for John's, given that objectively the outcomes are
equally bad, and that John is the one who would have died had I
done nothing. I don't think there is anything that I can say,
given that people are not interchangeable the way chairs are - I
can substitute the destruction of one chair for the destruction of
another, at least provided that both chairs belong to me, but it
doesn't seem morally permissible for me to do the same with
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people74 , unless I have one hell of a good reason for it, even if
both outcomes are in some objective sense equally bad. So, my two
alternatives appear to be completely asymmetric - I can only turn
the trolley if I have a very good reason to do S075, but I do not
need a reason to refrain from turning the troll ey76.
Should I then opt for flipping a coin? After all, I did say
that the two outcomes are equally regrettable, so why not be fair
and give John and Mike an equal chance for survival? But there
would be nothing fair about it, since the two alternative courses
of action that are open to me are not, it seems, morally
equivalent, even though the outcomes themselves are. It is
unclear why John should be entitled to any possibility of Mike's
death being substituted for his own. Besides, assuming, as we
always do in these cases, that all other things are equal, the
universe seems to have already conducted a coin toss and placed
John in the path of the trolley - why would flipping a coin make
things any more fair77 ?
74 Perhaps the same applies even to animals.
75 Perhaps I can also turn the trolley just for fun, provided that it
harms no one, and that it is not a violation of anyone's rights, such
as those of the owner of the trolley, to turn it for no good reason at
all - in cases where no harm can be foreseen, I am certainly not
morally required to maintain the status quo for its own sake.
76As I've suggested in footnote 72, the same asymmetry appears to apply
to distribution-of-a-good cases where the "taking possession"
interpretation does not seem at all plausible, if such cases do,
indeed, exist.
77He idi MaIm gives an argument similar to the one I give regarding Qne-
One Trolley about a different, although relevantly similar, group of
cases, e.g. Michael Tooley's "Diabolical Machine" case, in "Killing,
Letting Die, and Simple Conflicts" (1989), reprinted in EPR.
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In conclusion, I think that it is impermissible for me to
either to divert the trolley or to flip a coin in order to
determine whether or not to divert it; and I believe that what
makes the moral difference is that I cannot kill in order to
substitute the deaths of some for the deaths of others, unless I
have a very good reason to do so. One final note: I don't even
see the Health-Pebble case as a bona fide case of conflict between
killing and letting die, since it is morally permissible for me to
take possession of the pebble, and then the choice is clearly a
choice between letting five die and letting one die.
The conclusion that I have just reached still does not entitle
me to claim that diverting the trolley is impermissible in
Trolley. After all, there may be features of the case that render
the killing/letting die distinction morally inert, or, as the
explanation of my opponents is more likely to go, the good of
preserving four extra lives outweighs the stringency of the
injunction not to kill in order to substitute the deaths of one
group for the deaths of another - the increment of good provides a
sufficient reason to change who lives and who dies. I do not find
either of these alternatives appealing. While I do not outright
rule out the possibility that the killing/letting die distinction
may be morally inert in some, but not all, cases78 , I do not see
what could possible make it morally inert in Trolley, but not One-
One Trolley.
Also, as I have argued in the previous chapter, I do not agree
78This possibility will be discussed in more detail in subsection 2 of
section VI, as well as in section VII.
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that numbers playa role in morality. In particular, I do not
believe that the outcome of having saved five lives is in itself
morally preferable to the outcome of having saved just one. Thus
to me Trolley is morally on a par with One-One Trolley. But this
is a very controversial and unpopular position, which I would
rather not rely on as a premise. Fortunately, even philosophers
who believe that numbers matter considerably in morality do not
necessarily think that the numerical asymmetry in itself entitles
me to kill a smaller group in order to save a larger one. As
Judith Thomson says regarding Transplant in her latest published
discussion of the Trolley Problem79 , "the increment of good the
surgeon would produce is insufficiently great" to justify the
violation of the one's rights that would be involved in killing
him to save the five. This applies equally well to Trolley, as
the alleged increment of good is the same.
I agree that the increment of good in itself, even if it
exists, cannot justify killing one in order to save five in any
case where all other things are equal 8o . Aside from the fact that
Trolley and Transplant are symmetric in that respect, but acting
so as to save the five is deemed permissible in only one of the
two cases, I think that the injunction against killing innocents
79Chapter 7 of ROR, e.g. on p.176.
8°Thomson leaves the door open for the possibility that killing some to
save others solely because of the increment of good at stake may be
permissible sometimes if that increment is enormous, e.g. if the
disparity in numbers is great enough. I do not necessarily disagree,
despite my view on numbers in morality - see my discussion of this
issue in section VII of chapter 2.
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in order to substitute their deaths for the deaths of others is
too basi~ and stringent for the above-mentioned increment to be
able to override it81 . Thomson proceeds to suggest a reason why
killing the one is permissible in Trolley, i.e. the hypothetical
prior consent approach that we discussed in section IV. I, on the
other hand, think that there is not and cannot be a reason for me
to be morally permitted to kill the one in Trolley to save the
five.
It seems to me to be an obvious moral fact that I need one
hell of a good reason to cause someone to die by any means, who
would not have died, at least not at the time he did and the way
he did82 , without my interference, which is what I inevitablY do if
I kill someone; and I believe that merely avoiding letting a
larger group perish is, all other things being equal, never a
sufficient reason. Unfortunately, all I can offer in support of
this opinion, which goes against the grain of what the majority
believes, are the admittedly intuition-based arguments above, and
81This isn't to say that it is never morally permissible to kill one in
order to save five, but only that the special circumstances, such as
that the one is in the process of trying to kill the five, which would
need to obtain in order for that to be the case, would also, in a
relevantly similar situation, make it morally permissible to kill one
in order to save just one, which I think is clearly not the case
regarding Trolley's variant One-One Trolley. It is, however, possible
that a similar claim is not true if we are talking about killing one
in order to save millions, or the whole human race other than the one.
82At least not through the same causal process, which is something we
need to add because of cases of overdetermination. Of course, in
overdetermination cases the issue might not just be how many people
die, but whether I can kill someone, who would otherwise be killed
anyway at the same time, in order to save the lives of several others.
That is a hard question, which, fortunately, is irrelevant to this
discussion because it does not arise in pure tradeoff situations.
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the systematic failure of all attempts to corne up with moral
grounds to distinguish Transplant from Trolley sufficiently for
the purpose of pronouncing saving the five in the latter, but not
the former, morally permissible. I will spend the rest of this
paper trying to remove various obstacles to the plausibility of my
claim.
How is it possible, as I maintain, that nearly everyone has
the moral intuition that saving the five is permissible in
Trolley, whereas that is not the case? I can offer two
suggestions. The first is that even though most people who think
about it nowadays discard utilitarianism, as well as other purely
consequentialist doctrines, the subconscious pull of
utilitarianism is still quite strong. When faced with a choice
between five lives and merely one, I suggest that the utilitarian
pull tends to overwhelm and seduce us, unless the action in
question prima facie seems so abhorrent that sound moral judgment
prevails anyway. The latter is, I believe, the case with
Transplant, and even, to a slightly lesser extent, Fat Man, but,
unfortunately, not Trolley. The prima facie differences between
those cases and Trolley, as well as whether saving the five in
Trolley is really morally better than saving the five in
Transplant, or whether it only seems that way, I will discuss in a
moment. For now, I just want to suggest that it is this
consequentialist seduction that causes us to think that there is a
Trolley Problem in the first place, but those of us who do not
believe that numbers matter in morality, are, of course, to a
large extent (larger than the rest of us) immune to the
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utilitarian virus, and hence, perhaps, in a better position to see
the Trolley Problem for what it really is - a very intriguing,
provocative, and eye-opening non-problem.
So, what are the differences between Transplant and Trolley,
in virtue of which saving the five in Transplant seems much worse
than saving the five in Trolley? Most of us think that there are
special moral injunctions against the harming of patients,
especially healthy ones, by doctors, as opposed to mere
bystanders. Also, as was mentioned in section IV, organ failure
is often, if not almost always, the result of certain lifestyle
choices a person makes. In addition, those who are dying of organ
failure usually have advance warning and hence time to get their
affairs in order. These do appear to make saving the five in
Transplant look worse than saving the five in Trolley. But all
this shows is that the original formulation of Transplant is
poorly chosen. Everyone seems to acknowledge this, but, in
keeping with tradition, Transplant is still always used as the
example to elicit our negative intuitive response. I suggest
using a bystander version of Six People Car, which is introduced
and discussed towards the end of section IV, instead.
Is there anything else? Well, even though death by runaway
trolley is probably quite gruesome, it might be much easier to
imagine the gruesomeness of being cut up and having one's organs
removed, and that may make Transplant seem worse, whether or not
it actually is. In addition, in Transplant, your organs,
something you have a right to and others don't, are physically
removed without your permission in order to save the five. I
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think all this means is that we should modify our bystander
version of Six People Car to have the agent use my instantaneous
organ-cloning machine, patent pending. Let's call this case Six
People Car Cloning.
Does that remove all of the remaining differences? There lS
one more factor, briefly discussed at the very end of section II,
which we have not eliminated as possibly having moral
significance, although we ruled it out as a possible solution to
the Trolley Problem by itself, and which perhaps differentiates
Trolley and Six People Car Cloning. Even though in the latter
case the one's organs are not physically removed, there may be a
sense in which we are doing something to the one via doing
something to his organs in six People Car Cloning, but we are only
doing something to the threat, i.e. the trolley, in Trolley83.
There are, however, cases, such as Handrail and various Mafia
examples, i.e. situations in which the Mafia will kill five people
if I do not kill someone at their request, in which this
distinction is either even less clearly applicable, as in the
former, or fails to explain the correct verdicts, as in the
latter. And even if this difference does make saving the five In
Transplant worse than saving the five in Trolley, it is clearly,
as we/ve discussed before, insufficient to account for the one's
being morally impermissible while the other is not.
83 This is controversial, however, as it is the cloning that causally or
noncausally, depending on the interpretation, makes the one's organs
fail. So there might be no way to classify this as actually doing
something to the one, without classifying diverting the trolley as
doing something to the one as well.
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All of these factors, all but one of which (if not everyone)
can, and probably should be, contrary to accepted practice,
equalized for prior to even stating the Trolley Problem, surely
make saving the five in Transplant look worse than saving the five
in Trolley. Is that really the case? It seems to me that it
might be, although I could be falling prey to a psychological
fallacy which I will dub "the Jury Error" - an error that consists
in resolving uncertainty regarding the defendant's guilt by
finding him or her guilty of a lesser charge, even if there is no
way, based on the facts of the case, that the defendant can be
guilty of the lesser charge without also being guilty of the
original, more serious, charge. After all, as a person raised in
our society and familiar with much of the literature on the
Trolley Problem, I certainly have very few doubts about the
impermissibility of saving the five in Transplant, but I can't
help having at least some initial doubt regarding the
impermissibility of saving the five in Trolley. And it could
conceivably be that initial doubt, rather than the facts of the
two cases, that makes me think that saving the five in Transplant
is morally worse than saving the five in Trolley. Still, I tend
to believe that the former action is at least slightly less
palatable than the latter, even though I believe that both are, in
fact, morally impermissible.
I have staked out a major role in my response to the Trolley
Problem for the killing/letting die distinction. I do not believe
that it is necessary, even if it were possible within the scope of
this paper, to produce a precise definition of the distinction,
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as, fortunately, it is clear enough in all the Trolley-Problem-
related cases that have come up, what is a killing and what is a
letting die. However, as I will, in the next two sections, need
to defend the distinction's moral significance from some rather
influential arguments, in order to show that it can fill the shoes
I need it to fill, certain issues that concern defining the
killing/letting die distinction will have to be addressed and
clarified.
Section VI.
A Few General Remarks on the Killing/Letting Die Distinction.
In this section I will address a pair of attempts that have
been made to discredit the killing/letting die distinction as a
morally significant one.
Subsection 1: Jonathan Bennett and the Quantitative Approach.
First, I want to discuss Bennett's attack on the moral relevance
of the distinction in his book The Act Itself. Bennett sets out
to analyze the role of the making/allowing distinction in
morality, but doesn't want to rely on our intuitions about pairs
of cases in order to do it. He has doubts about the reliability
of our moral intuitions and, furthermore,
~however well such a pair [of cases] succeeds in eliciting
certain intuitions, with however little help from extraneous
factors such as cost, knowledge, etc., we still don't know what
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is going on. To know what place making/allowing should have in
morality, we need a good analytic understanding of what
distinction it is - an account of it in terms that are clear,
objective, and deeply grounded in the natures of things. Clear
so that we can think effectively, objective so that we can think
communally, and deeply grounded so that the issue about moral
significance will not be trivialized."84
Once we have a "good analytic understanding" of a distinction,
it seems to follow that we should be able to analytically examine
it and determine whether or not it can matter in morality. That
is, in fact, what Bennett does with the making/allowing
distinction, declaring it obviously morally inert as soon as he
has analyzed it. Clearly, if the making/allowing distinction is
morally inert, then so is the killing/letting die distinction,
which is nothing more than a particular instance of it. I believe
that Bennett is wrong, and I think it will be very illuminating to
consider what appears to be the main reason why he's wrong. This
will not require looking at either Bennett's analysis or the major
criticisms of it in much detail, however, we will need to consider
a brief and somewhat oversimplified sketch of Bennett's account.
Before presenting Bennett's analysis of the making/allowing
distinction, we need to get a few preliminaries out of the way, so
that we can properly understand what the analysis means. First,
for Bennett the making/allowing distinction is a distinction that
applies to facts, rather than acts, e.g. for him it is the fact
that I turn the trolley that is a making, not the act of my
turning it. Bennett gives an extensive argument for why it is
better to draw the distinction that way, but I see no reason to
84Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself, Clarendon Press, Oxford l 1995;
pp.78-79.
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discuss it here. Second, the only kind of fact that can be a
making or an allowing is a fact about somebody's movements,
including, of course, the "null movement" of remaining at rest.
Third, Bennett employs a very broad notion of causation. Any fact
that is in any way relevant to whether or not another fact
obtains, is, on his account, causally related to it. For
instance, if a pot of water in my kitchen boils over, for each
person who could have gotten to it in time to prevent the contents
of the pot from spilling out, had they known about it and tried
hard, the fact that they didn't turn off the stove, or remove the
pot from it in time is causally relevant to the fact that my
kitchen is now a mess; in fact, on Bennett's view, the former is a
cause of the latter. There is a lot that can be said back and
forth regarding all three of these preliminaries, as all of them
are quite controversial, but I think we should just play along
with Bennett here, because I believe that it is more than likely
that the main idea behind his view can be expressed even without
the framework he adopts in The Act Itself.
The following is an approximate statement of
Bennett's Making/Allowing Distinction (BMAD): Suppose that I
do A at t 85 t and that causes86 an outcome O. Furthermore, the
fact that I did A at t is a fact about my movements. Consider
all the ways in which I could have moved at t, and call the set
of all my possible movements at t my behavior space at t. If
the subset of my behavior space at t that contains my movements,
the facts about which would have caused 0 to occur, is larger
85By "doing" A, of course, I don't mean to beg the question of whether
the fact that I did A represents a positive act or an omission -
"doing" A is supposed to cover both possibilities.
86 In Bennett's sense of "causes".
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than the subset of my behavior space at t that contains my
movements, the facts about which would have caused 0 not to
occur, then the fact that I did A at t is an allowing of O. If
the reverse is true, then the fact that I did A at t is a making
of o.
Upon stating roughly this, Bennett immediately concludes that the
making/allowing distinction has no moral significance. It does,
indeed, seem unlikely, even though not necessarily outright
impossible, that the moral status of an act, going back to the way
we have been talking throughout this paper, can depend on how many
other acts would have resulted in the same outcome, as compared
with the number of acts that would have had the opposite effect.
Should we accept Bennett's analysis? Hardly! I think we
should in general be worried by any analysis that starts out with
"surely by A we can only mean B", where A is a term which is
perpetually at the center of philosophical disputes, and B is
something no one would ever possibly mean by A. I am inclined to
agree that BMAD clearly lacks moral significance, but I think it
is obvious that BMAD is not what we mean when we talk about the
making/allowing distinction. I sympathize with Bennett's goal
that, whenever possible, we should not argue about the
significance of a distinction before arriving at an analysis of
what the distinction is. But even the alternative that Bennett
tries to avoid seems preferable to the alternative of substituting
for a relatively clear87 , albeit only intuitive, distinction, an
analysis which obviously fails to capture what we mean by the
distinction.
87At least in a large number of basic cases.
230
I do not want to go into too much detail regarding the
problems with BMAD as an analysis of the making/allowing
distinction. A good and detailed discussion can be found in Jeff
McMahan's UA Challenge to Common Sense Morality".88 The objection
that I want to concentrate on is the complaint that BMAD ignores
all background considerations, even the ones that are very
relevant to the common-sense making/allowing distinction. As a
result, Bennett misclassifies many cases as makings instead of
allowings, and vice versa. For our current purposes I want to
concentrate on cases like
Baby: I am a single parent and have a 3-month old daughter.
I have every opportunity to feed her, but neglect to do so for
days. She dies.
Since the number of my movements that would have resulted in my
daughter's death is greater than the number of my movements that
would not have, i.e. the feeding movements, BMAD would classify
what I do in Baby as a case of allowing, on a par with
Starving Children: There are starving children in Africa. I
could send money to feed them, but I do not. The children die.
Mind you, the issue is not whether Baby and Starving Children are
morally on a par, as there are many differences between the two
cases that are irrelevant to analyzing the making/allowing
distinction. The question is whether or not the two cases are
equivalent with regard to the distinction itself. I think that
88 In Ethics 108 (January 1998) :394-418. I agree with much of what
McMahan says about Bennett and BMAD, although not with McMahan's own
analysis of the making/allowing distinction.
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they are clearly not equivalent. It seems very reasonable, in
light of what we normally seem to mean by ~killing" and ~letting
die", to think that I merely let the children die in Starving
Children, while I kill my baby daughter in Baby. The former is a
case of allowing, and the latter is a case of making.
The problem seems to be that no brute counting up of
possibilities, or the counting up of anything else for that
matter, can capture the meaning of the making/allowing
distinction. The reason for this may be that it is altogether
wrong to expect the making/allowing distinction to be a merely
physical distinction, which nevertheless makes a moral difference.
In ~Physician-AssistedSuicide: Two Moral Arguments"89, Judith
Thomson introduces and argues for a different approach to
analyzing the distinction - an approach which already includes
ethical terms in the analysis. She suggests that whether or not
something I do is a letting die depends on whether or not I have a
liberty-right to do that thing. This is the criterion that
Thomson suggests:
Thomson's Killing/Letting Die Distinction (TKLD): My doing A
is a letting die only if (i) the ~victim" dies of a pre-existing
threat to him or her, e.g. of a pre-existing medical condition;
(ii)the victim loses only what he or she would have had with my
aid; and (iii)I have a liberty-right to do A. 9o
89Cited in footnote 11.
90This definition is, of course, incomplete as a definition of the
distinction between killing and letting die, since it leaves open what
a killing is (thanks to Sarah McGrath for directing my attention to
this). We certainly wouldn't want to define a killing simply as a
causing to die that's not a letting die, as on most, if not all,
accounts of causation, there are many causings to die that are neither
killings nor cases of letting die. But, as I' ve said earlier, for the
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(i) and (ii) are quite uncontroversial. Obviously, if the victim
was under no threat until and unless I did A, my doing A cannot be
a letting die. Equally, even if the victim was under threat, but
ended up dying of a clearly different threat, e.g. if I shoot a
drowning cancer patient who has just swallowed a bottle of
sleeping pills, my action cannot be a letting die. (ii) points
out that my doing A can only be a letting die if A deprives the
victim only of no more than he or she would have had with my
assistance, e.g. if I fail to throw a life-jacket to John who is
drowning, that can be a letting die, but if John is struggling to
get to a lifejacket that someone else threw in for him, and I go
by in a motorboat and remove it, leaving John to drown, that
cannot be a letting die. On the other hand, (ii) also reflects
the fact that if there is nothing I can do to help the victim,
whatever I do cannot be a case of letting die, although it might
not be a case of killing either.
But the key to TKLD is (iii), which introduces an ethical term
into the analysis. It is important to point out that my having a
liberty-right to do A is quite compatible with it being morally
wrong for me to do A, e.g. in most cases I would have a liberty-
right not to throw a life-jacket to John who is drowning, but, at
the very least, if there is one nearby and it costs me nothing to
throw it to John, it is morally wrong for me to just stand there
and watch John drown. Is introducing (iii) into the analysis
purposes of this discussion we do not need a precise definition of the
killing/letting die distinction, but only a rough, though workable,
idea of how to draw it - which TKLD certainly seems to provide.
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appropriate? Thomson is concerned with the apparent differences
between
Doctor: I am a doctor and there is a terminally-ill patient
in a vegetative state, who has previously expressed a desire to
have his life-support equipment turned off should such a
situation arise. After all the appropriate procedures were
followed, I was authorized by the hospital and the patient's
family to pull the plug. I do so. The patient dies.
and the following two cases -
Intruder: I am an intruder in the hospital.
terminally-ill patient in a vegetative state.
The patient dies;
and
I see a
I pull the plug.
Mistaken Doctor: This is just like Doctor except I mistakenly
think that I have been authorized to disconnect the life-support
equipment. I pull the plug. The patient dies.
It is important to note that all three cases meet condition (i),
as the patient dies of a pre-existing terminal medical condition.
My actions in Intruder, unlike Doctor and Mistaken Doctor, fail
condition (ii), as the patient loses something he would have had
independently of my aid. And only Doctor, but not Mistaken Doctor
or Intruder, meet condition (iii). This, Thomson thinks, is as it
should be - intuitively, Doctor is a case of letting die, but
Intruder and Mistaken Doctor are cases of killing, the latter with
the best intentions, the former perhaps with the worst. These
three cases seem to provide yet another example of how Bennett's
ignoring of relevant background considerations leaves him with an
incorrect classification of cases.
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I am not sure whether I agree with Thomson. Perhaps my
actions in Doctor, as well as Intruder and Mistaken Doctor, should
be classified as a killing, although, unlike in the other two
cases, a morally permissible one. I am also not certain whether
conditions (i) and (ii) are entirely satisfactory, or whether more
conditions need to be added91 • After all, Thomson's precise
formulation of her criterion is intended to deal with only a
narrow group of cases - those involving "assisted suicide"; and,
perhaps, after we look at many other cases we will realize that
(i) and (ii) need to be clarified or amended, or that more
conditions need to be added. But I think that in any case, having
(iii) as a part of the analysis of the killing/letting die
distinction is crucial, as it allows for the proper handling of
the differences between cases like Baby, and cases like Starving
Children, which BMAD mishandles quite egregiously. I think it is
very plausible that the reason why what happens in Baby, but not
what happens in Starving Children, is a case of killing, is that
all other things being equal, I have the liberty-right not to aid
starving children in Africa, regardless of whether or not it is
morally wrong for me to do so; but if I have a child, I have a
duty to take care of her until she can take care of herself, which
means that I do not have the liberty-right to stop feeding her
91 1 £, in fact, it is true that my actions in Doctor should be
classified as a morally permissible killing, that would, indeed,
indicate that (i) and (ii) in their current form are insufficient to
screen out at least some killings. Of course, even in this
hypothetical scenario, it seems that the fact that my actions in
Doctor satisfy (iii) would playa major role in making them, but not
my actions in Intruder or Mistaken Doctor, morally permissible.
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when she is 3 months old and let her starve to death.
I can also invoke condition (iii) to explain my intuition that
my not rendering basic medical aid to someone who would die
without it, is a letting die if I am a mere bystander, but a
killing if I am a doctor, or, at the very least, if I am a doctor
on duty. This is not uncontroversial, however, as it may be
argued that even a doctor has the liberty-right to not render
basic life-saving medical aid, even though it is surely morally
wrong for him or her to do so. I disagree, but I find it
reassuring, as far as my belief that something like condition
(iii) is necessary for any analysis of the killing/letting die
distinction is concerned, that it seems intuitively very plausible
to me that such a debate would have relevance to whether or not it
1S a case of killing if a doctor refuses to provide life-saving
medical aid to a patient. In fact, should someone offer me a
convincing argument for the doctor's having the liberty-right in
question, I would likely find myself convinced that the omission
in question is a case of letting die rather than killing.
It is important to note that the kind of analysis that offers
an ethics-based interpretation of the killing/letting die
distinction is not, by itself, sufficient to resolve dilemmas such
as the Trolley Problem, even though it makes it clear why the
distinction is at least sometimes morally relevant. For one
thing, in cases more complicated than Trolley and Transplant, we
may find ourselves in a debate regarding whether or not the agent
has a liberty-right to perform the action or omission in question
- with a condition like (iii) onboard, ethical debates can start
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one level earlier. Also, an analysis like TKLD does not settle
the question of exactly how and in which cases the killing/letting
die distinction is morally relevant, it only points out a more
proper way of drawing the distinction in the first place. But I
think that especially after considering Bennett's account of the
making/allowing distinction, if we believe that the
killing/letting die distinction may have some moral significance,
the appeal of an analysis like as TKLD, which incorporates an
ethics-based condition such as (iii), should be obvious. Nothing
else, it seems, can give us even a remote chance of drawing the
line where intuitively it should be drawn.
Subsection 2: The Contrast Strategy.
The second major type of argument against the moral significance
of the killing/letting die distinction that I want to discuss in
this section involves pairs of cases which are purportedly
equalized for everything but the killing/letting die factor. Some
philosophers have argued, based on such pairs of cases, in which
it seems prima facie that the actions in question in the two cases
are morally equivalent, that the killing/letting die distinction
lacks moral significance, for if a distinction plays a moral role,
a properly equalized pair of cases differing only with regard to
that distinction would have to exhibit some moral difference
between the actions in the two cases. I will discuss a few such
pairs of examples, as well as whether or not the actions in the
members of these pairs are, in fact, morally equivalent, as some
authors have claimed, in section VII. What I want to address now
237
is a serious general flaw in such arguments against the moral
significance of various distinctions.
In ~The Additive Fallacy" (1989)92, Shelly Kagan attacks the
strategy behind what he calls contrast arguments - arguments for
general conclusions regarding the moral significance of a
distinction, based on one or several pairs of cases purportedly
equalized for all potentially morally relevant factors other than
the distinction in question93 • Many problems can arise when we use
contrast arguments - we can become mired in debates regarding
whether or not the pair of cases is properly equalized, whether or
not it is even in principle possible to equalize for everything
but the factor in question, whether or not the author's moral
intuitions are on target, and even, last but not least, whether or
not our moral intuitions can ever be trusted without an
independently supported moral theory to back them up. But these
problems will threaten to come up any time we try to use
intuitions about cases to further our ethical knowledge, and it
seems that to a certain extent, if we want to get anywhere in
ethics, we will need to trust at least a few basic moral
intuitions that people tend to agree on, unless reasons for
suspicion are presented. The problem that I want to concentrate
92 Ethics 1998, reprinted in EPR.
93 Such a strategy is utilized, at least to a certain extent, by, for
instance, Michael Tooley in ~An Irrelevant Consideration: Killing
Versus Letting Die" (1980), James Rachels in ~Active and Passive
Euthanasia" (1975), Richard Trammell in ~Saving Life and Taking Life"
(1975), Bruce Russell in ~On the Relative Strictness of Negative and
Positive Duties" (1977), all reprinted in EPR, as well as undoubtedly
by many other authors writing on the subject.
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on, and which Kagan discusses in detail, is the problem of getting
from our intuitions about a pair of examples, which lead us to
believe that a particular distinction does or does not make a
moral difference there, to a general conclusion about whether or
not the distinction matters in all other cases.
Anyone trying to argue, for instance, that the killing/letting
die distinction is in general morally inert, based on just one
pair, or even several pairs, of contrast cases, seems to
presuppose something like the principle that Kagan dubs the
Ubiquity Thesis: If a variation in a given factor makes a
[moral] difference anywhere, it makes a difference everywhere94 •
Indeed, without such a principle, the arguments in question cannot
get off the ground. But why should we believe that the Ubiquity
Thesis is true? Kagan suggests that the belief arises from
thinking, quite plausibly, that the fundamental principles of
morality have to be universal. Many are tempted to make the leap
from this rather uncontroversial claim to the conclusion that a
variation in a particular factor cannot ever make a moral
difference unless it makes one everywhere, i.e. the Ubiquity
Thesis. Kagan gives us a good reason to think that this line of
reasoning at the very least may be false, by offering the
following analogy:
"The presence or absence of oxygen has a role in determining
chemical reactions. This role is presumably universal - that
is, the fundamental laws of chemistry do not vary from case to
case. Yet, obviously enough, the particular effects of oxygen's
94EPR , p. 258.
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presence or absence do vary: in some cases, for example, the
presence of oxygen makes a difference to whether or not a
compound burns; but it would be a mistake to think that it must
make this difference in every case. This is because making a
difference to whether compounds burn is not, strictly speaking,
part of the role of oxygen in the laws of chemistry. Rather, it
is a consequence of that role in particular cases. The mere
fact that the role of oxygen in the laws of chemistry is
universal does not imply that some particular kind of effect
must be universal ... ,,95
Thus someone who argues that the killing/letting die distinction
never matters in morality because it has purportedly failed to
make a moral difference in a particular pair of equalized cases,
may be on a par with someone who maintains that the presence of
oxygen never plays a role in whether or not compounds burn because
in a particular controlled experiment the presence of oxygen has
failed to make such a difference.
Kagan suggests that the most natural view for someone who
believes in the truth of the Ubiquity Thesis to hold, is the view
that incorporates the
Additive Assumption: ~The moral status of an act is a
function of the various (genuinely relevant) factors that come
into play in the given situation ... The overall status of an
act is the sum of the contributions made by individual factors
[Furthermore] the size of a given factor's contribution is
determined solely by the value of that factor: variations in the
given factor will affect the nature of its contribution; but
variations in the other factors will not affect the contribution
made by the factor in question. "96
This is a very simple and elegant hypothesis about how morality
works. Kagan also suggests that what adds plausibility to the
Additive Assumption is that people often think about whether or
95EPR , p. 259.
96 EPR , pp. 259, 261.
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not an action ought to be performed by, so to speak, adding up all
the moral reasons for and against the action, and balancing them
against each other to see whether the positives outweigh the
negatives or vice versa.
It is important to note that it is not logically necessary for
the Additive Assumption to be true in order for the Ubiquity
Thesis to hold. However, I think we have to agree with Kagan that
it is completely unclear what someone using the contrast strategy
to argue for a general conclusion regarding the moral significance
of a distinction, and thus committed to the Ubiquity Thesis, could
possibly have in mind as a justification for his strategy, unless
he believes that something very much like the Additive Assumption
is true. But, Kagan adds, we have been given no reason to believe
that the Additive Assumption is true. In fact, he argues, anyone
who holds many of our common-sense intuitions about some
particular cases will have to agree that the Additive Assumption
is false.
Kagan suggests, for instance, that if we accept the assumption
that the moral status of an act is determined by some sort of a
function of the values of the morally relevant factors involved,
the additive model fails to properly capture the roles that seem
to be played by the factor of whether or not the agent is acting
in self-defense, and the factor of guilt or innocence of a person
whose suffering is at stake. Kagan proposes that a multiplicative
model might better explain how these two factors affect the moral
status of acts. For instance, the self-defense factor can be
supposed to take values of 0 in cases of self-defense, and 1 in
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all other cases, with the coefficient then multiplied by the value
of the killing/letting die factor. This, unlike the additive
model, would seem to explain Kagan's intuition that the action of
pushing someone who is trying to kill you off a cliff to his
death l is morally on a par with not warning such a person that he
is about to falloff a cliff, and letting him fall to his death,
despite the differing contributing values of the killing/letting
die factor.
I will return to the question of whether Kagan is right about
self-defense and other "guilty victims" situations in section VII.
But l regardless of whether or not he is right about those cases l
Kagan appears to have given us some reasons to believe that the
Additive Assumption is false, and hence that! most likely, the
Ubiquity Thesis is false as well. He has also pointed out that we
have been given absolutely no reason, either depending on! or
independent ofl the Additive Assumption, to believe that the
Ubiquity Thesis is true - aside from the fact that perhaps ethics
would be a lot more simple and manageable if morality worked the
way the Ubiquity Thesis claims it does, there isn/t much I at least
up to this point l to be said in favor of the hypothesis.
Thus there appear to be absolutely no grounds for taking
contrast arguments in favor of general conclusions, such as that
the killing/letting die distinction never matters in morality,
seriously 97. This means that we should pay a lot more attention to
970 f course! neither can we take seriously arguments for the conclusion
that the killing/letting die distinction always makes a difference, if
they are based only on our intuitions about one or several pairs of
cases.
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how various factors that we believe might be morally relevant
interact with each other, and why they interact the way they do;
instead of just evaluating our intuitions regarding roles of
various factors considered in isolation. This should not,
however, be taken to mean that according to Kagan, all kinds of
contrast arguments should be banned from ethics altogether9B •
Contrast arguments can be very helpful, in fact, in some
cases, perhaps even indispensable, as long as we don't expect to
reach unwarranted general conclusions by using them. We can
certainly expect to establish, via a properly constructed contrast
argument, that a certain distinction is morally relevant in at
least some cases, or that it is not morally relevant in at least
some cases. Also, even though we have no reason to expect that a
given morally relevant factor will always make the same, or even
any, contribution to the moral status of an act, if the
contribution is different in two cases, or the factor makes a
difference in one situation but not in another, there has to be a
reason, i.e. the presence or absence of some other feature or
features that interact with the given factor in some particular
way. So, if no such difference between two cases appears to be
present, it seems quite justified, until and unless reasons to
believe that there is such a difference are pointed out, to
presume that the distinction in question will make the same
contribution to the moral status of acts in the cases being
considered. This, for instance, is the reason why I feel
98Heidi MaIm seems to have misinterpreted Kagan that way in her "In
Defense of the Contrast Strategy" (Unpublished), printed in EPR.
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justified in claiming that since the killing/letting die
distinction appears to be morally relevant in One-One Trolley, it
is also morally relevant in a similar way in Trolley - the
presence of five people on the main piece of track instead of just
one doesn't seem to be the kind of factor that should be expected
to ~neutralize" the contribution of the killing/letting die factor
to the moral status of diverting the trolley.
In any case, since we do have reasons to believe that the
killing/letting die distinction makes a difference in determining
the moral status of acts in at least some cases, it seems clear
that contrast arguments cannot really threaten the plausibility of
the claim that the killing/letting die distinction is a morally
relevant one. Exactly when the distinction makes a moral
difference is the topic of the next and final section.
Section VII.
When does the Killing/Letting Die Distinction Make
a Moral Difference?
Why think that the killing/letting die distinction sometimes
makes a moral difference? First, as discussed in section V, it
seems that we need a very good reason in order to change who lives
and who dies by substituting one group of people for another, even
if the group we kill to save the other is smaller. Second, the
idea behind Thomson's analysis of the distinction is very
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plausible, and appears to capture our intuitions about what is a
killing and what is a letting die quite well. If an analysis like
Thomson's, incorporating a condition concerned with liberty-rights
of the agent with regard to the potential victims, is correct, it
is clear why the distinction would make a moral difference at
least in some situations. And, finally, there are pairs of cases
where it seems obvious that the killing/letting die distinction is
making a moral difference, such as
Lifejacket: John is drowning, but I can save him by throwing
him his lifejacket which he had forgotten on the beach. I don't
throw John his lifejacket. John drowns;
and
Taken Lifejacket: John is drowning, but somebody threw him
his lifejacket, and he is about to get to it. I swim by in a
boat and take John's lifejacket before he can reach it. John
drowns.
Clearly, my actions in Taken Lifejacket are considerably worse,
from a moral standpoint, than my actions in Lifejacket, although I
think it is relatively uncontroversial that both actions are
morally impermissible. 99 But, as I mentioned in subsection 2 of
section VI, pairs of cases have also been offered in the
literature as examples of situations in which the killing/letting
die distinction fails to make a moral difference. I think we
should now take a look at a few such pairs, and see whether they
99Al so , for a recent very interesting and thought-provoking argument in
favor of the moral significance of the making/allowing distinction,
see David McCarthy'S "Harming and Allowing Harm" in Ethics 110,
July 2000, pp. 749-779.
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have been properly analyzed.
Consider the following two situations -
Child Crushing: ~Smith walks into a room and discovers that a
machine that has been set up to crush the child inside has
malfunctioned. Smith knows that he could restart the machine by
pushing a nearby button, and he does so solely because he is
curious to see how flat a person can be;"
and
Child Crushing 2: "Jones walks into a room and discovers that
a machine that has been set up to crush the child inside is
about to do so. Jones knows he could stop the machine by
pushing a nearby button, but he does not do so solely because he
is curious to see how flat a person can be."lOO
Here is an excerpt of what MaIm has to say about these cases:
"Were killing a person in itself worse than letting a person die,
then we should see a difference in the moral status of Smith's and
Jones' behaviors. But we do not. The acts are clearly both
wrong, and Jones, it seems to me, deserves as much moral
disapprobation as Smith. 101 " I agree with MaIm - the acts are both
morally wrong, and perhaps Jones does deserve exactly as much
moral disapprobation as Smith. Why, however, this is supposed to
show that Smith's actions in Child Crushing are morally on a par
with Jones' actions in Child Crushing 2, I fail to see.
The fact that two actions are morally impermissible certainly
doesn't imply that they are morally equivalent. Neither are two
actions necessarily morally on a par if the agents of those
actions are equally to blame or to praise. As discussed in
lOOHeidi MaIm, "Killing, Letting Die and Simple Conflicts ", EPR, P .135.
lOlMalm, EPR, p .135.
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section II, there are factors which are relevant to whether or not
the agent is to blame, and, if so, to what extent, which are,
nevertheless, irrelevant to the moral status of the act itself -
for instance, the agent's intentions. If the intentions are
horrific enough, as surely they are in both Child Crushing and
Child Crushing 2, it certainly seems possible for two actions to
be on a par as far as the blameworthiness of the agents who
performed them is concerned, but not equivalent with regard to the
goodness, badness, or moral permissibility of the actions
themselves.
Disentangling questions regarding the moral status of agents
from questions regarding the moral status of acts should help us
see the situation more clearly. However, it might still not
become entirely obvious what's really going on, since the badness
of the intentions in the two cases may have what has been referred
to in the literature as a "sledgehammer effect" - equally, or even
just nearly equally, horrific intentions, can, in some cases,
overwhelm our intuitions and prevent us from seeing the difference
between the moral statuses of the acts; especially if not only the
intentions, but the acts themselves, are very bad, and so the
difference between their moral statuses may appear to be so small
as to be negligible in comparison with the badness of both.
Keeping the possible presence of the sledgehammer effect in mind,
as well as the necessity of evaluating actions and agents
separately, it seems to me to be a very plausible view to hold
that even if Smith and Jones are equally blameworthy, their
actions are still not morally on a par - Jones' actions are
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somewhat worse.
The same explanation, I think, applies to the following pair
of cases -
Push: "Gertrude pushes Bertrand into a deep pit, hoping that
the fall will kill him so that she will inherit the family
fortune" ;
and
Warning: "Seeing that Bertrand is about to fall into a deep
pit, Gertrude deliberately refrains from warning him, hoping
that the fall will kill him so that she will inherit the family
fortune,,102.
If anything, the explanation seems more plausible here, as well as
in this non-comparison example -
Poison: "Two sons are looking forward to the death of their
nasty but very wealthy father. Tired of waiting, they decide,
independently of one another, to kill their father. The one
puts some poison in his father's whiskey, and is discovered
doing so by his brother, who was just about to do the same
thing. The latter then allows his father to imbibe the deadly
drink, and refrains from administering an antidote which he
happens to have. 103"
Surely, says Tooley, who appears to be attempting the exact kind
of fallacious contrast argument against the significance of the
killing/letting die distinction that was discussed in subsection 2
of section VI, the actions of the two brothers are morally on a
102Shelly Kagan, "The Additive Fallacy", EPR, p.254;
Similar examples are discussed in a similar context by Nancy (Ann)
Davis, Judith Jarvis Thomson, as well as undoubtedly many others.
103Michael Tooley, "An Irrelevant Consideration: Killing Versus Letting
Die", EPR, p.108.
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par. But it seems more plausible to me, both in comparing Push
with Warning, and in considering Poison, that the agents in
question are equally blameworthy, and can to an equal degree be
judged to be evil from their actions and intentions, but the
actions themselves are still not morally equivalent.
Are there any other pairs of cases, equalized for everything
but the killing/letting die distinction, in which the distinction
appears, at least at first glance, to be morally inert? What
about the two examples which Kagan uses to illustrate the
inadequacy of the Additive Assumption -
Active Self-Defense: "In order to defend myself against the
aggressor, I push him into a pit, expecting the fall to kill
him" ;
and
Passive Self-Defense: "In order to defend myself against the
aggressor, I refrain from warning him about the pit into which
he is about to fall, and I expect the fall to kill him"lo4?
Assuming that both situations involve legitimate instances of
self-defense, i.e. that the aggressor was about to cause grievous
harm to me, sufficiently serious to justify doing something that
would result In his death, certainly my actions are morally
permissible in both cases. I am also equally blameless in Active
Self-Defense and Passive Self-Defense. Does this necessarily
mean, as Kagan believes, that the two actions are morally on a
par? I don't think so. Even though I can't appeal to the
l04Shelly Kagan, "The Additive Fallacy", EPR, p. 262.
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sledgehammer effect to hedge my bets herelOS , I find it plausible
that there is once again at least a slight difference in the moral
statuses of the acts themselves, even though there is perhaps no
difference at all in the way those acts reflect on mel06 •
Another very famous pair of cases is the comparison between
passive and active euthanasia. I am inclined to believe, provided
that proper consent and authorization are present, that it is
morally permissible for a doctor to perform either one - at the
very least, I am at a loss to come up with a scenario in which one
kind of euthanasia is morally permissible, but the other is not.
Once again, this does not have to mean that the killing/letting
die distinction is morally inert here. For one thing, to make an
obvious point, as should already be evident from the self-defense
cases, it is not necessary, even for someone who believes that the
killing/letting die distinction always makes a moral difference,
to believe that all killings are morally impermissible. And it is
possible that the same kind of analysis as the one I suggested for
the self-defense cases applies here. But also, as I've already
mentioned in subsection 1 of section VI, I am not convinced that
passive euthanasia situations are cases of letting die in the
first place. If they are not, then both passive and active
l05A l t hough the fact that the aggressor is intending to do me grievous
harm may have a sledgehammer-effect-like influence in favor, rather
than against, the two actions in question.
l06It may be possible, however, that should I have both options of
dealing with the aggressor available to me, even though either one
would be morally permissible, choosing the passive option would
reflect slightly better on my moral character.
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euthanasia cases involve killing, which would render the
euthanasia controversy irrelevant to the discussion at hand.
Another potentially interesting pair of examples concerns
military situations -
Shelling: I am a general in command of my nation's armed
forces. The only way to win a brutal war which threatens
hundreds of thousands of additional lives, and possibly the
very existence of my country, is to carpet-bomb a certain area,
as a decoy, then proceeding to attack the enemy from the other
direction. Unfortunately, the carpet-bombing would kill 300 of
my troops, which I don't have the time to pull back. I proceed
anyway.
and
Sitting Ducks: I am a general in command of my nation's armed
forces. The only way to win a brutal war which threatens
hundreds of thousands of additional lives and possibly the
very existence of my country, is to allow the enemy to carpet-
bomb a certain area without warning and calling back 300 of my
troops, in order to confuse the enemy about which direction my
army's attack will be coming from. I do not call back the
troops.
This is a hard pair of cases. For one thing, I am not extremely
comfortable with the moral permissibility of my actions in either
situation. However, I believe that if my actions are permissible
in one of these cases, they are permissible in the other; and,
furthermore, I am quite likely equally blameworthy or blameless in
both scenarios, even though I am inclined to think that there is a
moral difference between the moral statuses of the two acts
themselves - what I did in Shelling being at least slightly worse
than what I did in Sitting Ducks.
Also, even though it is even less likely in Sitting Ducks than
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in passive euthanasia cases, I am not 100 percent convinced that
my actions in Sitting Ducks qualify as a letting die. Certainly,
a general, unlike a doctor, does not and cannot take an oath to do
soldiers under his command no harm, but he is, nevertheless,
responsible for their lives in a very significant way, in which a
mere bystander would not be. Thus I am not entirely convinced
that, as a general, I have any more of a liberty-right to leave my
men to be killed as a decoy when I have a chance to pull them
back, than I do to shell them myself. So, once again, I am not
even absolutely certain that this pair of examples is relevant to
the issue at hand.
I have not, thus far, encountered any two cases that are
definitely equalized for everything but the killing/letting die
distinction, and in which it is clearly true that the actions of
the agents are morally on a par. The analyses in the literature
of purported pairs of such cases are badly confused, as they lump
together the moral statuses of actions and the moral statuses of
the agents that perform them. In all of the pairs that I am aware
of~ there is some alternative analysis available that appears to
me to be at least as plausible as the one that claims that the
killing/letting die distinction is not making a moral difference.
Thus I see no basis, at this point, for believing that the
killing/letting die distinction is ever completely morally inert,
although it is quite likely that even if it is never entirely
extraneous, how big of a role it plays depends on other morally
relevant factors present. Of course, even if I am wrong about
this, and the killing/letting die distinction is sometimes morally
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irrelevant, in light of the fact that we have no reason to accept
the Ubiquity Thesis, that is not a problem for my view regarding
Trolley, as long as the killing/letting die distinction does make
a significant moral difference in cases similar to Trolley as far
as the other morally significant factors present. And, as I have
tried to make clear with my discussion of One-One Trolley, it
appears that we have every reason to believe that the
killing/letting die distinction is very relevant in Trolley-
Problem-related cases. Thus I don't see any grounds emerging from
this discussion for doubting my verdict for the Trolley case, and,
more generally, no grounds for believing that, all other things
being equal, it is ever morally permissible to kill one person in
order to save five.
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